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# 1NC vs Emory GK

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### Racial Capitalism K---1NC

#### Anti-trust is based in free-market logics of competition and consumerism that reify neoliberal exploitation. Monopolies are inevitable in a world of government collusion and empire-building, only the alt solves.

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One of these is the inexorable tendency of competition to lead to monopoly under capitalism. Competition means winners and losers. By definition, not everyone can win when competing. Competition means rivalry for supremacy. Thousands compete in the Olympics, for example, but only a select few (“winners”) go home with a gold medal.[1] It is no accident that the economy, media, and politics are heavily monopolized by a handful of billionaires while billions of people who actually produce the wealth in society and run society remain marginalized and disempowered.

This brutal reality cannot be reversed or overcome with the utterance of a few platitudes, the passage of some policies, or the creation of some agencies that claim to be able to fix the outdated economic system, especially when all of the above come from billionaires themselves.

On July 9, 2021, President Joe Biden issued an Executive Order on Promoting Competition in the American Economy (https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/07/09/executive-order-on-promoting-competition-in-the-american-economy/).

The order is about 7,000 words long and full of anticonscious statements. Disinformation pervades the entire order.

The opening paragraph begins with the following disinformation:

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, and in order to promote the interests of American workers, businesses, and consumers, it is hereby ordered….

Here, “American workers, businesses, and consumers” are casually misequated and no mention is made of citizens or humans. The implication is that consumerism is normal, healthy, and desirable, and that workers and big business somehow have the same aims, world outlook, and interests. This conceals the fact that owners of capital and workers have antagonistic irreconcilable interests and that people exist as humans and citizens, not just utilitarian consumers and shoppers in a taken-for-granted system based on chaos, anarchy, and violence.

Disinformation is further escalated in the next paragraph:

A fair, open, and competitive marketplace has long been a cornerstone of the American economy, while excessive market concentration threatens basic economic liberties, democratic accountability, and the welfare of workers, farmers, small businesses, startups, and consumers.

“Market concentration” has been the norm for generations. Monopolies, cartels, and oligopolies have been around since the late 1800s. Mergers and acquisitions have been taking place non-stop for decades. The so-called “free market” largely disappeared long ago. Objectively, there can be no fairness in a system rooted in wage-slavery and empire-building. Wage-slavery is the precondition for the tendency of the rich to get richer and the poor poorer. It is not a recipe for prosperity and security for all. This is also why inequality, tyranny, violence, and surveillance have been growing over the years. Moreover, what “threatens basic economic liberties, democratic accountability, and the welfare of workers, farmers, small businesses, startups, and consumers” is the ongoing political and economic exclusion of people from control over the economy and their lives by the financial oligarchy. There can be no liberty, accountability, and welfare when most people are deprived of real decision-making power and major owners of capital make all the decisions. Problems would not constantly worsen if people had control over their lives. The “best allocation of resources” cannot be made when the economy is carved up, fractured, and controlled by competing owners of capital.

Although recurring economic crises for well over a century have repeatedly discredited “free market” ideology, the 7,000-word executive order is saturated with the language of “choice,” “competition,” and “consumers.” This is the same worn-out language used by privatizers of all hues at home and abroad.

Further, while the executive order gives many examples of “economic consolidation” in numerous sectors, the government is not interested in creating a self-reliant vibrant diverse economy that meets the needs of all. It is not committed to reversing “the harmful effects of monopoly and monopsony.” Numerous antitrust laws have not stopped either. Big mergers and acquisitions have been going on for years. Rather, the executive order is an attempt to restructure economic and political arrangements among different factions of the wealthy elite; it reflects a new stage or form of inter-capitalist rivalry for even greater domination of the economy by fewer owners of capital. In other words, moving forward, the economy will remain monopolized by a few monopolies. Wealth is only going to become more concentrated in fewer hands in the years ahead. Mountains of data from hundreds of sources document growing wealth and income inequality every year.

The bulk of the executive order is filled with endless directives, strategies, rules, and suggestions for how to curb “unfair practices” and promote “fairness” and “competition.” But these all ring hollow given concrete realities and past experience.

Today, governments at all levels have been taken over by global private monopoly interests and have become instruments of decisions made on a supranational basis. There is a fine-tuned revolving door between officials from government and the private sector; they have become synonymous for all essential purposes. The same people who run major corporations also serve in high-level government positions where they advance the narrow interests of the private sector and then they leave government and return to their high-level corporate positions. There is a reason why the majority of members of Congress are millionaires. The Executive Branch in the United States, especially the President’s Office, is a major tool for the expression of the will of the most powerful monopolies. This is why billions of dollars are spent every few years to select the President of the country.

#### All capitalism is racial capitalism---the system of competition the aff perpetuates cannot sustain itself without theft of indigenous land, super-exploitation of black labor, imperial extraction, and racist devaluation of ‘disposable populations.’

\*2 point font and paragraph merging for readability.

\*\*Footnote 14 is inserted below the paragraph it’s cited in, other footnotes excluded for readability.

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Drawing on the intellectual production of twentieth-century Black anticapitalists, I theorize modern U.S. racial capitalism as a racially hierarchical political economy constituting war and militarism, imperialist accumulation, expropriation by domination, and labor superexploitation.14 The racial here specifically refers to Blackness, defined as African descendants’ relationship to the capitalist mode of production—their structural location—and the condition, status, and material realities emanating therefrom.15 It is out of this structural location that the irresolvable contradiction of value minus worth arises. Stated differently, Blackness is a capacious category of surplus value extraction essential to an array of political-economic functions, including accumulation, disaccumulation, debt, planned obsolescence, and absorption of the burdens of economic crises.16 At the same time, Blackness is the quintessential condition of disposability, expendability, and devalorization.

[Footnote 14]: Another feature of modern U.S. racial capitalism is property by dispossession. In Theft Is Property! Dispossession and Critical Theory, Robert Nichols draws on the experience of Indigenous peoples in the United States, Canada, and New Zealand to theorize how the “system of landed property” was fundamentally predicated on violent dispossession. While the Anglo-derived legal-political regimes differed in these localities, the “intertwined and co-constitutive” material effects converged in the legalized theft of indigenous territory amounting in “approximately 6 percent of the total land on the surface of Earth.” Such dispossession, Nichols notes, is recursive: “In a standard formulation one would assume that ‘property’ is logically, chronologically, and normatively prior to ‘theft.’ However, in this (colonial) context, theft is the mechanism and means by which property is generated: hence its recursivity. Recursive dispossession is effectively a form of property-generating theft.” As such, theft and dispossession, through property regimes, are an ongoing feature of the Indigenous reality of modern U.S. racial capitalism. Robert Nichols, Theft Is Property! Dispossession and Critical Theory (Durham: Duke University Press, 2020), 50–51.

My operationalization of capitalism follows Oliver Cromwell Cox’s explication in Capitalism and American Leadership.17 Modern U.S. racial capitalism arose in the context of the First World War, when, as Cox explains, the United States took advantage of the conflict to capture the markets of South America, Asia, and Africa for its “over-expanded capacity.”18 Cox further expounds upon this auspicious moment of ascendant modern U.S. racial capitalism thus: By 1914, the United States had brought its superb natural resources within reach of intensive exploitation. Under the stimulus of its foreign-trade outlets, the financial assistance of the older capitalist nations, and a flexible system of protective tariffs, the nation developed a magnificent work of transportation and communication so that its mines, factories, and farms became integrated into an effectively producing organism having easy access to its seaports.… [Likewise,] further internal expansion depended upon far greater emphasis on an ever widening foreign commerce.… Major entrepreneurs of the United States proceeded to step up their campaign for expansion abroad. The war accentuated this movement. It accelerated the growth of [modern] American [racial] capitalism and impressed upon its leaders as nothing had before the need for external markets.19 Relatedly, Peter James Hudson argues that the First World War fundamentally changed the terms of order of international finance, allowing New York to compete with London, Paris, and Berlin for the first time in the realm of global banking. This was not least because the Great War “drastically reordered global credit flows,” with the United States transforming from a debtor into a creditor nation.20 In addition to Latin American and Caribbean nations and businesses turning to the United States for financing and credit, domestic saving and investment patterns were altered to the benefit of imperial financial institutions like the City Bank.21 Although the United States is, to use Cox’s terminology, more a “lusty child of an already highly developed capitalism” than an exceptional capitalist power, the nation perfected its techniques of accumulation through its vast natural wealth, large domestic market, imbalance of Northern and Southern economies, and, importantly, through its lack of concern for the political and economic welfare of the overwhelming masses of its population, least of all the descendants of the enslaved.22 Modern U.S. racial capitalism is thus sustained by military expenditure, the maintenance of an extremely low standard of living in “dependent” countries, and the domestic superexploitation of Black toilers and laborers. Cox notes that Black labor has been the “chief human factor” in wealth production; as such, “the dominant economic class has always been at the motivating center of the spreads of racial antagonism. This is to be expected since the economic content of the antagonism, especially at its proliferating source in the South, has been precisely that of labor-capital relations.”23 In a general sense, racial capitalism in the United States constitutes “a peculiar variant of capitalist production” in which Blackness expresses a structural location at the bottom of the labor hierarchy characterized by depressed wages, working conditions, job opportunities, and widespread exclusion from labor unions.24 Furthermore, modern U.S. racial capitalism is rooted in the imbrication of anti-Blackness and antiradicalism. Anti-Blackness describes the reduction of Blackness to a category of abjection and subjection through narrations of absolute biological or cultural difference; ruling-class monopolization of political power; negative and derogatory mass media propaganda; the ascent of discriminatory legislation that maintains and reinscribes inequality, not least various modes of segregation; and social relations in which distrust and antipathy toward those racialized as Black is normalized and in which “interracial mass behavior involving violence assumes a continuously potential danger.”25 Anti-Blackness thus conceals the inherent contradiction of Blackness—value minus worth—obscuring and distorting its structural location by, as Ralph and Singhal remark, contorting it into only a “debilitated condition.”26 Antiradicalism can be understood as the physical and discursive repression and condemnation of anticapitalist and/or left-leaning ideas, politics, practices, and modes of organizing that are construed as subversive, seditious, and otherwise threatening to capitalist society. These include, but are not limited to, internationalism, anti-imperialism, anticolonialism, peace activism, and antisexism. Anti-Blackness and antiradicalism function as the legitimating architecture of modern U.S. racial capitalism, which includes rationalizing discourses, cultural narratives, technologies of repression, legal structures, and social practices that inform and are informed by racial capitalism’s political economy.27 Throughout the twentieth century, anti-Blackness propelled the “Black Scare,” defined as the specter of racial, social, and economic domination of superior whites by inferior Black populations. Antiradicalism, in turn, was enunciated through the “Red Scare,” understood as the threat of communist takeover, infiltration, and disruption of the American way of life.28 For example, in the 1919 Justice Department Report, Radicalism and Sedition Among the Negroes, As Reflected in Their Publications, it was asserted that the radical antigovernment stance of a certain class of Negroes was manifested in their “ill-governed reaction toward race rioting,” “threat of retaliatory measures in connection with lynching,” open demand for social equality, identification with the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), and “outspoken advocacy of the Bolshevik or Soviet doctrine.”29 Here, anti-Blackness, articulated through the fear of the “assertion of race consciousness,” was attached to the IWW and Bolshevism—in other words, to anticapitalism—to make it appear even more subversive and dangerous. Likewise, antiradicalism, expressed through the denigration of the IWW and Soviet Doctrine, was made to seem all the more threatening and antithetical to the social order in its linkage with Black insistence on equality and self-defense against racial terrorism. In this way, “defiance and insolently race-centered condemnation of the white race” and “the Negro seeing red” came to be understood as seditious in the context of modern U.S. racial capitalism. The link between my theory of modern U.S. racial capitalism and Robinson’s catholic theory of racial capitalism, beyond his “suggest[ion] that it was there,” is vivified through the prison abolitionist and scholar Ruth Wilson Gilmore, who writes: “Capitalism…[is] never not racial.… Racial capitalism: a mode of production developed in agriculture, improved by enclosure in the Old World, and captive land and labor in the Americas, perfected in slavery’s time-motion, field factory choreography, its imperative forged on the anvils of imperial war-making monarchs.”30 Racial capitalism, she continues, “requires all kinds of scheming, including hard work by elites and their compradors in the overlapping and interlocking space-economies of the planet’s surface. They build and dismantle and reconfigure states, moving capacity into and out of the public realm. And they think very hard about money on the move.”31 Perhaps more than Gilmore, though, my approach aligns with that of Neville Alexander as described by Hudson.32 Like Alexander, who focused on South Africa, I offer a particularistic understanding of racial capitalism, mine being rooted in the political economy of Blackness and the legitimating architectures of anti-Blackness and antiradicalism in the United States. Gilmore qua Robinson offers a more universalist and transhistorical conception. Like Alexander, my theory of modern U.S. racial capitalism is primarily rooted in (Black) Marxist-Leninists and fellow travelers. This is an important epistemological distinction: whereas Robinson finds Marxism-Leninism to be, at best, inattentive to race, my theory of modern U.S. racial capitalism is rooted in the work of Black freedom fighters who, as Marxist-Leninists, were able to offer potent and enduring analyses and critiques of the conjunctural entanglements of racialism, white supremacy, and anti-Blackness, on the one hand, and capitalist exploitation and class antagonism on the other hand.33 Although Robinson draws on scholars like Fernand Braudel, Henri Pirenne, David Brion Davis, and Eli Heckscher to understand European history, socialist theory, and the European working class, the work of Black Marxists like James Ford, Walter Rodney, Amílcar Cabral, and Paul Robeson offer me those same intellectual, historical, and theoretical resources. Finally, I agree with Alexander that the resolution to racial capitalism is antiracist socialism, not a cultural-metaphysical Black radical tradition. In what remains of this essay, I will draw on the work of Black Marxist-Leninists and anticapitalists to explicate the defining features of modern U.S. racial capitalism—war and militarism, imperialist accumulation, expropriation by domination, labor superexploitation, and property by dispossession. In this, I demonstrate that their critiques and analyses offer a blueprint for theorizing modern U.S. racial capitalism. War and militarism facilitate the endless drive for profit. Military conflicts between imperial powers result in the reapportioning of boundaries, possessions, and spheres of influence that often exacerbate racial and spatial economic subjection. War and militarism also perpetuate the endless construction of “threats,” primarily in racialized and socialist states, against which to defend progress, prosperity, freedom, and security. The manufacturing of conflict legitimates the mobilization of extraordinary violence to expropriate untold resources that produce relations of underdevelopment, dependency, extraversion, and disarticulation in the Global South. Moreover, the ruling elite and labor aristocracy in imperialist countries, not least the United States, wage perpetual war to defend their way of life and standard of living against the racialized majority who, because they would benefit most from the redistribution of the world’s wealth and resources, represent a perpetual threat. Here, Du Bois’s 1915 essay, “The African Roots of War,” is instructive.34 Though he does not directly analyze the United States, he nonetheless demonstrates how racism, white supremacy, and the plunder of Africa underpinned the capitalist imperialist war that engulfed the world from July 1914 to November 1918—a war that catapulted the United States into the center of the capitalist world system. Using Du Bois’s own words, Hubert Harrison, the father of Harlem radicalism, makes the direct link: But since every industrial nation is seeking the same outlet for its products, clashes are inevitable and in these clashes beaks and claws—armies and navies—must come into play. Hence beaks and claws must be provided beforehand against the day of conflict, and hence the exploitation of white men in Europe and America becomes the reason for the exploitation of black and brown and yellow men in African and Asia. And, therefore, it is hypocritical and absurd to pretend that the capitalist nations can ever intend to abolish wars.… For white folk to insist upon the right to manage their own ancestral lands, free from the domination of tyrants, domestic and foreign, is variously described as “democracy” and “self-determination.” For Negroes, Egyptians and Hindus to seek the same thing is impudence.… Truly has it been said that “the problem of the 20th century is the problem of the ‘Color Line.'” And wars are not likely to end; in fact, they are likely to be wider and more terrible—so long as this theory of white domination seeks to hold down the majority of the world’s people under the iron heel of racial oppression.35 For Du Bois, the imperialist rivalry for the booty on offer in Africa drove Berlin’s efforts to consolidate its place in the sun by displacing London in particular. While Vladimir Lenin understood that “the war [was] a product of half a century of development of world capitalism and of billions of threads and connections,” Du Bois expanded this analysis by providing a critique of the racial foundations of capitalist expansion.36 He held that the struggle to the death during the Great War for African resources and labor had begun to “pay dividends” centuries earlier through the enslavement of African peoples, the subsequent conflation of color and inferiority, and the reduction of what was routinely referred to as the “Dark Continent” to a space of backwardness ideally suited for dispossession. He further noted that “with the waning possibility of Big Fortune…at home, arose more magnificently the dream of exploitation abroad,” especially in Africa—a dream shared by white labor and the ruling class.37 In other words, this “democratic despotism” allowed for the white working class to “share the spoil of exploiting ‘chinks and niggers,'” and facilitated the creation of “a new democratic nation composed of united capital and labor” that perpetuated racial capitalism across class lines.38 Moreover, this national unity was strengthened through the disrespect and dehumanization of the racialized toilers and peasants in the plundered colonies that mitigated the exploitation and impoverishment of the white working class in imperial countries. This superexploitation allowed white workers to get a share, however pitiful, of “wealth, power, and luxury…on a scale the world never saw before” and to benefit from the “new wealth” accumulated from the “darker nations of the world” through cross-class consent “for governance by white folk and economic subjection to them”—a consensus solidified through the doctrine of “the natural inferiority of most men to the few.”39 Given the entanglement of racialization and capitalist exploitation, Du Bois averred, “Racial slander must go. Racial prejudice will follow…the domination of one people by another without the other’s consent, be the subject people black or white, must stop. The doctrine of forcible economic expansion over subject people must go.” Insofar as this admonishment applied as much to the United States as to European imperialists, beyond the international proletariat, it was the darker peoples and nations of the world who would challenge racial capitalism, not least “the twenty-five million grandchildren of the European slave trade…and first of all the ten million black folk in the United States.”40

Imperialist accumulation denotes the rapacious conscription of resources and labor for the purpose of superprofits through violent means that are generally reserved for populations deemed racially inferior. On the precipice of the Great Depression, the prominent Black communist James Ford beautifully explicated imperialist accumulation. In his 1929 report on the Second World Congress of the League Against Imperialism, he explained that the extant political economy constituted the consolidation of Africa’s partition and the “complete enslavement of its people”; the arresting of its industrialization, which hindered the development of the “toiling masses”; and the relegation of the continent to a source of raw material, a market for European goods, and a dumping ground for accumulated surplus capital. In the U.S. South, the Black poor were dehumanized by Wall Street, “white big business,” and the “rising Negro bourgeoisie” whose condition of possibility was the subjection of the Black working class. This oppression was exacerbated by rigid racial barriers, disenfranchisement, and lynching. Ford further argued that the West Indies, subjected to U.S. militarism and occupation on behalf of Wall Street, were largely transformed into a marketplace for U.S. goods. Moreover, throughout Africa, the U.S. South, and the Caribbean, Black workers were impressed into forced labor, laying railroads, building roads and bridges, and working in mines; were entrapped on plantations through peonage; and were subjected to convict leasing. In addition, they suffered intolerable working conditions and routinized violence.41

Expropriation by domination designates the seizure and confiscation of land, assets, property, bodies, and other sources of material wealth set to work by relations of economic dependence. This relationship exists both between nations and between groups. A quintessential enunciation of expropriation by domination between groups is We Charge Genocide: The Historic Petition to the United Nations for Relief from a Crime of the United States Government Against the Negro People, edited by the Black Communist William Patterson (with significant help from his wife and comrade Louise Thompson Patterson) and submitted to the United Nations by the Civil Rights Congress in 1951.42 The petition meticulously documented the past and present expropriation of Black people by the ruling class of modern U.S. racial capitalism through consistent and persistent discrimination in employment, unfair wages, forced ghettoization, inequitable and inferior accommodation and services, and the denial of justice in the courts. It further argued that this process was sustained by genocidal terror, white supremacist law, and the drive of monopoly capitalists for superprofits. Importantly, We Charge Genocide noted that, for primarily economic reasons, the historical and geographical locus of anti-Black genocide was the “Black Belt” of the Southern United States, a region expropriated by the Northern industrial capitalists and by Southern landowners alike. This was due in large part to plantation systems of sharecropping and peonage—legacies of slavery—in which Black political and economic rights were virtually nonexistent, Black laborers were inexorably tied to the land through debt, and the threat of violence and death precluded demands for justice. For Patterson, such expropriation by domination was the basis of “racist contamination that has spread throughout the United States.”43 We Charge Genocide further conveyed that expropriation by domination, a central element of modern U.S. racial capitalism, was more than a domestic concern because such practices “at home must inevitably create racist commodities for export abroad—must inevitably tend toward war.”44

Labor superexploitation can be understood as an economic relationship in which the intensity, form, and racial basis of exploitation differs little from slavery. Its effects are so extreme that it pushes racialized, particularly Black, labor effectively below the level of sheer physical subsistence. As Harrison explained, in the context of modern U.S. racial capitalism, Black workers “form a group that is more essentially proletarian than any other American group” because enslaved Africans were brought to the “new world” to be ruthlessly exploited. This reality fixed their social status as the most despised group, which in turn intensified their subjection.45 Likewise, organizations like the American Negro Labor Congress and the Anti-Imperialist League analyzed that the racial capitalist superexploitation of Black nations like Haiti in the first quarter of the twentieth century for the purposes of consolidating Wall Street control over land, commercial relations, and production was accompanied by the brutalization of Black labor, the export of Jim Crow practices, military occupation, and political repression.46 In effect, superexploitation results from the conjuncture of white supremacy, racialization, and the “badge of slavery,” which exacerbates the conditions of exploitation to which white working classes are subjected. As the Black Marxist Harry Haywood argued in 1948, “the stifling effects of the race factor are most strikingly illustrated by the drastic differences in the economic and cultural status of Negroes and whites.… Beyond all doubt, the oppression of the Negro, which is the basis of the degradation of the ‘poor whites,’ is of separate character demanding a special approach.”47 Superexploitation, he explained further, constitutes a combination of direct exploitation, outright robbery, physical violence, legal coercion, and perpetual indebtedness. It stifles “the free economic and cultural development” of the Black masses “through racist persecution as a basic condition for maintaining” virtual enslavement.48

The entrapment of Black women in domestic labor throughout the twentieth century—a function of their “triple oppression”—is perhaps the most glaring example of labor superexploitation under modern U.S. racial capitalism. In 1936, the lifelong Black radical Louise Thompson explained that Black women’s superexploitation in the capitalist mode of production was based on their race, sex, and subordination in the labor market.49 That same year, Black militants Marvel Cooke and Ella Baker published an article titled “The Bronx Slave Market” in which they studied triple oppression as it related to Black domestic workers. Cooke and Baker explained that the entanglements of racism, sex-based labor subordination, and structural poverty were deeply intensified by the Great Depression and forced Black domestic workers to pauperize their labor for the abysmal wage of less than thirty cents an hour. This form of labor exploitation was unique to the female sex because domestic work was conventional “women’s work,” and it was racialized insofar as the denigration of Black people fitted this group of women for low-wage, unprotected, and contingent labor.50

#### The alternative is an international workers organization led by the Global South.

Foster 20, Editor of Monthly Review, and a professor of sociology at the University of Oregon (John Bellamy, The Renewal of the Socialist Ideal, *Monthly Review*, September 2020, Volume 72, Number 4)

The International of Workers and Peoples

Although untold numbers of people are engaged in innumerable struggles against the capitalist juggernaut in their specific localities all around the world, struggles for substantive equality, including battles over race, gender, and class, depend on the fight against imperialism at the global level. Hence, there is a need for a new global organization of workers based on the model of Marx’s First International.48 Such an International for the twenty-first century cannot simply consist of a group of elite intellectuals from the North engaged in World Social Forum-like discussion activities or in the promotion of social-democratic regulatory reforms as in the so-called Socialist and Progressive Internationals. Rather, it needs to be constituted as a workers-based and peoples-based organization, rooted from the beginning in a strong South-South alliance so as to place the struggle against imperialism at the center of the socialist revolt against capitalism, as contemplated by figures such as Chávez and Amin.

In 2011, just prior to his final illness, Chávez was preparing, following his next election, to launch what was to be called the New International (pointedly not a Fifth International) focusing on a South-South alliance and giving a global significance to socialism in the twenty-first century. This would have extended the Bolivarian Alliance for Peoples of Our America to a global level.49 This, however, never saw the light of day due to Chávez’s rapid decline and untimely death.

Meanwhile, a separate conception grew out of the efforts of Amin, working with the World Forum for Alternatives. Amin had long contemplated a Fifth International, an idea he was still presenting as late as May 2018. But in July 2018, only a month before his death, this had been transformed into what he called an Internationale of Workers and Peoples, explicitly recognizing that a pure worker-based International that did not take into account the situation of peoples was inadequate in confronting imperialism.50 This, he stated, would be an organization, not just a movement. It would be aimed at the

alliance of all working peoples of the world and not only those qualified as representatives of the proletariat…including all wage earners of the services, peasants, farmers, and the peoples oppressed by modern capitalism. The construction must also be based on the recognition and respect of diversity, whether of parties, trade unions, or other popular organizations of struggle, guaranteeing their real independence.… In the absence of [such revolutionary] progress the world would continue to be ruled by chaos, barbarian practices, and the destruction of the earth.51

The creation of a New International cannot of course occur in a vacuum but needs to be articulated within and as a product of the building of unified mass organizations expanding at the grassroots level in conjunction with revolutionary movements and delinkings from the capitalist system all over the world. It could not occur, in Amin’s view, without new initiatives from the Global South to create broad alliances, as in the initial organized struggles associated with the Third World movement launched at the Bandung Conference in 1955, and the struggle for a New International Economic Order.52 These three elements—grassroots movements, delinking, and cross-country/cross-continent alliances—are all crucial in his conception of the anti-imperialist struggle. Today this needs to be united with the global ecological movement.

Such a universal struggle against capitalism and imperialism, Amin insisted, must be characterized by audacity and more audacity, breaking with the coordinates of the system at every point, and finding its ideal path in the principle of from each according to one’s ability, to each according to one’s need, as the very definition of human community. Today we live in a time of the perfect coincidence of the struggles for freedom and necessity, leading to a renewed struggle for freedom as necessity. The choice before us is unavoidable: ruin or revolution.

### Advantage CP---1NC

#### Text: The United States federal government should:

#### Pass a resolution affirming its trust in the FTC,

#### Sustain current levels of funding for the FTC,

#### Announce that we are bound to the Convention Against Torture and Geneva Convention,

#### Close Guantanamo Bay,

#### Establish a commission on human rights

#### And establish a Global Concert for the 21st Century.

#### Planks 1 and 2 solve FTC---fiats through their backlash IL by having Congress signal trust in the FTC and maintain funding.

#### Planks 3-5 solve LIO by affirming US soft power.

Shattuck 8 [John Shattuck is CEO of the John F. Kennedy Library Foundation and a lecturer on U.S. foreign policy at Tufts University. He is the author of Freedom on Fire. He served as Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor from 1993 to 1998, and Ambassador to the Czech Republic from 1998 to 2000. “Restoring U.S. Credibility on Human Rights,” *American Bar Association*, Fall 2008, <https://www.americanbar.org/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/human_rights_vol35_2008/human_rights_fall2008/hr_fall08_shattuck.html>] KS

Among the many challenges facing you from the time you take office will be how to restore U.S. credibility in the world. One way to do this will be to change the global perception that the United States is a human rights violator. International public opinion of the recent U.S. record on human rights has been devastating. A poll conducted last year in eighteen countries on all continents by the British Broadcasting Corporation revealed that 67 percent disapproved of U.S. detention practices in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Another poll in Germany, Great Britain, Poland, and India found that majorities or pluralities condemned the United States for torture and other violations of international law. A third poll by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations showed that majorities in thirteen countries, including many traditional allies, believe “the U.S. cannot be trusted to act responsibly in the world.” Less than a decade ago, the situation was quite different. A 1999 survey published by the U.S. State Department’s Office of Research showed that the United States was viewed favorably by large majorities in France, 62 percent; Germany, 78 percent; Indonesia, 75 percent; and Turkey, 52 percent; among others. This positive climate of opinion helped produce the outpouring of international support immedi-ately following the 9/11 attacks that made it possible for this country to quickly assemble a broad coalition with United Nations (UN) approval to respond to the terrorist attacks by striking al Qaeda strongholds in Afghanistan. Seven years later, global support for U.S. leadership has evaporated. In nearly all the countries that registered strong support for the United States in 1999, a big downward shift of opinion had occurred by 2006. In France it was down to 39 percent; in Germany, 37 percent; and in Indonesia, 30 percent. A separate survey conducted by the Pew Research Center revealed extremely hostile attitudes toward the United States throughout the Arab and Muslim world: In Egypt, the United States polled 70 percent negative; in Pakistan, 73 percent negative; in Jordan, 85 percent negative; and in Turkey, 88 percent negative. The gap between America’s values and actions revealed by this polling data has severely eroded U.S. global influence. How can you and your administration gain it back? First, you should make it clear that one of our country’s bedrock principles is the international rule of law. Human rights are de-fined and protected by the Constitution and international treaties ratified and incorporated into our domestic law. In flaunting basic rules—such as habeas corpus, the Convention against Torture, and the Geneva Conventions—the previous administration created a series of “law-free zones.” Within these zones, detainees were abused, thousands were held indefinitely without charges, and human rights were trampled. Second, you should bring U.S. values and practices back into alignment. The United States in recent years has lost credibility by charging others with the types of human rights violations that it has committed itself. In recent annual country reports on human rights practices, the State Department has criticized other countries for engaging in torture, detention without trial, warrantless electronic surveillance, and other abuses, even though the U.S. record in these areas also has been abysmal. Fortunately, history shows that U.S. credibility on human rights can be restored when our government’s policies reflect our na-tion’s values. A series of bipartisan initiatives during five recent presidencies––three Republican and two Democratic––illustrates the point. President Gerald Ford signed the Helsinki Accords, paving the way for international recognition of the cause of human rights inside the Soviet bloc. President Jimmy Carter mobilized democratic governments to press for the release of political prisoners by repressive regimes. President Ronald Reagan signed the Con-vention against Torture and persuaded a Republican-dominated Senate to ratify it. President George H. W. Bush joined with other governments in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe to nurture new democracies and respect for human rights following the end of the Cold War. And President Bill Clinton worked with NATO and the UN to implement the Genocide Conven-tion and bring an end to the human rights catastrophe in the Balkans. Mr. President, you can restore U.S. influence by reconnecting the nation’s values and policies on human rights and the rule of law. Among the initiatives that you might take are the following. Human Rights Law Enforcement. You should announce that the United States is bound by the human rights treaties and con-ventions that it has ratified and adopted as domestic law, including the Geneva Conventions, the Torture Convention, and the Interna-tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. You should follow through with your commitment to close the detention center at Guan-tanamo and transfer detainees to this country for determinations whether to try them in U.S. courts or release them. Fully complying with the Geneva Conventions would not preclude the United States from trying detainees in military commissions under constitutional standards of due process, nor would it restrict the government’s authority to conduct lawful interrogations to obtain intelligence in-formation about terrorist activities. Truth Commission. At times in our recent history, the nation has created high-level commissions to probe national crises and recommend ways to prevent them in the future. In the area of human rights, these bodies have included, most notably, the Kerner Commission on race in the 1960s and the commission in the 1980s on the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II. The recent commission on the events of 9/11 had a comparable scope and impact in addressing a complex and far-reaching national crisis. A similar commission could be established to compile the record of human rights abuses in the War on Terror. U.S. Commission on Human Rights. A permanent institution could be created to monitor the U.S. government’s compliance with its legal obligations on human rights. I urge you to endorse legislation pending in Congress that would establish a United States Commission on Human Rights with oversight authority and subpoena power. The legislation would require the executive branch to provide regular reports to the commission on its implementation of international human rights treaties such as the Torture Convention and the Geneva Conventions. Counterterrorism Assistance. The United States could provide assistance to other countries for counterterrorism operations that comply with basic standards on human rights. “Fighting terror” has become a convenient excuse for repressive regimes around the world to engage in further repression, often leading to more terrorism in an increasing cycle of violence. To break this cycle, this country could provide assistance and training to foreign military and law enforcement personnel in methods of fighting terrorism within the rule of law. Democracy and Human Rights Assistance. The United States should find appropriate ways to support those seeking to promote the rule of law, democracy, and human rights within their own countries. Democracy and human rights activists are the shock troops in the struggle against terrorism. But democracy and human rights can never be delivered from the barrel of a gun. Assistance to those working to build their own democratic societies must be carefully planned, sustained over time, and based on a thorough understand-ing of the unique circumstances and profound differences among cultures, religions, and countries. The new administration should work within a multilateral framework to assist those struggling around the world to bring democracy and human rights to their own societies. Responsibility to Protect. The United States should join with other countries, alliances, and international organizations to pre-vent or stop crimes against humanity and genocide. Mr. President, you could invoke the Doctrine of Responsibility to Protect, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2006, to work with other leaders to develop effective multilateral methods of preventing human rights catastrophes such as Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Darfur. Diplomatic and economic tools should be employed first to head off im-pending genocides, but multilateral military intervention must remain available under international law if other means have been ex-hausted. By recommitting the United States to a foreign policy conducted within a framework of human rights and the rule of law, Presi-dent Obama, you can restore America’s moral leadership in the world, and, by doing so, strengthen U.S. national security.

#### Plank 6 solves terminal to LIO.

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The best vehicle for promoting stability in the twenty-first century is a global concert of major powers. As the history of the nineteenth-century Concert of Europe demonstrated—its members were the United Kingdom, France, Russia, Prussia, and Austria—a steering group of leading countries can curb the geopolitical and ideological competition that usually accompanies multipolarity.

Concerts have two characteristics that make them well suited to the emerging global landscape: political inclusivity and procedural informality. A concert’s inclusivity means that it puts at the table the geopolitically influential and powerful states that need to be there, regardless of their regime type. In so doing, it largely separates ideological differences over domestic governance from matters of international cooperation. A concert’s informality means that it eschews binding and enforceable procedures and agreements, clearly distinguishing it from the UN Security Council. The UNSC serves too often as a public forum for grandstanding and is regularly paralyzed by disputes among its veto-wielding permanent members. In contrast, a concert offers a private venue that combines consensus building with cajoling and jockeying—a must since major powers will have both common and competing interests. By providing a vehicle for genuine and sustained strategic dialogue, a global concert can realistically mute and manage inescapable geopolitical and ideological differences.

A global concert would be a consultative, not a decision-making, body. It would address emerging crises yet ensure that urgent issues would not crowd out important ones, and it would deliberate on reforms to existing norms and institutions. This steering group would help fashion new rules of the road and build support for collective initiatives but leave operational matters, such as deploying peacekeeping missions, delivering pandemic relief, and concluding new climate deals, to the UN and other existing bodies. The concert would thus tee up decisions that could then be taken and implemented elsewhere. It would sit atop and backstop, not supplant, the current international architecture by maintaining a dialogue that does not now exist. The UN is too big, too bureaucratic, and too formalistic. Fly-in, fly-out G-7 or G-20 summits can be useful but even at their best are woefully inadequate, in part because so much effort goes toward haggling over detailed, but often anodyne, communiqués. Phone calls between heads of state, foreign ministers, and national security advisers are too episodic and often narrow in scope.

Fashioning major-power consensus on the international norms that guide statecraft, accepting both liberal and illiberal governments as legitimate and authoritative, advancing shared approaches to crises—the Concert of Europe relied on these important innovations to preserve peace in a multipolar world. By drawing on lessons from its nineteenth-century forebearer, a twenty-first-century global concert can do the same. Concerts do lack the certitude, predictability, and enforceability of alliances and other formalized pacts. But in designing mechanisms to preserve peace amid geopolitical flux, policymakers should strive for the workable and the attainable, not the desirable but impossible.

A GLOBAL CONCERT FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

A global concert would have six members: China, the European Union, India, Japan, Russia, and the United States. Democracies and nondemocracies would have equal standing, and inclusion would be a function of power and influence, not values or regime type. The concert’s members would collectively represent roughly 70 percent of both global GDP and global military spending. Including these six heavyweights in the concert’s ranks would give it geopolitical clout while preventing it from becoming an unwieldy talk shop.

Members would send permanent representatives of the highest diplomatic rank to the global concert’s standing headquarters. Although they would not be formal members of the concert, four regional organizations—the African Union, Arab League, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Organization of American States (OAS)—would maintain permanent delegations at the concert’s headquarters. These organizations would provide their regions with representation and the ability to help shape the concert’s agenda. When discussing issues affecting these regions, concert members would invite delegates from these bodies as well as select member states to join meetings. For example, were concert members to address a dispute in the Middle East, they could request the participation of the Arab League, its relevant members, and other involved parties, such as Iran, Israel, and Turkey.

A global concert would shun codified rules, instead relying on dialogue to build consensus. Like the Concert of Europe, it would privilege the territorial status quo and a view of sovereignty that precludes, except in the case of international consensus, using military force or other coercive tools to alter existing borders or topple regimes. This relatively conservative baseline would encourage buy-in from all members. At the same time, the concert would provide an ideal venue for discussing globalization’s impact on sovereignty and the potential need to deny sovereign immunity to nations that engage in certain egregious activities. Those activities might include committing genocide, harboring or sponsoring terrorists, or severely exacerbating climate change by destroying rainforests.

### Inflation DA---1NC

#### Inflation’s on the brink. Higher wages trigger a wage-price spiral that cause rate hikes and recession.

Smialek 11-5-2021, writes about the Federal Reserve and the economy for The New York Times. She previously covered economics at Bloomberg News (Jeanna, “Wages are rising, but can they keep up with inflation?,” *New York Times*, <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/05/business/economy/wages-inflation.html>)

American workers are taking home bigger paychecks as employers pay up to attract and retain employees. But those same people are shelling out more for furniture, food and many other goods and services these days. It is not yet clear which side of that equation — higher pay or higher prices — is going to win out, but the answer could matter enormously for the Federal Reserve and the White House. There are a few ways this moment could evolve. Wage growth could remain strong, driven by a tight labor market, and overall inflation could simmer down as supply chain snarls unravel and a surge in demand for goods eases. That would benefit workers. But troubling outcomes are also possible, and high on the list of worries is what economists call a “wage-price spiral.” Employees could begin to demand higher pay because they need to keep up with a rising cost of living, and companies may pass those labor costs on to their customers, kicking off a vicious cycle. That could make today’s quick inflation last longer than policymakers expect. The stakes are high. What happens with wages will matter to families, businesses and central bankers — and the path ahead is far from certain. “It’s the several-trillion-dollar question,” said Nick Bunker, director of research for the hiring site Indeed. For now, wage growth is rapid — just not fast enough to keep up with prices. One way to measure the dynamic is through the Employment Cost Index, which is reported by the Labor Department every quarter. In the year through September, the index’s measure of wages and salaries jumped by 4.2 percent. But an inflation gauge that tracks consumer prices rose by 5.4 percent over the same period. A different measure of pay, an index that tracks hourly earnings, did rise faster than inflation in August and September after lagging it for much of the year. And an update to that gauge on Friday showed that wages climbed 0.4 percent in October, which is roughly in line with recent monthly price increases. Over the past year, that measure is up by 4.9 percent. But the data on hourly earnings have been distorted by the pandemic, because low-wage workers who left the job market early in 2020 are now trickling back in, jerking the average around. The upshot is that the tug of war between price increases and pay increases has yet to decisively swing in workers’ favor. Whether wage gains eventually eclipse inflation — and why — will be crucial for economic policymakers. Central bankers celebrate rising wages when they come from productivity increases and strong labor markets, but would worry if wages and inflation seemed to be egging each other upward. The Federal Reserve is “watching carefully,” for a troubling increase in wages, its chair, Jerome H. Powell, said on Wednesday, though he noted that the central bank did not see such a trend shaping up. Recruiters do report some early signs that inflation is factoring into pay decisions. Bill Kasko, president of Frontline Source Group, a job placement and staffing firm in Dallas, said that as gas prices in particular rise, employees are demanding either higher pay or work-from-home options to offset their increased commuting costs. “It becomes a topic of discussion in negotiations for salary,” Mr. Kasko said. But for the most part, today’s wage gains are tied to a different economic trend: red-hot demand for workers. Job openings are high, but many would-be employees remain on the labor market’s sidelines, either because they have chosen to retire early or because child care issues, virus concerns or other considerations have dissuaded them from working. Emily Longsworth Nixon, 27 and from Dallas, is one of Mr. Kasko’s employees. She tried to recruit a woman to an executive assistant position at a technology company that would have given her a $30,000 raise — and saw the candidate walk away for a counter offer of no additional pay but three work-from-home days each week. Covid’s impact on the supply chain continues. The pandemic has disrupted nearly every aspect of the global supply chain and made all kinds of products harder to find. In turn, scarcity has caused the prices of many things to go higher as inflation remains stubbornly high. Almost anything manufactured is in short supply. That includes everything from toilet paper to new cars. The disruptions go back to the beginning of the pandemic, when factories in Asia and Europe were forced to shut down and shipping companies cut their schedules. First, demand for home goods spiked. Money that Americans once spent on experiences were redirected to things for their homes. The surge clogged the system for transporting goods to the factories that needed them — like computer chips — and finished products piled up because of a shortage of shipping containers. Now, ports are struggling to keep up. In North America and Europe, where containers are arriving, the heavy influx of ships is overwhelming ports. With warehouses full, containers are piling up at ports. The chaos in global shipping is likely to persist as a result of the massive traffic jam. No one really knows when the crisis will end. Shortages and delays are likely to affect this year’s Christmas and holiday shopping season, but what happens after that is unclear. Jerome Powell, the Federal Reserve chair, said he expects supply chain problems to persist “likely well into next year.” “After that, I had my tail between my legs for a couple of days; I had never thought to ask that,” she said, adding that employers need to know their candidates like never before as workers flex their power, taking home raises and other perks. “Before Covid, it was an employer-driven market.” Those in-demand workers could end up being better off in the long run, should their pay continue to chug higher even as supply chains heal and prices for used cars and couches moderate, allowing them to afford more. Pay gains might also become more sustainable for employers as virus concerns fade and employees trickle back from the labor market’s sidelines. And even if rapid wage increases persist, it is not absolutely the case that employers will be forced to drastically raise prices. Businesses could stomach a hit to their profits instead, or they could invest in technology that improves worker productivity. If fewer waitresses can sell the same number of dinners because customers are ordering from QR codes, for instance, employers will have leeway to pay more without taking a hit to their bottom line. But a happy outcome is not guaranteed. If today’s high prices do drive tomorrow’s wage negotiations and set off an upward spiral, the result could be a longer period of high inflation that prods the Fed to raise interest rates to tamp down demand and cool off prices, slowing the economy and possibly even sending it back into a recession.

#### Rate hikes crush renewables---locks in warming.

Bornhauser 19, citing Tobias Schmidt, Professor of Energy Politics. (Martin, 9-9-2019, "Interest rates are a decisive factor for competitive renewables", *ETH Zurich*, <https://ethz.ch/en/news-and-events/eth-news/news/2019/09/interest-rates-are-a-decisive-factor-in-the-competitivenessof%20renewable%20energy.html>)

Renewable energy is an essential part of efforts to reduce CO2 emissions. Without it – according to all the climate scenarios – the Paris Agreement’s target of limiting global warming to below 2°C relative to the pre-​industrial age will not be achieved. Policymakers have therefore introduced various support measures for renewable energy, in particular in the EU – and not without success: the generation costs of alternative energy in many European countries today are comparable with the (marginal) costs of existing gas or coal-​fired power stations. The last two years have seen the widespread emergence of photovoltaic plants that can survive and hold their own on the market without subsidies – for example, in Spain and Germany. Green electricity’s new-​found competitiveness is based on more mature technology and higher volumes, which bring down costs. In addition – and this is often overlooked – the low cost of capital has also played its part, as low interest rates boost the economic viability of alternative energy sources. Lower costs thanks to low interest rates But what happens if interest rates rise? ETH researchers have explored this question in two studies. As renewable energy is more capital-​intensive than fossil fuels, the costs rise more sharply with rising interest rates, making it less attractive. “Renewable energy is now very cheap, but that won’t necessarily be the case with higher interest rates,” says Tobias Schmidt, Professor of Energy Politics. According to Schmidt, analysis of 133 photovoltaic and onshore wind projects in Germany over the last 18 years shows that – in the case of wind power, for example – lower financing costs account for about 25% of the savings in electricity-​production costs (see article in Nature Energycall\_made). “Renewable energy has become cheaper – thanks in part to significant improvements in financing conditions,” says Bjarne Steffen, co-​author of the study. Conversely, rising financing costs will lead to disproportionate increases in the price of renewable energy. Less attractive with rising interest rates In a study published today in Nature Sustainability, the ETH researchers calculated various interest rate scenarios in collaboration with a team from the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK). If interest rates were to return to pre-​crisis levels, electricity production costs in Germany would increase by 11% for solar power plants and 25% for wind power projects – with a knock-​on impact on competitiveness. In a scenario involving a moderate rise in interest rates, the lower costs of solar power plants due to advances in knowledge and technology would be offset by higher interest charges. For wind power stations, it is estimated that electricity generation costs would increase by 9% in such a scenario.

#### Extinction.

Kareiva 18, Ph.D. in ecology and applied mathematics from Cornell University, director of the Institute of the Environment and Sustainability at UCLA, Pritzker Distinguished Professor in Environment & Sustainability at UCLA, et al. (Peter, “Existential risk due to ecosystem collapse: Nature strikes back,” *Futures*, 102)

In summary, six of the nine proposed planetary boundaries (phosphorous, nitrogen, biodiversity, land use, atmospheric aerosol loading, and chemical pollution) are unlikely to be associated with existential risks. They all correspond to a degraded environment, but in our assessment do not represent existential risks. However, the three remaining boundaries (climate change, global freshwater cycle, and ocean acidification) do pose existential risks. This is because of intrinsic positive feedback loops, substantial lag times between system change and experiencing the consequences of that change, and the fact these different boundaries interact with one another in ways that yield surprises. In addition, climate, freshwater, and ocean acidification are all directly connected to the provision of food and water, and shortages of food and water can create conflict and social unrest. Climate change has a long history of disrupting civilizations and sometimes precipitating the collapse of cultures or mass emigrations (McMichael, 2017). For example, the 12th century drought in the North American Southwest is held responsible for the collapse of the Anasazi pueblo culture. More recently, the infamous potato famine of 1846–1849 and the large migration of Irish to the U.S. can be traced to a combination of factors, one of which was climate. Specifically, 1846 was an unusually warm and moist year in Ireland, providing the climatic conditions favorable to the fungus that caused the potato blight. As is so often the case, poor government had a role as well—as the British government forbade the import of grains from outside Britain (imports that could have helped to redress the ravaged potato yields). Climate change intersects with freshwater resources because it is expected to exacerbate drought and water scarcity, as well as flooding. Climate change can even impair water quality because it is associated with heavy rains that overwhelm sewage treatment facilities, or because it results in higher concentrations of pollutants in groundwater as a result of enhanced evaporation and reduced groundwater recharge. Ample clean water is not a luxury—it is essential for human survival. Consequently, cities, regions and nations that lack clean freshwater are vulnerable to social disruption and disease. Finally, ocean acidification is linked to climate change because it is driven by CO2 emissions just as global warming is. With close to 20% of the world’s protein coming from oceans (FAO, 2016), the potential for severe impacts due to acidification is obvious. Less obvious, but perhaps more insidious, is the interaction between climate change and the loss of oyster and coral reefs due to acidification. Acidification is known to interfere with oyster reef building and coral reefs. Climate change also increases storm frequency and severity. Coral reefs and oyster reefs provide protection from storm surge because they reduce wave energy (Spalding et al., 2014). If these reefs are lost due to acidification at the same time as storms become more severe and sea level rises, coastal communities will be exposed to unprecedented storm surge—and may be ravaged by recurrent storms. A key feature of the risk associated with climate change is that mean annual temperature and mean annual rainfall are not the variables of interest. Rather it is extreme episodic events that place nations and entire regions of the world at risk. These extreme events are by definition “rare” (once every hundred years), and changes in their likelihood are challenging to detect because of their rarity, but are exactly the manifestations of climate change that we must get better at anticipating (Diffenbaugh et al., 2017). Society will have a hard time responding to shorter intervals between rare extreme events because in the lifespan of an individual human, a person might experience as few as two or three extreme events. How likely is it that you would notice a change in the interval between events that are separated by decades, especially given that the interval is not regular but varies stochastically? A concrete example of this dilemma can be found in the past and expected future changes in storm-related flooding of New York City. The highly disruptive flooding of New York City associated with Hurricane Sandy represented a flood height that occurred once every 500 years in the 18th century, and that occurs now once every 25 years, but is expected to occur once every 5 years by 2050 (Garner et al., 2017). This change in frequency of extreme floods has profound implications for the measures New York City should take to protect its infrastructure and its population, yet because of the stochastic nature of such events, this shift in flood frequency is an elevated risk that will go unnoticed by most people. 4. The combination of positive feedback loops and societal inertia is fertile ground for global environmental catastrophes Humans are remarkably ingenious, and have adapted to crises throughout their history. Our doom has been repeatedly predicted, only to be averted by innovation (Ridley, 2011). However, the many stories of human ingenuity successfully addressing existential risks such as global famine or extreme air pollution represent environmental challenges that are largely linear, have immediate consequences, and operate without positive feedbacks. For example, the fact that food is in short supply does not increase the rate at which humans consume food—thereby increasing the shortage. Similarly, massive air pollution episodes such as the London fog of 1952 that killed 12,000 people did not make future air pollution events more likely. In fact it was just the opposite—the London fog sent such a clear message that Britain quickly enacted pollution control measures (Stradling, 2016). Food shortages, air pollution, water pollution, etc. send immediate signals to society of harm, which then trigger a negative feedback of society seeking to reduce the harm. In contrast, today’s great environmental crisis of climate change may cause some harm but there are generally long time delays between rising CO2 concentrations and damage to humans. The consequence of these delays are an absence of urgency; thus although 70% of Americans believe global warming is happening, only 40% think it will harm them (http://climatecommunication.yale.edu/visualizations-data/ycom-us-2016/). Secondly, unlike past environmental challenges, the Earth’s climate system is rife with positive feedback loops. In particular, as CO2 increases and the climate warms, that very warming can cause more CO2 release which further increases global warming, and then more CO2, and so on. Table 2 summarizes the best documented positive feedback loops for the Earth’s climate system. These feedbacks can be neatly categorized into carbon cycle, biogeochemical, biogeophysical, cloud, ice-albedo, and water vapor feedbacks. As important as it is to understand these feedbacks individually, it is even more essential to study the interactive nature of these feedbacks. Modeling studies show that when interactions among feedback loops are included, uncertainty increases dramatically and there is a heightened potential for perturbations to be magnified (e.g., Cox, Betts, Jones, Spall, & Totterdell, 2000; Hajima, Tachiiri, Ito, & Kawamiya, 2014; Knutti & Rugenstein, 2015; Rosenfeld, Sherwood, Wood, & Donner, 2014). This produces a wide range of future scenarios. Positive feedbacks in the carbon cycle involves the enhancement of future carbon contributions to the atmosphere due to some initial increase in atmospheric CO2. This happens because as CO2 accumulates, it reduces the efficiency in which oceans and terrestrial ecosystems sequester carbon, which in return feeds back to exacerbate climate change (Friedlingstein et al., 2001). Warming can also increase the rate at which organic matter decays and carbon is released into the atmosphere, thereby causing more warming (Melillo et al., 2017). Increases in food shortages and lack of water is also of major concern when biogeophysical feedback mechanisms perpetuate drought conditions. The underlying mechanism here is that losses in vegetation increases the surface albedo, which suppresses rainfall, and thus enhances future vegetation loss and more suppression of rainfall—thereby initiating or prolonging a drought (Chamey, Stone, & Quirk, 1975). To top it off, overgrazing depletes the soil, leading to augmented vegetation loss (Anderies, Janssen, & Walker, 2002). Climate change often also increases the risk of forest fires, as a result of higher temperatures and persistent drought conditions. The expectation is that forest fires will become more frequent and severe with climate warming and drought (Scholze, Knorr, Arnell, & Prentice, 2006), a trend for which we have already seen evidence (Allen et al., 2010). Tragically, the increased severity and risk of Southern California wildfires recently predicted by climate scientists (Jin et al., 2015), was realized in December 2017, with the largest fire in the history of California (the “Thomas fire” that burned 282,000 acres, https://www.vox.com/2017/12/27/16822180/thomas-fire-california-largest-wildfire). This catastrophic fire embodies the sorts of positive feedbacks and interacting factors that could catch humanity off-guard and produce a true apocalyptic event. Record-breaking rains produced an extraordinary flush of new vegetation, that then dried out as record heat waves and dry conditions took hold, coupled with stronger than normal winds, and ignition. Of course the record-fire released CO2 into the atmosphere, thereby contributing to future warming. Out of all types of feedbacks, water vapor and the ice-albedo feedbacks are the most clearly understood mechanisms. Losses in reflective snow and ice cover drive up surface temperatures, leading to even more melting of snow and ice cover—this is known as the ice-albedo feedback (Curry, Schramm, & Ebert, 1995). As snow and ice continue to melt at a more rapid pace, millions of people may be displaced by flooding risks as a consequence of sea level rise near coastal communities (Biermann & Boas, 2010; Myers, 2002; Nicholls et al., 2011). The water vapor feedback operates when warmer atmospheric conditions strengthen the saturation vapor pressure, which creates a warming effect given water vapor’s strong greenhouse gas properties (Manabe & Wetherald, 1967). Global warming tends to increase cloud formation because warmer temperatures lead to more evaporation of water into the atmosphere, and warmer temperature also allows the atmosphere to hold more water. The key question is whether this increase in clouds associated with global warming will result in a positive feedback loop (more warming) or a negative feedback loop (less warming). For decades, scientists have sought to answer this question and understand the net role clouds play in future climate projections (Schneider et al., 2017). Clouds are complex because they both have a cooling (reflecting incoming solar radiation) and warming (absorbing incoming solar radiation) effect (Lashof, DeAngelo, Saleska, & Harte, 1997). The type of cloud, altitude, and optical properties combine to determine how these countervailing effects balance out. Although still under debate, it appears that in most circumstances the cloud feedback is likely positive (Boucher et al., 2013). For example, models and observations show that increasing greenhouse gas concentrations reduces the low-level cloud fraction in the Northeast Pacific at decadal time scales. This then has a positive feedback effect and enhances climate warming since less solar radiation is reflected by the atmosphere (Clement, Burgman, & Norris, 2009). The key lesson from the long list of potentially positive feedbacks and their interactions is that runaway climate change, and runaway perturbations have to be taken as a serious possibility. Table 2 is just a snapshot of the type of feedbacks that have been identified (see Supplementary material for a more thorough explanation of positive feedback loops). However, this list is not exhaustive and the possibility of undiscovered positive feedbacks portends even greater existential risks. The many environmental crises humankind has previously averted (famine, ozone depletion, London fog, water pollution, etc.) were averted because of political will based on solid scientific understanding. We cannot count on complete scientific understanding when it comes to positive feedback loops and climate change.

#### Inflation obviates the benefits of real wage growth---turns inequality.

Iacurci 21, Personal Finance Reporter (Greg, July 27th, “Wages are rising, but inflation may have given workers a 2% pay cut,” *CNBC*, <https://www.cnbc.com/2021/07/27/wages-are-rising-but-has-inflation-given-workers-a-2percent-pay-cut.html>, Accessed 11-06-2021)

Workers saw their hourly pay in June jump at the fastest clip in more than a decade. Yet some of them saw those gains erased by high levels of inflation.

“Real wages” — a measure of income after accounting for the cost of goods and services people buy — fell by almost 2%, on average, last month compared with 2020. Senate Republicans said Wednesday that Americans were getting a pay cut as a result.

“The staples of American life are increasing exponentially,” according to Sen. Tim Scott, R-S.C., who cited examples like higher prices for gas, laundry, airfare, moving costs, hotels, bacon and TVs.

The thrust of the argument — that inflation eats into rising wages — is true, according to economists. Still, there are many nuances, they said.

For one, whether a consumer got a pay cut or not depends on their individual earnings and the things they buy.

“If prices are growing faster than wages, then people are getting inflation-adjusted pay cuts,” according to Michael Strain, director of economic policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute, a right-leaning think tank. “Ultimately, this varies dramatically for every individual.”

Plus, inflation has been volatile and may prove temporary — meaning a reduction in buying power could be short-lived, economists said.

Inflation and wage growth

Average hourly earnings rose 3.6%, to $30.40, in June compared with the same month in 2020. That’s the biggest spike since January 2009, according to data compiled by the Economic Policy Institute.

Meanwhile, the consumer price index, a measure of inflation, jumped 5.4% over the same period — the most since August 2008.

Together, this amounts to a 1.7% loss in buying power, on average, when factoring in seasonal adjustments, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

“Inflation is a tax,” said William Foster, a vice president at Moody’s Investors Service. “That’s the best way to think about it.”

Inflation most impacts lower earners, who spend more of their average dollar on gas, food and other items that may be rising in price, Foster said. Wealthier individuals, who tend to hold more financial assets like stocks or homes, may be better able to offset the impact of inflation, he added.

### Horse-trading DA---1NC

#### Antitrust only passes after it’s horse-traded with Republicans for censorship prohibitions

Perera 3-12-2021, veteran cybersecurity reporter, Data security & privacy reporter for MLex (Dave, “US antitrust legislation faces uphill battle despite unified Democratic government,” <https://mlexmarketinsight.com/news-hub/editors-picks/area-of-expertise/antitrust/us-antitrust-legislation-faces-uphill-battle-despite-unified-democratic-government>)

Renewed interest among US lawmakers in antitrust legislation is unlikely to produce radical policy shifts, notwithstanding the Democratic Party’s unified control of the federal government. Democrats promised a “big, bold agenda” after they captured the Senate by a hairsbreadth in January. Democratic lawmakers may very well stick to those ambitions and announce audacious legislative proposals. But the fate of those bills is at the mercy of a political dynamic ensuring that the more liberal the policy prescriptions, the less likely they are to become law. The most likely outcome over the next two years is more funding for enforcers at the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, whether directly through appropriated funds, steeper merger notification filing fees, or both. It’s also possible Congress could incrementally tinker along the edges of antitrust. It might lower the threshold for challenging mergers, or mandate data portability requirements for social media companies. Those expecting — or fearing — more ambitious outcomes likely won’t see them enacted. So until America’s November 2022 election, scratch from the list of high probabilities reforms such as requiring dominant firms to separate lines of business, or shifting the burden of proof onto an acquiring company. Put another way, unless a bill can attract significant Republican support, not even two years of unified Democratic government can guarantee reforms. — American exceptionalism — Single party control of both congressional chambers and the presidency is relatively rare in American politics. It has occurred in fewer than a third of legislative sessions since 1980. When it strikes, it doesn’t last long — typically just the two years between one congressional election and another. Historically, unified control is a fertile period for new regulations. President George W. Bush overhauled Medicare. President Barack Obama ushered in financial sector reforms and the Affordable Care Act. Indications are that President Joe Biden is emboldened by his party’s last-minute capture of the Senate. History, of course, isn’t a blueprint. Even a brief look at past episodes of unified control reveals that not even single-party capture of the executive and legislative branches of the US government can assure the enactment of a partisan agenda. For one thing, neither political party is a monolith. Although far more politically aligned than when Democratic conservatives found common cause in the 20th century with Republicans, the major American parties nonetheless are coalitions of centrist and activist wings. For Democrats, the tensions inherent in appeasing all sides became apparent earlier this month when centrists trimmed benefits in the $1.9 trillion coronavirus stimulus package. Neither is single party grip on power secure unless it commands an overwhelming majority in the Senate, thanks to a uniquely American institution: the filibuster. In the Senate, the rules mandate a three-fifths vote before debate over a bill is cut off. In recent decades, it’s become a weapon routinely wielded by the minority party to kill legislation. The upshot is that policy legislation needs supermajority support before it can proceed, meaning the 50 Democrats of today’s Senate have little choice but to resign themselves to the grind of finding Republican supporters. There are limited exceptions. Assuming Democrats stay in unison, they don’t need Republican votes to appoint judges, approve executive branch nominations or pass fiscal legislation such as the coronavirus stimulus that just became law. It’s within Democrats’ power to abolish the filibuster, but for now, the maneuver appears safe. Asked just days ago about the matter, White House spokeswoman Jen Psaki told reporters that the president’s preference is for it to stay in place. “The president is an optimist by nature,” Psaki added. — Hunting for bipartisan consensus — Not every bill introduced in Congress, nor even every bill approved by a committee or even an entire single chamber, makes it through the process because its sponsors believe it’ll become law. There are a host of bills drafted with the intent of sending a message to industry, to independent regulators, to donors, to constituents. There are bills that lawmakers view as setting out a position to influence an ongoing policy debate. Even if it won’t become law this year, it might the next year, or the next, reintroduced and refined along the way. Telltale signs of whether a bill is a serious attempt at law are the number of cosponsors, and whether that list of names includes members of both parties in good stead with their party’s leadership. Bipartisan support is important even in the House, where Democrats have the votes to completely bypass Republicans. Because the House doesn’t have the filibuster to contend with, those with the majority of seats control the chamber. House Democrats can and do pass bills in the face of absolute House Republican opposition, but — special exceptions for fiscal bills aside — those bills are dead on arrival in the Senate. As long as the filibuster exists or Democrats lack a Senate supermajority, the House Judiciary antitrust subcommittee must court Republican support if its intention is to make new law. Finding clues of what House Democrats might seriously achieve, then, may be little more difficult than looking up the policy prescriptions House Republicans favor: giving regulators more resources, shifting the burden of proof in merger cases and boosting data portability and interoperability. A report issued by now-ranking Republican Ken Buck as a rejoinder to last year’s Democratic House Judiciary antitrust subcommittee staff report on competition in digital markets allowed that the GOP shares other Democratic concerns, including predatory pricing, monopoly leveraging and control over marketplace platforms. That conciliatory signal also came weighted, with warnings that Congress should be wary of “handing additional regulatory to agencies in an attempt to micromanage.” Instead, try instead telling enforcers they should return to first principles, the Colorado lawmaker advised. Whether Republicans and Democrats in the Senate can find common cause is an even more fraught question. Unlike its House counterpart, the Senate Judiciary subcommittee on antitrust hasn't conducted a 16-month investigation into digital monopolization. The subcommittee’s senior Republican, Utah’s Mike Lee, is prone to touting the importance of the consumer welfare standard and rails against online platforms “eager to impose the ideological censorship called for by their political benefactors.” Lee also says he’s open to working with subcommittee Chairwoman Amy Klobuchar on strengthening enforcement, adding the caveat that current antitrust laws are sufficient. Klobuchar, a Minnesota Democrat, doesn’t need Lee to get a bill through her subcommittee, but failing to find consensus with Republicans imperils her chances of making law. The prospects for her Competition and Antitrust Law Enforcement Reform Act becoming law as current written aren't good. — 'Big tech is out to get conservatives' — A looming question hanging over any bill, even one tailored to win bipartisan support, is whether it could be derailed by Republican anger at online platforms for alleged anti-conservative bias. A right-wing trope especially spread by President Donald Trump during his last year in office — the belief that platforms use their content moderation powers to silence conservatives — has mainstream acceptance in Republican circles. It’s a refrain almost obligatory for Republican lawmakers to repeat when discussing any issue related to online platforms. “Big tech is out to get conservatives,” House Judiciary Committee ranking member Jim Jordan of Ohio has said more than once. Democrats have their own share of anger at online platforms’ content-moderation practices, to be sure. They accuse online platforms of circumventing consumer protections, undermining civil rights laws and not doing enough to stymie disinformation. It’s Republicans, though, who appear the angriest, and are the more likely to insist that any legislative reform touching online platforms address content moderation, with the intention of making it harder, not easier, for online platforms to remove users, potentially imperiling a compromise measure.

#### That allows the GOP to successfully weaponize misinformation---triggers epistemic decay and cements a perma-GOP government

Carpenter 21, contributing writer for The Nation. She received the James Aronson Award for Social Justice Journalism in 2018, and has been a finalist for the Livingston Awards and the National Awards for Education Reporting. Her writing has also appeared in Rolling Stone, Guernica, and various other publications (Zoe, “Misinformation Is Destroying Our Country. Can Anything Rein It In?,” *The Nation*, <https://www.thenation.com/article/society/right-wing-media-misinformation/>)

Natali Fierros Bock says she could feel this mass delusion calcifying in the wake of the election in Pinal County, a rural area between Phoenix and Tucson where she serves as co–executive director of the group Rural Arizona Engagement. “It feels like an existential crisis,” Bock adds. Many of the Sharpiegate claims online referred to Pinal County, and Gosar, whose district includes a portion of the area, was reportedly responsible for helping organize the January 6 “Stop the Steal” rally in Washington that resulted in the deaths of five people. Mark Finchem, a Republican who represents part of Pinal County in the statehouse, was also in Washington on January 6. The Capitol insurrection threw into relief the real-world consequences of America’s increasingly siloed media ecosystem, which is characterized on the right by an expanding web of outlets and platforms willing to entertain an alternative version of reality. Social media companies, confronted with their role in spreading misinformation, scrambled to implement reforms. But right-wing misinformation is not just a technological problem, and it is far from being fixed. Any hope that the events of January 6 might provoke a reckoning within conservative media and the Republican Party has by now evaporated. The GOP remains eager to weaponize misinformation, not only to win elections but also to advance its policy agenda. A prime example is the aggressive effort under way in a number of states to restrict access to the ballot. In Arizona, Republicans have introduced nearly two dozen bills that would make it more difficult to vote, with the big lie about election fraud as a pretext. “When you can sell somebody the idea that their elections were stolen, they’ve been violated, right? So then you need protection,” Bock says, explaining the conservative justification for the suite of new restrictions in her state. Voting rights is her organization’s “number one concern” at the moment. But Bock’s fears about political misinformation are more sweeping. Community organizing is difficult in the best of times. “But when you can’t agree on what is true and not true, when my reality doesn’t match the reality of the person I’m speaking to, it makes it more difficult to find common ground,” she says. “If we can’t agree on a common truth, if we can’t find a starting place, then how does it end?” Around the time of the 2016 election, Kate Starbird, a professor at the University of Washington who studies misinformation during crises, noticed that more and more social media users were incorporating markers of political identity into their online personas—hashtags and memes and other signifiers of their ideological alignment. In the footage from the Capitol she saw the same symbols, outfits, and flags as those she’d been watching spread in far-right communities online. “To see those caricatures come alive in this violent riot or insurrection, whatever you want to call it, was horrifying, but it was all very recognizable for me,” Starbird says. “There was a time in which we were like, ‘Oh, those are bots, those aren’t real people,’ or ‘That’s someone play-acting,’ or ‘We’re putting on our online persona and that doesn’t really reflect who we are in an offline sense.’ January 6 pretty much disabused us of that notion.” It was a particularly rude awakening for social media companies, which had long been reluctant to respond to the misinformation that flourished on their platforms, treating it as an issue of speech that could be divorced from real-world consequences. Facebook, Twitter, and other platforms had made some changes in anticipation of a contested election, announcing plans to label or remove content delegitimizing election results, for instance. Facebook blocked new campaign ads for the week leading up to the election; Twitter labeled hundreds of thousands of misleading tweets with fact-checking notes. Yet wild claims about election fraud spread virally anyway, ping-ponging from individual social media users to right-wing influencers and media. During the 2016 campaign, most public concern about misinformation centered on shadowy foreign actors posing as news sources or US citizens. This turned out to be an oversimplification, though many on the center and left offered it as an explanation for Hillary Clinton’s defeat in 2016; blaming Russian state actors alone ignored factors like sexism, missteps made by the Clinton campaign itself, and the home-grown feedback loop of right-wing media. In 2020, according to research done by Starbird and other contributors to the Election Integrity Project, those most influential in disseminating misinformation were largely verified, “blue check” social media users who were authentic, in the sense that they were who they said they were—Donald Trump, for example, and his adult sons. DONATE NOW TO POWER THE NATION. Readers like you make our independent journalism possible. Another key aspect in the creation of the big lie was what Starbird calls “participatory disinformation.” Trump was tweeting about the election being stolen from him months beforehand, but once voting got under way, “what we see is that he kind of relies on the crowd, the audiences, to create the evidence to fit the frame,” Starbird explains. Individuals posted their personal experiences online, which were shared by more influential accounts and eventually featured in media stories that placed the anecdotes within the broader narrative of a stolen election. Some of the anecdotes that fueled Sharpiegate came from people who used a felt-tip pen to vote in person, then saw online that their vote had been canceled—though the “canceled” vote actually referred to mail-in ballots that voters had requested before deciding to vote in person. “It’s a really powerful kind of propaganda, because the people that were helping to create these narratives really did think they were experiencing fraud,” Starbird says. Action by content moderators usually came too late and was complicated by the fact that many claims of disenfranchisement by individual users were difficult to verify or disprove. The Capitol riot led the tech giants to take more aggressive action against Trump and other peddlers of misinformation. Twitter and Facebook kicked Trump off their platforms and shut down tens of thousands of accounts and pages. Facebook clamped down on some of its groups, which the company’s own data scientists had previously warned were incubating misinformation and “enthusiastic calls for violence,” according to an internal presentation. Google and Apple booted Parler, a social media site used primarily by the far right, from their app stores, and Amazon stopped hosting Parler’s data on its cloud infrastructure system, forcing it temporarily offline. But these measures were largely reactions to harm already done. “Moderation doesn’t reduce the demand for [misleading] content, and demand for that content has grown during some periods of time when the platforms weren’t moderating or weren’t addressing some of the more egregious ways their tools were abused,” says Renée DiResta, technical research manager at the Stanford Internet Observatory. Deplatforming individuals or denying service to companies that tolerate violent rhetoric, as Amazon did with Parler, can have an impact, particularly in the short term and when done at scale. It reduces the reach of influential liars and can make it more difficult for “alt-tech” apps to operate. A notorious example of deplatforming involved Alex Jones, the conspiracy theorist behind the site Infowars. Jones was kicked off Apple, Facebook, YouTube, and Spotify in 2018 for his repeated endorsement of violence. He lost nearly 2.5 million subscribers on YouTube alone, and in the three weeks after his accounts were cut off, Infowars’ daily average visits dropped from close to 1.4 million to 715,000. But Jones didn’t disappear—he migrated to Parler, Gab, and other alt-tech platforms, and he spoke at a rally in Washington the night before the Capitol attack. One outcome of unplugging Trump and other right-wing influencers has been a surge of interest in those alternative social media platforms, where more dangerous echo chambers can form and, in encrypted spaces, be more difficult to monitor. “Isn’t this just going to make the extreme communities worse? Yes,” says Ethan Zuckerman, founder of the Institute for Digital Public Infrastructure at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. “But we’re already headed there, and at least the good news is that [extremists] aren’t going to be recruiting in these mainstream spaces.” The bad news, in Zuckerman’s view, is that the far right is now leading the effort to create new forms of online community. “The Nazis right now have an incentive to build alternative distributed media, and the rest of us are behind, because we don’t have the incentive to do it,” Zuckerman explains. He argues that a digital infrastructure that is smaller, distributed, and not-for-profit is the path to a better Internet. “And my real deep fear is that we end up ceding the design of this way of building social networks to far-right extremists, because they are the ones who need these new spaces to discuss and organize.” In March, Trump spokesman Jason Miller said on Fox that the former president was likely to return to social media this spring “with his own platform.” A more fundamental problem than Trump’s presence or absence on Twitter is the power that a single executive—Jack Dorsey, in the case of Twitter—has in making that decision. Social media companies have become so big that they have little fear of accountability in the form of competition. “To put it simply, companies that once were scrappy, underdog startups that challenged the status quo have become the kinds of monopolies we last saw in the era of oil barons and railroad tycoons,” concluded a recent report by the staff of the Democratic members of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust. For now, the reforms at Facebook and other companies remain largely superficial. The platforms are still based on algorithms that reward outrageous content and are still financed via the collection and sale of user data. Karen Hao of MIT Technology Review recently reported that a former Facebook AI researcher told her “his team conducted ‘study after study’ confirming the same basic idea: models that maximize engagement increase polarization.” Hao’s investigation concluded that Facebook leadership’s relentless pursuit of growth “repeatedly weakened or halted many initiatives meant to clean up misinformation on the platform.” The modest “break glass” measures Facebook took during the election in response to the swell of misinformation, which included tweaks to its ranking algorithm to emphasize news sources it considered “authoritative,” have already been reversed. Tech companies could do more, as the election-time tweaks revealed. But they still “refuse to see misinformation as a core feature of their product,” says Joan Donovan, research director for the Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics and Public Policy at Harvard University. The problem of misinformation appears so vast “because that’s exactly what the technology allows.” There are some signs of a growing appetite for regulation on Capitol Hill. Democrats have proposed reforms to Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which insulates tech companies from legal liability for content posted to their platforms, such as requiring more transparency about content moderation and opening platforms to lawsuits in limited circumstances when content causes real-world harm. (GOP critiques of Section 230, on the other hand, make the false argument that it allows platforms to discriminate against conservatives.) Another legislative tactic would focus on the algorithms that platforms use to amplify content, rather than on the content itself. A bill introduced by two House Democrats would make companies liable if their algorithms promote content linked to acts of violence. Democratic lawmakers are also eyeing changes to antitrust law, while several antitrust lawsuits have been filed against Facebook and Google. But litigation could take years. Even breaking up Big Tech would leave intact its predatory business model. To address this, Zuckerman and other experts have called for a tax on targeted digital advertising. Such a tax would discourage targeted advertising, and the revenue could be used to fund public-service media. Held to account? Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey testified remotely before the Senate Judiciary Committee in November 2020. (Matt York / AP) Social media plays a key role in amplifying conspiracy theories and political misinformation, but it didn’t create them. “When we think of disinformation as something that appeared [only in the Trump era], and that we used to have this agreed-upon narrative of what was true and then social platforms came into the picture and now that’s all fragmented… that makes a lot of assumptions about the idea that everyone used to agree on what was true and what was false,” says Alice E. Marwick, an assistant professor at the University of North Carolina who studies social media and society. Politicians have long leveraged misinformation, particularly racist tropes. But it’s been made particularly potent not just by social media, Marwick argues, but by the right-wing media industry that profits from lies. “The American online public sphere is a shambles because it was grafted onto a television and radio public sphere that was already deeply broken,” argue Yochai Benkler, Robert Faris, and Hal Roberts of Harvard’s Berkman Klein Center for Internet and Society in their book Network Propaganda. The collapse of local news left a vacuum that for many Americans has been filled by partisan outlets that, on the right, are characterized by blatant disregard for journalistic standards of sourcing and verification. This insulated world of right-wing outlets, which stretches from those that bill themselves as objective sources, Fox News chief among them, to talk radio and extreme sites like Infowars and The Gateway Pundit, “represents a radicalization of roughly a third of the American media system,” the authors write. The conservative movement spent decades building this apparatus to peddle lies and fear along with miracle cures and pyramid schemes, and was so successful that Fox and other far-right outlets ended up in a tight two-step with the White House. Fox chairman Rupert Murdoch maintained a close relationship with Trump, as did Sean Hannity and former Fox News copresident Bill Shine, who became White House communications director in 2018. The backlash against Fox in the wake of the election hinted at a possible dethroning of the ruler of the right’s media machine. Its farther-right rival Newsmax TV posted a higher rating than Fox for the first time ever in the month after the election, following supportive tweets from Trump, and during the week of November 9 it passed Breitbart as the most-visited conservative website. But Fox quickly regained its perch. The network backpedaled rapidly during its post-election ratings slump, firing an editor who’d defended the projection of a Biden win in Arizona and replacing news programming with opinion content. According to Media Matters, Fox News pushed the idea of a stolen election nearly 800 times in the two weeks after declaring Biden the winner. The network’s ad revenue increased 31 percent during the final quarter of 2020, while its parent company, Fox Corporation, saw a 17 percent jump in pretax profit. The far-right media ecosystem has become so powerful in part because there’s been no downside to lying. Instead, the Trump administration demonstrated that there was a market opportunity in serving up misinformation that purports to back up what people want to believe. “In this day and age, people want something that tends to affirm their views and opinions,” Newsmax CEO Chris Ruddy told The New York Times’ Ben Smith in an interview published shortly after the election. Claims of a rigged election were “great for news,” he said in another interview. Trump’s departure from the White House won’t necessarily reduce the demand for this kind of content. Since the Capitol riot, two voting-systems companies have launched an unusual effort to hold right-wing outlets and influencers accountable for some of the lies they’ve spread. Dominion Voting Systems, a major provider of voting technology, and another company called Smartmatic were the subjects of myriad outlandish claims related to election fraud, many of which were used in lawsuits filed by Trump’s campaign and were repeatedly broadcast on Fox, Newsmax TV, and OAN. Since January the companies have filed several defamation suits against Trump campaign lawyers Sidney Powell and Rudy Giuliani, MyPillow CEO Mike Lindell, and Fox News and three of its hosts. Dominion alleges that as a result of false accusations, its “founder and employees have been harassed and have received death threats, and Dominion has suffered unprecedented and irreparable harm.” The threat of legal action forced a number of media companies to issue corrections for stories about supposed election meddling that mentioned Dominion. The conservative website American Thinker published a statement admitting its stories about Dominion were “completely false and have no basis in fact” and “rel[ied] on discredited sources who have peddled debunked theories.” OAN simply deleted all of the stories about Dominion from its website without comment. These lawsuits will not dismantle the world of right-wing media, but they have prompted a more robust debate about how media and social media companies could be held liable for lies that turn lethal—and whether this type of legal action should be pursued, given the protections afforded by the First Amendment and the fact that the powerful often use libel law to bully journalists. Alternative reality: Trump supporters in Maricopa County derided Fox for reporting on election night that Biden had won the state. (Hannah McKay / Pool / Getty Images) Ethan Zuckerman has been thinking about how to build a better Internet for years, a preoccupation not unrelated to the fact that, in the 1990s, he wrote the code that created pop-up ads. (“I’m sorry. Our intentions were good,” he wrote in 2014.) Still, he believes that framing misinformation as a problem of media and technology is myopic. “It’s very hard to conclude that this is purely an informational problem,” Zuckerman says. “It’s a power problem.” The GOP is increasingly tolerant of, and even reliant on, weaponized misinformation. “We’re in a place where the Republican Party realizes that as much as 70 percent of their voters don’t believe that Biden was legitimately elected, and they are now deeply reluctant to contradict what their voters believe,” Zuckerman says. Republicans are reluctant, at least in part, because of a legitimate fear of primary challenges from the right, but also because they learned from Trump the power of using conspiracy theories to mobilize alienated voters by preying on their deep mistrust of public institutions. It’s one thing for an ordinary citizen to retweet a false claim; it’s another for elected officials to legitimize conspiracy theories. But holding the GOP to account may prove to be even harder than reforming Big Tech. The radical grass roots have been empowered by small-dollar fundraising and gerrymandering, while more moderate Republicans are retiring or leaving the party. Writer Erick Trickey argued recently in The Washington Post that what undercut a similar wave of conservative crackpot paranoia driven by the John Birch Society in the 1960s was explicit denunciation by prominent conservatives like William Buckley and Ronald Reagan as well as Republican congressional leaders. But today’s party leaders have been unwilling to excommunicate conspiracy-mongers. In the aftermath of the Capitol riot, elected officials who spread rumors that the violence was actually the result of antifascists—including Arizona’s Paul Gosar and Andy Biggs—gained notoriety, while those critical of Trump were publicly humiliated. The embrace of conspiratorial narratives has been particularly pronounced in state GOP organizations. The Texas GOP recently incorporated the QAnon slogan “We are the storm” into official publicity media, and the Oregon GOP’s executive committee endorsed the theory that the riot had been a “false flag” operation. In March, members of the Oregon GOP voted to replace its Trump-supporting chairman with a candidate even farther out on the extremist fringe. Weaponized misinformation could have a lasting impact not only on the shape of the GOP but also on public policy. Republicans are now using the big lie to try to restrict voting rights in Arizona, Georgia, and dozens of other states. As of February 19, according to the Brennan Center for Justice, lawmakers in 43 states had introduced more than 250 bills restricting access to voting, “over seven times the number of restrictive bills as compared to roughly this time last year.” In late March, Georgia Governor Brian Kemp signed a 95-page bill making it harder to vote in that state in a number of ways. Many of the far-right extremists, politicians, and media influencers who spread misinformation about the presidential election are now pushing falsehoods about Covid-19 vaccines. The rumors, which have spread on social media apps like Telegram that are frequented by QAnon adherents and militia groups, among others, range from standard anti-vax talking points to absurd claims that the vaccines are part of a secret plan hatched by Bill Gates to implant trackable microchips, or that they cause infertility or alter human DNA. Sidestepping the craziest conspiracies, prominent conservatives like Tucker Carlson and Wisconsin Senator Ron Johnson, who has become one of the GOP’s leading purveyors of misinformation, are casting doubt about vaccine safety under the pretense of “just asking questions.” Vaccine misinformation plays into the longstanding conservative effort to sow mistrust in government, and it appears to be having an effect: A third of Republicans now say they don’t want to get vaccinated. These are the true costs of misinformation: deadly riots, policy changes that could disenfranchise legitimate voters, scores of preventable deaths. These translate into financial externalities: the additional expense of securing the Capitol, additional dollars devoted to the pandemic response. More abstract but no less real are the social costs: the parents lost down QAnon rabbit holes, the erosion of factual foundations that permit productive argument. The problem with the far right’s universe of “alternative facts” is not that it’s hermetically sealed from the universe the rest of us live in. Rather, it’s that these universes cannot truly be separated. If we’ve learned anything in the past six months, it’s that epistemological distance doesn’t prevent collisions in the real world that can be lethal to individuals—and potentially ruinous for democratic systems.

#### Disinformation undermines collective responses to existential threats

Roston 21, citing Bak-Coleman, PhD, postdoctoral fellow at the University of Washington Center for an Informed Public (Eric, “As Climate Change Fries the World, Social Media Is Frying Our Brains,” *Bloomberg News*, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-06-29/as-climate-change-fries-the-world-social-media-is-frying-our-brains>)

Amid emergency heat, flooding, and famine, it’s even more critical that people recognize and agree at least on the big picture. And yet, as recent history has shown us time and again, they don’t. Much of that can be blamed on the pandemic of misinformation—concerning climate change, Covid-19, vaccines, and so much more— now running rampant on social media. It reminds Joseph Bak-Coleman of fish. Bak-Coleman is the lead author of a provocative new article in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences about scientists’ inability thus far to adequately inform policymakers about how digital technology is impeding efforts to solve climate change and other collective-behavior problems. Individual fish swimming in a school intuit each other so rapidly and clearly that they can instantaneously and in unison pivot away from whatever dangers they encounter. Insofar as that is true, they have a limited error margin for passing along bad information. “It costs energy when you get scared for no reason, and it also costs life if you don’t get scared when you should,” said Bak-Coleman, a University of Washington postdoctoral scholar with expertise in neuroscience and evolutionary biology. “Animal groups are highly tuned to do these really fantastic feats of behavior. But it’s all quite fragile.” The development of digital communications has eroded or vaporized community protections developed over millennia to ensure at least a minimally healthy flow of information, which leads to healthy decision-making. That loss, Bak-Coleman and his co-authors write, “combined with rapid distribution of falsehood, may present one of the larger threats to human well-being.” Think of it like this. If you wanted to make the most obvious statement in the world, you could do worse than: “Technology now allows people to communicate instantaneously and across great distances.” Yet if you wanted to elicit the most tortured answer in the world, you might ask something incredibly similar: “What happens when people can communicate instantaneously and across great distances?” The tension between the obvious statement and the unanswerable question—which holds within it just about all of the world’s large-scale problems, including climate change—is so great, Bak-Coleman and his colleagues propose a whole new academic discipline just to try to understand it. As physiology has medicine and climate science has emissions-mitigation and adaptation–planning, they argue, the digital-misinformation pandemic requires an applied science—or as they call it, a “crisis discipline.” The need for such a discipline is also urgent, they argue, because “given that algorithms and companies are already altering our global patterns of behavior for financial reasons, there is no safe hands-off approach.” Despite the many joys and productive uses of digital communication, it routinely conveys so many falsehoods, so quickly, that many people are left either unable to see or unwilling to fix existential dilemmas, leaving humanity overall in a precarious condition.

### Politics DA---1NC

#### Reconciliation-bill will pass next week, but it’s not inevitable. There’s more work to be done.

Woodruff, Alcindor and Deese 11-9-2021 (“White House ‘confident’ Congress will pass Build Back Better bill,” *PBS*,” pbs.org/newshour/show/white-house-confident-congress-will-pass-build-back-better-bill)

President Joe Biden is expected to sign the bipartisan infrastructure deal into law, securing a major legislative victory. But his larger economic and social spending package still remains a subject of concern as members of Congress mull its provisions. Yamiche Alcindor talks to Brian Deese, director of the National Economic Council for the Biden administration, about those negotiations. Judy Woodruff: President Biden will soon sign into law one major piece of his agenda, the bipartisan infrastructure deal, securing a major legislative victory. But there is still work to be done to get his larger economic and social spending package over the finish line. Yamiche Alcindor talks to one of the White House's key negotiators on where it all stands. Yamiche Alcindor: Since the infrastructure vote on Friday night, the Biden administration has directed its focus to the Build Back Better package. That's the $1.75 trillion bill with money for child care, health care, and climate change. It needs nearly every House Democrat and all 50 Senate Democrats on board to pass. Brian Deese is the director of the National Economic Council for the Biden administration. He's been a central figure in these negotiations. And he joins me now from the White House. Brian, thank you so much for being here. President Biden will soon pass the bipartisan infrastructure plan, but there were many lawmakers who wanted it tied to the Build Back Better act. What assurances can you give Americans that that Build Back Better act is going to become law? And how soon do you expect that to happen? Brian Deese, Director, National Economic Council: Well, for starters, what I can assure folks is that signing this historic infrastructure bill is going to do a lot of good for the country. We have waited decades to actually do something about infrastructure. And, in that period, the United States has fallen behind. We're 13th in the world in infrastructure. And with this piece of legislation that the president will sign soon, we're going to make historic investments in rebuilding both our physical infrastructure ports, and airports, roads, and bridges, transit, but also provide high-speed Internet to all Americans, clean water by replacing lead service lines across the country. So this is a big set of investments, a capital investment in America that we have waited way too long to do, and we're now finally going to make happen. And I think that's going to build real momentum for getting the second half of the president's economic agenda, the Build Back Better plan, into law. That will start next week, where we anticipate a vote in the House, and then onto the Senate as well.

#### Antitrust reform trades off with other legislative priorities

Carstensen 21, JD and MA @ Yale, Former Chair of U-W Law School, Senior Fellow of the American Antitrust Institute (Peter, “THE “OUGHT” AND “IS LIKELY” OF BIDEN ANTITRUST,” <https://www.concurrences.com/en/review/issues/no-1-2021/on-topic/the-new-us-antitrust-administration-en>)

14. Similarly, despite bipartisan murmurs about competitive issues, the potential in a closely divided Congress that any major initiatives will survive is limited at best. In part the challenge here is how the Biden administration will rank its commitments. If it were to make reform of competition law a major and primary commitment, it would have to trade off other goals, which might include health care reform or increases in the minimum wage. It is likely in this circumstance the new administration, like the Obama administration’s abandonment of the pro-competitive rules proposed under the PSA, would elect to give up stricter competition rules in order to achieve other legislative priorities. 15. Another key to a robust commitment to workable competition is the choice of cabinet and other key administrative positions. Here as well, the early signs are not entirely encouraging. In selecting Tom Vilsack to return as secretary of agriculture, the president has embraced a friend of the large corporate interests dominating agriculture who has spent the last four years in a highly lucrative position advancing their interests. Given the desperate need for pro-competitive rules to implement the PSA and control exploitation of dairy farmers through milk-market orders, the return of Vilsack is not good news. Who will head the FTC and who will be the attorney general and assistant attorney general for antitrust is still unknown, but if those picks are also centrists with strong links to corporate America the hope for robust enforcement of competition law will further attenuate! 16. In sum, this is a pessimistic prognostication for the likely Biden antitrust enforcement agenda. There is much that ought to be done. But this requires a willingness to take major enforcement risks, to invest significant political capital in the legislative process, and to select leaders who are committed to advancing the public interest in fair, efficient and dynamically competitive markets. The early signs are that the new administration will be no more committed to robust competition policy than the Obama administration. Events may force a more vigorous policy—I will cling to that hope as the Biden administration takes shape.

#### Reconciliation is key to pandemic preparedness

Kates 11-10-2021, PhD @ GWU, Senior Vice President and Director of Global Health & HIV Policy at KFF, where she oversees policy analysis and research focused on the U.S. government’s role in global health and on the global and domestic HIV epidemics. Widely regarded as an expert in the field, she regularly publishes and presents on global health and HIV policy issues and is particularly known for her work analyzing donor government investments in global health; assessing and mapping the U.S. government’s global health architecture, programs, and funding; and tracking and analyzing major U.S. HIV programs and financing, and key trends in the HIV epidemic, an area she has been working in for close to thirty years. Prior to joining KFF in 1998, Dr. Kates was a Senior Associate with The Lewin Group, a health care consulting firm, where she focused on HIV policy, strategic planning/health systems analysis, and health care for vulnerable populations. Among other prior positions, she directed the Office of Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Concerns at Princeton University. Dr. Kates has served on numerous federal and private sector advisory committees on global health and HIV issues, including PEPFAR’s Scientific Advisory Board, the NIH Office of AIDS Research Advisory Council, the CDC/HRSA Advisory Committee on HIV, Viral Hepatitis and STD Prevention and Treatment (CHACHSPT), the board of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, and the Governing Council of the International AIDS Society. She is also a lecturer at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. (Jennifer and Adam Wexler, “Public Health Infrastructure and Pandemic Preparedness Provisions in the Build Back Better Act,” *KFF*, <https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/public-health-infrastructure-and-pandemic-preparedness-provisions-in-the-build-back-better-act/>)

The Build Back Better Act, originally introduced in Congress on September 27, 2021, is a broad funding and programmatic package supported by President Biden. The bill, as first introduced by the House, was estimated to total $3.5 trillion. A more recent version now under consideration in the House is estimated to total significantly less, at $1.75 trillion, due to pressures to reduce the bill’s cost. Among the provisions in the bill are several designed to strengthen the public health infrastructure, including the workforce, and to support pandemic preparedness. While the original version of the bill provided $51.8 billion for these purposes (with $36 billion directed toward improving the public health infrastructure and $15.8 billion toward pandemic preparedness), the new version of the bill provides 63% less, or $19.2 billion, including $16.2 billion for public health infrastructure and $3 billion for pandemic preparedness. Almost all public health and preparedness areas in the original bill saw reductions, and several were eliminated. The following table identifies the provisions of the bill related to public health infrastructure and pandemic preparedness, their specific funding amounts, and activities supported.1 Unless otherwise specified, all funding would be made available until expended, and, if ultimately enacted, would build on funding provided in previous emergency spending bills passed by Congress to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. Area/Provision Amount Activities HEALTH CARE INFRASTRUCTURE AND WORKFORCE $16,160,000,000 SEC. 31001. FUNDING TO SUPPORT CORE PUBLIC HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURE FOR STATE, TERRITORIAL, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL HEALTH DEPARTMENTS AT THE CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION $7,000,000,000 (provided between 2022-2026) Funding to support core public health infrastructure activities to strengthen the public health system and expand and improve activities of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Activities include: health equity activities; workforce capacity and competency; all hazards public health and preparedness; testing capacity, including test platforms, mobile testing units, and personnel; health information, health information systems, and health information analysis (including data analytics); epidemiology and disease surveillance; contact tracing; policy and communications; financing; community partnership development; and relevant components of organizational capacity. Funding Allocation: To support core public health infrastructure activities throughout the U.S. Population-Based Grants: $3,500,000,000 provided to each State or territorial health department, and to local health departments that serve counties with a population of at least 2,000,000 or cities with a population of at least 400,000 people. Formula must consider population size and the Social Vulnerability Index. Competitive Grants: $1,750,000,000 provided through competitive grants to State, territorial, local, or Tribal health departments. NOTE: Of the grant funding provided to State health departments through formula and competitive awards, at least 25% must be reallocated to local health departments. CDC: $1,750,000,000 to expand and improve core public health infrastructure and activities at the CDC. SEC. 31002. FUNDING FOR HEALTH CENTER CAPITAL GRANTS $2,000,000,000 Funding to be awarded through grants and cooperative agreements to support community health centers for capital improvement projects. SEC. 31003. FUNDING FOR TEACHING HEALTH CENTER GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION $3,370,000,000 Funding for direct payments and awards to support the establishment of new as well as the maintenance and expansion of existing graduate medical residency training programs. SEC. 31004. FUNDING FOR CHILDREN’S HOSPITALS THAT OPERATE GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS $200,000,000 Funding to support children’s hospitals that operate graduate medical education programs. SEC. 31005. FUNDING FOR NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE CORPS $2,000,000,000 Funding to support the National Health Service Corps. SEC. 31006. FUNDING FOR THE NURSE CORPS $500,000,000 Funding to support the Nurse Corps. SEC. 31007. FUNDING FOR SCHOOLS OF MEDICINE IN UNDERSERVED AREAS $500,000,000 Funding to be awarded to support the establishment, improvement, or expansion of an allopathic or osteopathic school of medicine, with priority given to minority-serving institutions, and taking into consideration equitable distribution of awards among the geographical regions of the United States (including rural populations) in order to reach disadvantaged, rural, underserved, underrepresented, and low-income individuals. Among other things, supported activities include: recruiting, enrolling, and retaining students; curricula development, implementation, expansion, and modernization; facilities construction, modernization, or expansion; accreditation; and the hiring of faculty and staff. SEC. 31008. FUNDING FOR SCHOOLS OF NURSING IN UNDERSERVED AREAS $500,000,000 Funding to be awarded to support schools of nursing to enhance and modernize nursing education programs and increase the number of faculty and students at such schools, taking into consideration equitable distribution of awards among the geographical regions of the United States, the capacity of a school of nursing to provide care in underserved areas, and with priority to reach disadvantaged, rural, underserved, underrepresented, and low-income individuals. Among other things, supported activities include: recruiting, enrolling, and retaining students; creating, modernizing, enhancing, or expanding curricula and programs; hiring and retention of faculty; modernizing school infrastructure; and establishing partnerships with healthcare providers as well as interdisciplinary programs to further educational opportunities. SEC. 31009. FUNDING FOR PALLIATIVE CARE AND HOSPICE EDUCATION AND TRAINING $25,000,000 Funding to be awarded through grants and contracts to support the training of health professionals in palliative and hospice care as well as foster patient and family engagement, integration of palliative and hospice care with primary care and other appropriate specialties, and collaboration with community partners to address gaps in health care for individuals in need of palliative or hospice care with priority given to rural, medically underserved populations and communities, Indian Tribes or Tribal Organizations, or Urban Indian organizations. SEC. 31010. FUNDING FOR PALLIATIVE MEDICINE PHYSICIAN TRAINING $20,000,000 Funding to be awarded through grants and contracts to accredited schools of medicine, schools of osteopathic medicine, teaching hospitals, and graduate medical education programs for the purpose of providing support for projects that fund the training of physicians or specialists who plan to teach or practice palliative medicine. SEC. 31011. FUNDING FOR PALLIATIVE CARE AND HOSPICE ACADEMIC CAREER AWARDS $20,000,000 Funding to be awarded to accredited schools of medicine, osteopathic medicine, nursing, social work, psychology, allied health, dentistry, or chaplaincy applying on behalf of board-certified or board-eligible individuals to promote the academic career development as hospice and palliative care specialists. SEC. 31012. FUNDING FOR HOSPICE AND PALLIATIVE NURSING $20,000,000 Funding to be awarded as grants and contracts to accredited schools of nursing, health care facilities, programs leading to certification as a certified nurse assistant, or partnerships of such schools and facilities to develop and implement programs and initiatives to train and educate individuals in providing interprofessional, interdisciplinary, team-based palliative care in health-related educational, hospital, hospice, home, or long-term care settings. SEC. 31013. FUNDING FOR DISSEMINATION OF PALLIATIVE CARE INFORMATION $5,000,000 Funding to be provided through the award of grants or contracts to public and nonprofit private entities to disseminate information to inform patients, families, caregivers, direct care workers, and health professionals about the benefits of palliative care throughout the continuum of care for patients with serious or life-threatening illness. PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS $3,000,000,000 SEC. 31021. FUNDING FOR LABORATORY ACTIVITIES AT THE CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION $1,400,000,000 Acting through the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, funding shall be used to renovate, improve, expand, and modernize State and local public health laboratory infrastructure as well as CDC laboratories. Activities supported include improving and enhancing: testing and response capacity; the Laboratory Response Network for rapid outbreak detection; genomic sequencing capabilities to detect emerging diseases and variant strains; and biosafety and biosecurity capacity. Funding may also be used to enhance the ability of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to monitor and exercise oversight over biosafety and biosecurity of State and local public health laboratories. SEC. 31022. FUNDING FOR PUBLIC HEALTH AND PREPAREDNESS RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND COUNTERMEASURE CAPACITY $1,300,000,000 Acting through the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response Activities, funding shall be used to support: Surge capacity, including through construction, expansion, or modernization of facilities, to respond to a public health emergency, for procurement and domestic manufacture of drugs, active pharmaceutical ingredients, vaccines and other biological products, diagnostic technologies and products, personal protective equipment, medical devices, vials, syringes, needles, and other components or supplies for the Strategic National Stockpile Expanded global and domestic vaccine production capacity, including by developing or acquiring new technology and expanding manufacturing capacity through construction, expansion, or modernization of facilities Activities to mitigate supply chain risks and enhance supply chain elasticity and resilience for critical drugs, active pharmaceutical ingredients, and supplies (including essential medicines, medical countermeasures, and supplies in shortage or at risk of shortage), drug and vaccine raw materials, and other supplies through the construction, expansion, or modernization of facilities, adoption of advanced manufacturing processes, and other activities to support domestic manufacturing of such supplies Activities conducted by the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority for advanced research, standards development, and domestic manufacturing capacity for drugs, including essential medicines, diagnostics, vaccines, therapeutics, and personal protective equipment Increased biosafety and biosecurity in research on infectious diseases, including by modernization or improvement of facilities. SEC. 31023. FUNDING FOR INFRASTRUCTURE MODERNIZATION AND INNOVATION AT THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION $300,000,000 Funding provided to improve and modernize infrastructure at the Food and Drug Administration and to enhance food and medical product safety as follows: $150,000,000 for improving technological infrastructure, including through developing integrated systems, and improving the interoperability of information technology systems. $150,000,000 for modernizing laboratory infrastructure of, or used by, the Food and Drug Administration, including modernization of facilities related to, and supporting, such laboratory infrastructure, including through planning for, and the construction, repair, improvement, extension, alteration, demolition, and purchase of, fixed equipment or facilities.

#### Extinction

Mooney 21, Senior Communications and Advocacy Manager @ (Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations) (Tom, “Preparing for the next “Disease X”,” CEPI, <https://cepi.net/news_cepi/preparing-for-the-next-disease-x/>)

We cannot develop vaccines against all potential viral threats, but we could produce a library of prototype vaccines and other biological interventions against representative pathogens from each of these 25 viral families. Having such a library of prototype vaccines, which could be ‘pulled off the shelf’, and advanced into clinical testing as soon as a related threat emerges would dramatically accelerate the development of vaccines. We also know that beta coronaviruses that cause SARS and MERS are associated with case fatality rates of 10-35% (25-88 times worse than COVID-19) and that coronaviruses circulate widely in animal reservoirs. The emergence of a coronavirus variant combining the transmissibility of COVID-19 with the lethality of SARS or MERS would be utterly devastating. We must minimise this threat as a matter of urgency. One way to do this in the long-term would be to develop a vaccine that provides broad protection against coronaviruses in general. If we can produce vaccines against Disease X in a matter of months instead of a year or more, we could revolutionise the world’s ability to respond to epidemic and pandemic diseases. Disease X and other emerging infectious diseases pose an existential threat to humanity. But for the first time in history, with the right level of financial commitment and political will, we could credibly aim to eliminate the risk of epidemics and pandemics.

### T Per Se---1NC

#### T Prohibition

#### “Prohibition” requires a declaration of per se illegality

Loevinger 61 (Honorable Lee Loevinger- Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division. “THE RULE OF REASON IN ANTITRUST LAW” , *Section of Antitrust Law* , 1961, Vol. 19, PROCEEDINGS AT THE ANNUAL MEETING, ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, AUGUST 7 THROUGH 11, 1961 (1961), pp. 245-251, JSTOR accessed online via KU libraries, date accessed 9/13/21)

Running through the history of antitrust law are two contrapuntal themes: A prohibition of restraint of trade and a principle lately called the "rule of reason" which limits the prohibition. The legal rule against restraint of trade began in the 15th century in cases holding that a contract by which a man agreed not to practice his trade or profession was illegal.1 However, in the course of development of the common law, it became established that agreements which were ancillary to the sale or transfer of a trade or business and which were limited so as to impose a restriction no greater than reasonably necessary to protect the purchaser's interest.2

Thus, when the Sherman Act incorporated the common-law principles on this subject into federal statutory law 3 by adopting the concept of restraint of trade, it presumably imported both the principle that restrictions on competition are illegal and also the principle that in some circumstances a showing of reasonableness will legalize restrictions on competition. Nevertheless, when the question was first presented to the United States Supreme Court under the Sherman Act, it was clearly held (despite later disavowals4 ) that the justification of reasonableness was not available as a defense to a combination which had the effect of restraining trade.' Indeed, it was intimated that the question of reasonableness was not open to the courts in these actions at common law.6 However, when the Court reviewed this matter in Standard Oil Co. v. United States,7 it said in fairly explicit terms both that the Sherman Act prohibited only contracts or acts which unreasonably restrained competition and that the standard of reasonableness had been applied to all restraints of trade at the common law. The Court's assertion is somewhat weakened by the fact that it construed the rule of reason not as applying a standard for judging the character or consequences of the challenged conduct, but as a technique involving the application of human intelligence, or reason, to the problem of making a judgment about whether the conduct does restrain trade.'

#### The aff violates---they create a new legal standard for courts to decide whether a practice is “unreasonable” based on weighing effects

#### VOTE NEG---Balancing tests devastate core links because they allow the practice when it’s beneficial. AND, creates a moving target, because the disallowed behavior is context-dependent.

## Case

### Inequality Advantage---1NC

#### 1---Growth is goldilocks now. Strong growth without overheating.

Carlsson-Szlezak 10-7-2021, chief economist at The Boston Consulting Group and leads the firm's Center for Macroeconomics in New York (Philipp, et al, “The U.S. Economic Recovery Is Slowing Down. Don’t Be Alarmed.,” *Harvard Business Review*, <https://hbr.org/2021/10/the-u-s-economic-recovery-is-slowing-down-dont-be-alarmed>)

As business leaders enter the fall, a confluence of negatives is clouding their outlook on the economy. The big bounce back from last year’s trough has lost steam, stimulus is fading, and a plethora of softer economic data is weighing on sentiment. All of this unfolds against the backdrop of the pernicious Delta variant, reinforcing a downbeat narrative. Yet, the economic outlook in the next year remains attractive once we examine what’s driving the current slowdown. To understand why, we need to look at the nature of the rebound, the risks and opportunities as the expansion is handed off to consumers, and the potential ways the current cycle could end. What’s Really Driving the Current Slowdown Policy makers and vaccine developers delivered an enormous growth bounce globally — particularly in the U.S. where a massive V-shaped recovery has been achieved. But deceleration is built into any V-shaped recovery: Outsized growth rates pull activity out of the trough but such growth cannot persist as year-on-year comparisons are progressively made against stronger base periods. With a few exceptions, we expect global growth to peak this year, followed by a deceleration next year. The economy is running into additional negative surprises, which are driving uncertainty and fear: Consumer confidence has dipped markedly in recent weeks, while firms’ outlook has dimmed too, as seen in falling PMIs. Inflation, though moderating recently, has not yet fallen back to comfortable levels, while firms are facing bottlenecks in labor and product markets. This is all occurring against the backdrop of the Delta variant, which brings the prospect of waning of vaccine effectiveness, more breakthrough infections, booster shots, and potentially new rounds of restrictions. Adding complexity, all of this is unfolding in that critical stage of the recovery when the crutches of policy support fade and the private sector — consumers most of all — have to drive the expansion forward. That hand-off is part and parcel of any recovery, but given the unusual size of stimulus and its withdrawal, the slowdown now happens in a high-risk window. If the hand-off to consumers is successful, we project year-over-year growth will slow from as high as 7% in 2021 to perhaps 2.9% in 2022. What looks like a brutal deceleration, however, is in fact necessary. (The economy should not overheat too much.) Plus the projected 2.9% would leave the U.S. economy still operating comfortably above its trend growth of around 2%, below which an expansion becomes sharply more vulnerable. Five Reasons Consumers Can Pick Up the Economic Expansion It’s understandable that the slowdown, unexpected headwinds, and tricky hand-off to consumers should encourage negative expectations. But the headwinds that consumers face now should be netted against the tailwinds and the sources of strength that households have built. Here are five prominent concerns and why they are overblown. First, while economic prospects are still widely equated with the Delta variant’s path, the reality is that the economy largely decoupled from the virus early on. That was not only a function of strong stimulus but also of adaptability. Households and firms have learned to live with the virus and that learning is unlikely to be undone by the Delta variant. For example, even when cases and hospitalizations were at their highest in Florida, we did not see a sharp retreat in economic activity. Second, while fiscal stimulus to households is rapidly fading, the labor market is booming. Remarkably, despite historic unemployment numbers, the stimulus helped personal incomes soar in 2020 and early 2021. Now, with a record number of job openings and many firms struggling to fill them, households are in a good position to replace fading stimulus with employment and higher wages, ensuring that consumer spending power will remain strong. Third, while current inflation is eroding wage gains it is unlikely to last. U.S. price growth continues to look transitory – driven by the idiosyncrasies of a torrid reopening and supply bottlenecks – whereas a tight labor market will not easily return to slack conditions. The prospects for a tight cycle delivering both wage and productivity gains remain strong. Fourth, much has been made of soaring house prices undercutting confidence and household budgets. However, home prices are not the same as housing cost. After factoring in record low financing conditions, the index of housing affordability is broadly in line with pre-pandemic levels and significantly more favorable than in the decades before the global financial crisis. Finally, there is fear of a fickle household sector pulling back at any moment, and the continued high savings rate provides some cover for this idea. But that view ignores the large, accumulated savings, particularly relative to levels of household wealth, which is already high. This suggests that households have room to spend and carry an already strong expansion further.

#### 2---Income inequality doesn’t cause nationalism or war.

Bosancianu 17 (Constantin Manuel Bosancianu, Doctoral School of Political Science, Central European University, Nador u. 9, H-1051 Budapest, Hungary “A Growing Rift in Values? Income and Educational Inequality and Their Impact on Mass Attitude Polarization”, Social Science Quarterly , Volume 98, Issue 5, November 2017, Pages 1587–1602, Accessed 3/3/18, N.G.)

The analyses presented so far have tended to refute the hypotheses I have outlined in the beginning: economic inequality is not associated with increased attitude polarization, regardless of whether I examine the dispersion, bimodality, or consolidation of Left-Right self-placement with respect to income groups in the population. Although for dispersion and bimodality the estimates for income inequality tend to be in the direction expected, they are not statistically significant once educational inequality is controlled for. A conservative interpretation, pending a larger sample, is that there is no significant association between inequality and attitude polarization. The evidence is in line with analyses from the context of the United States, finding little connection between inequality and income-based partisan sorting (Dettrey and Campbell, 2013) or polarization in preferences for redistribution between income groups (Luttig, 2013). The models presented in the previous section also offer a refutation of the RD framework, inasmuch as it applies to mass attitude polarization, as well as of the political economic models presented in the beginning. Rising income inequality neither increases nor decreases the level of attitude polarization in a country; rather, the two appear to be unconnected. The reasons for this have already been presented: it is unlikely for small-to-medium shifts in inequality over a period of 20–30 years to be properly assessed by individuals who most often than not have difficulties naming members of the government, or the parties that form the governing coalition. A recent set of studies confirms that individuals in the United States and Australia woefully underestimate the degree of economic inequality in their society (Norton and Ariely, 2011; Norton et al., 2014). If this insight holds for other nations as well, it is to be expected that variations in attitude polarization are not connected in any way to the level of income inequality in the country. An additional contribution of the analysis conducted here is the strong cross-national impact that educational inequality has on attitude polarization: when controlling for it, the effect of income inequality on either attitude dispersion or bimodality largely disappears. Although economic inequality has been included in a variety of models used to predict attitudes toward redistribution, turnout, political engagement, or social trust, my analysis reveals that treating inequality as a completely exogenous factor is likely to yield biased findings. The effect of educational inequality is likely felt on both income inequality and attitude polarization, but, unlike the former, it does not depend on unrealistic expectations concerning the ability of voters to recognize glacial trends in inequality over decade-long periods. Most likely, educational inequality exerts an impact by shaping the socioeconomic circumstances of individuals at different educational levels, which, in turn, influences their prevailing policy orientations and values, particularly with respect to redistributive issues. These attitudes are some of the more important questions over which political competition is carried out, and form the foundation of Left-Right identification: the extent to which income differences result in harder work and a boost in productivity, or constitute a social harm; the extent to which government intervention in the economy maintains equality in the provision of goods and services, or rather leads to inefficiency and financial waste. Larger educational inequality leads to a growing divergence in these attitudes, which could subsequently make way for increased social tensions and breakdown in civil debate if allowed to continue unabated. The findings offer an additional cautionary tale for studies that attempt to model in vacuo the impact of income inequality on any individual-level political behavior or attitude.8 A wide range of factors can be presumed to be causes of both income inequality and attitude shift: changes in the population structure or in the relative importance of economic sectors, or the policies that have brought about welfare state retrenchment (an externality of which is educational inequality). Lack of proper consideration for the sources of economic inequality, and for the potential influences of these sources on the phenomenon to be explained, cannot produce an adequate picture of the true effects of inequality on democratic dynamics. As I have shown here, controlling for what could be considered a causal determinant of income inequality, the impact of the Gini index on attitude polarization largely disappears.

#### 3---No LIO impact---it’s a myth.

Staniland 18, Associate Professor of Political Science and Chair of the Committee on International Relations at the University of Chicago. (Paul, 7/29/18, “Misreading the “Liberal Order”: Why We Need New Thinking in American Foreign Policy”, *Lawfare*; https://www.lawfareblog.com/misreading-liberal-order-why-we-need-new-thinking-american-foreign-policy)

Pushing back against Trump’s foreign policy is an important goal. But moving forward requires a more serious analysis than claiming that the “liberal international order” was the centerpiece of past U.S. foreign-policy successes, and thus should be again. Both claims are flawed. We need to understand the limits of the liberal international order, where it previously failed to deliver benefits, and why it offers little guidance for many contemporary questions.

First, advocates of the order tend to skim past the policies pursued under the liberal order that have not worked. These mistakes need to be directly confronted to do better in the future.

Proponents of the order, however, often present a narrow and highly selective reading of history that ignores much of the coercion, violence, and instability that accompanied post-war history. Problematic outcomes are treated as either aberrant exceptions or as not truly characterizing the order. One recent defense of the liberal order by prominent liberal institutionalists Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, for instance, does not mention Iraq, Afghanistan, Vietnam, or Libya. Professors Stephen Chaudoin, Helen Milner, and Dustin Tingley herald the order’s “support for freedom, democracy, human rights, a free press.” Kori Schake writes that Western democracies’ wars are “about enlarging the perimeter of security and prosperity, expanding and consolidating the liberal order.” Historian Hal Brands argues that the order has advocated “political liberalism in the form of representative government and human rights; and other liberal concepts, such as nonaggression, self-determination, and the peaceful settlement of disputes.”

Other analysts have persuasively argued that these accounts create an “imagined” picture of post-World War II history. Patrick Porter outlines in detail how coercive, violent, and hypocritical U.S. foreign policy has often been. To the extent an international liberal order ever actually existed beyond a small cluster of countries, writes Nick Danforth, it was recent and short-lived. Thomas Meaney and Stephen Wertheim further argue that “critics exaggerate Mr. Trump’s abnormality,” situating him within a long history of the pursuit of American self-interest. Graham Allison—no bomb-throwing radical—has recently written that the order was a “myth” and that credit for the lack of great power war should instead go to nuclear deterrence. Coercion and disregard for both allies and political liberalism have been entirely compatible with the “liberal” order.

The last two decades have been a bumpy ride for U.S. foreign policy. Since 9/11, we have seen the disintegration of Syria, Yemen, and Libya, a war without end in Afghanistan, the collapse of the Arab Spring, the rise and resurgence of the Islamic State, and the distinctly mixed success of strategies aimed at managing China’s rise. At home, the growth of a national-security state has placed remarkable power in the hands of Donald Trump. Simply returning to the old order is no guarantee of good results. Grappling openly with failure and self-inflicted wounds—while also acknowledging clear benefits of the order—is essential for moving beyond self-congratulatory platitudes.

#### 4---International order is resilient, the U.S. isn’t key---it adapts and self-corrects

Deudney and Ikenberry, 18 - \*Daniel Deudney, Associate Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University \*\*G. John Ikenberry is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University; “Liberal World: The Resilient Order,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-06-14/liberal-world

Decades after they were supposedly banished from the West, the dark forces of world politics—illiberalism, autocracy, nationalism, protectionism, spheres of influence, territorial revisionism—have reasserted themselves. China and Russia have dashed all hopes that they would quickly transition to democracy and support the liberal world order. To the contrary, they have strengthened their authoritarian systems at home and flouted norms abroad. Even more stunning, with the United Kingdom having voted for Brexit and the United States having elected Donald Trump as president, the leading patrons of the liberal world order have chosen to undermine their own system. Across the world, a new nationalist mindset has emerged, one that views international institutions and globalization as threats to national sovereignty and identity rather than opportunities.

The recent rise of illiberal forces and leaders is certainly worrisome. Yet it is too soon to write the obituary of liberalism as a theory of international relations, liberal democracy as a system of government, or the liberal order as the overarching framework for global politics. The liberal vision of nation-states cooperating to achieve security and prosperity remains as vital today as at any time in the modern age. In the long course of history, liberal democracy has hit been hard times before, only to rebound and gain ground. It has done so thanks to the appeal of its basic values and its unique capacities to effectively grapple with the problems of modernity and globalization.

For the first time in history, global institutions are now necessary to realize basic human interests; intense forms of interdependence that were once present only on a smaller scale are now present on a global scale.

The order will endure, too. Even though the United States’ relative power is waning, the international system that the country has sustained for seven decades is remarkably durable. As long as interdependence—economic, security-related, and environmental—continues to grow, peoples and governments everywhere will be compelled to work together to solve problems or suffer grievous harm. By necessity, these efforts will build on and strengthen the institutions of the liberal order.

THE LIBERAL VISION

Modern liberalism holds that world politics requires new levels of political integration in response to relentlessly rising interdependence. But political orders do not arise spontaneously, and liberals argue that a world with more liberal democratic capitalist states will be more peaceful, prosperous, and respectful of human rights. It is not inevitable that history will end with the triumph of liberalism, but it is inevitable that a decent world order will be liberal.

The recent rise of illiberal forces and the apparent recession of the liberal international order may seem to call this school of thought into question. But despite some notable exceptions, states still mostly interact through well-worn institutions and in the spirit of self-interested, pragmatic accommodation.

Moreover, part of the reason liberalism may look unsuited to the times is that many of its critics assail a strawman version of the theory. Liberals are often portrayed as having overly optimistic—even utopian—assumptions about the path of human history. In reality, they have a much more conditional and tempered optimism that recognizes tragic tradeoffs, and they are keenly attentive to the possibilities for large-scale catastrophes. Like realists, they recognize that it is often human nature to seek power, which is why they advocate constitutional and legal restraints. But unlike realists, who see history as cyclical, liberals are heirs to the Enlightenment project of technological innovation, which opens new possibilities both for human progress and for disaster.

Liberalism is essentially pragmatic. Modern liberals embrace democratic governments, market-based economic systems, and international institutions not out of idealism but because they believe these arrangements are better suited to realizing human interests in the modern world than any alternatives. Indeed, in thinking about world order, the variable that matters most for liberal thinkers is interdependence. For the first time in history, global institutions are now necessary to realize basic human interests; intense forms of interdependence that were once present only on a smaller scale are now present on a global scale. For example, whereas environmental problems used to be contained largely within countries or regions, the cumulative effect of human activities on the planet’s biospheric life-support system has now been so great as to require a new geologic name for the current time period—the Anthropocene. Unlike its backward-looking nationalist and realist rivals, liberalism has a pragmatic adaptability and a penchant for institutional innovations that are vital for responding to such emerging challenges as artificial intelligence, cyberwarfare, and genetic engineering.

Overall, liberalism remains perennially and universally appealing because it rests on a commitment to the dignity and freedom of individuals. It enshrines the idea of tolerance, which will be needed in spades as the world becomes increasingly interactive and diverse. Although the ideology emerged in the West, its values have become universal, and its champions have extended to encompass Mahatma Gandhi, Mikhail Gorbachev, and Nelson Mandela. And even though imperialism, slavery, and racism have marred Western history, liberalism has always been at the forefront of efforts—both peaceful and militant—to reform and end these practices. To the extent that the long arc of history does bend toward justice, it does so thanks to the activism and moral commitment of liberals and their allies.

DEMOCRATIC DECLINE IN PERSPECTIVE

In many respects, today’s liberal democratic malaise is a byproduct of the liberal world order’s success. After the Cold War, that order became a global system, expanding beyond its birthplace in the West. But as free markets spread, problems began to crop up: economic inequality grew, old political bargains between capital and labor broke down, and social supports eroded. The benefits of globalization and economic expansion were distributed disproportionately to elites. Oligarchic power bloomed. A modulated form of capitalism morphed into winner-take-all casino capitalism. Many new democracies turned out to lack the traditions and habits necessary to sustain democratic institutions. And large flows of immigrants triggered a xenophobic backlash. Together, these developments have called into question the legitimacy of liberal democratic life and created openings for opportunistic demagogues.

Just as the causes of this malaise are clear, so is its solution: a return to the fundamentals of liberal democracy. Rather than deeply challenging the first principles of liberal democracy, the current problems call for reforms to better realize them. To reduce inequality, political leaders will need to return to the social democratic policies embodied in the New Deal, pass more progressive taxation, and invest in education and infrastructure. To foster a sense of liberal democratic identity, they will need to emphasize education as a catalyst for assimilation and promote national and public service. In other words, the remedy for the problems of liberal democracy is more liberal democracy; liberalism contains the seeds of its own salvation.

Indeed, liberal democracies have repeatedly recovered from crises resulting from their own excesses. In the 1930s, overproduction and the integration of financial markets brought about an economic depression, which triggered the rise of fascism. But it also triggered the New Deal and social democracy, leading to a more stable form of capitalism. In the 1950s, the success of the Manhattan Project, combined with the emerging U.S.-Soviet rivalry, created the novel threat of a worldwide nuclear holocaust. That threat gave rise to arms control pacts and agreements concerning the governance of global spaces, deals forged by the United States in collaboration with the Soviet Union. In the 1970s, rising middle-class consumption led to oil shortages, economic stagnation, and environmental decay. In response, the advanced industrial democracies established oil coordination agreements, invested in clean energy, and struck numerous international environmental accords aimed at reducing pollutants. The problems that liberal democracies face today, while great, are certainly not more challenging than those that they have faced and overcome in these historically recent decades. Of course, there is no guarantee that liberal democracies will successfully rise to the occasion, but to count them out would fly in the face of repeated historical experiences.

Today’s dire predictions ignore these past successes. They suffer from a blinding presentism. Taking what is new and threatening as the master pattern is an understandable reflex in the face of change, but it is almost never a very good guide to the future. Large-scale human arrangements such as liberal democracy rarely change as rapidly or as radically as they seem to in the moment. If history is any guide, today’s illiberal populists and authoritarians will evoke resistance and countermovements.

THE RESILIENT ORDER

After World War II, liberal democracies joined together to create an international order that reflected their shared interests. And as is the case with liberal democracy itself, the order that emerged to accompany it cannot be easily undone. For one thing, it is deeply embedded. Hundreds of millions, if not billions, of people have geared their activities and expectations to the order’s institutions and incentives, from farmers to microchip makers. However unappealing aspects of it may be, replacing the liberal order with something significantly different would be extremely difficult. Despite the high expectations they generate, revolutionary moments often fail to make enduring changes. It is unrealistic today to think that a few years of nationalist demagoguery will dramatically undo liberalism.

Growing interdependence makes the order especially difficult to overturn. Ever since its inception in the eighteenth century, liberalism has been deeply committed to the progressive improvement of the human condition through scientific discovery and technological advancements. This Enlightenment project began to bear practical fruits on a large scale in the nineteenth century, transforming virtually every aspect of human life. New techniques for production, communication, transportation, and destruction poured forth. The liberal system has been at the forefront not just of stoking those fires of innovation but also of addressing the negative consequences. Adam Smith’s case for free trade, for example, was strengthened when it became easier to establish supply chains across global distances. And the age-old case for peace was vastly strengthened when weapons evolved from being simple and limited in their destruction to the city-busting missiles of the nuclear era. Liberal democratic capitalist societies have thrived and expanded because they have been particularly adept at stimulating and exploiting innovation and at coping with their spillover effects and negative externalities. In short, liberal modernity excels at both harvesting the fruits of modern advance and guarding against its dangers.

### FTC Advantage---1NC

#### 1---Turn:

#### A---Uniqueness---the FTC is solving all their impacts now---their internal links demonstrate this because they are squo descriptive cards saying the FTC is solving things now.

#### B---Link turn: ambitious enforcement triggers backlash, which turns the case.

Jones and Kovacic 20, \*Alison Jones is Professor of Law, King’s College London, London WC2R 2LS, United Kingdom \*William E. Kovacic, (“Antitrust’s Implementation Blind Side: Challenges to Major Expansion of U.S. Competition Policy,” *The Antitrust Bulletin,* 202, Vol. 65(2) 227-255, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0003603X20912884>)

D. Political Backlash

As we have already indicated, the government’s prosecution of high stakes antitrust cases often inspires defendants to lobby elected officials to rein in the enforcement agency. Targets of cases that seek to impose powerful remedies have several possible paths to encourage politicians to blunt enforcement measures. One path is to seek intervention from the President. The Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division serves at the will of the President, making DOJ policy dependent on the President’s continuing support. The White House ordinarily does not guide the Antitrust Division’s selection of cases, but there have been instances in which the President pressured the Division to alter course on behalf of a defendant, and did so successfully.125 The second path is to lobby the Congress. The FTC is called an “independent” regulatory agency, but Congress interprets independence in an idiosyncratic way.126 Legislators believe independence means insulation from the executive branch, not from the legislature. The FTC is dependent on a good relationship with Congress, which controls its budget and can react with hostility, and forcefully, when it disapproves of FTC litigation—particularly where it adversely affects the interests of members’ constituents. Controversial and contested cases may consequently be derailed or muted if political support for them wanes and politicians become more sympathetic to commercial interests. The FTC’s sometimes tempestuous relationship with Congress demonstrates that political coalitions favoring bold enforcement can be volatile, unpredictable, and evanescent.127 If the FTC does not manage its relationship with Congress carefully, its litigation opponents may mobilize legislative intervention that causes ambitious enforcement measures to the founder.

#### 2---No scamming impact.

Ewing 20, Citing Keir Giles, a Russia specialist with the Conflict Studies Research Centre in the United Kingdom and Tim Hwang, director of the Harvard-MIT Ethics and Governance of AI Initiative. (Philip, 5-7-2020, “Why Fake Video, Audio May Not Be As Powerful In Spreading Disinformation As Feared”, *NPR*, <https://www.npr.org/2020/05/07/851689645/why-fake-video-audio-may-not-be-as-powerful-in-spreading-disinformation-as-feare>)

Sophisticated fake media hasn't emerged as a factor in the disinformation wars in the ways once feared — and two specialists say it may have missed its moment. Deceptive video and audio recordings, often nicknamed “deepfakes,” have been the subject of sustained attention by legislators and technologists, but so far have not been employed to decisive effect, said two panelists at a video conference convened on Wednesday by NATO. One speaker borrowed Sherlock Holmes' reasoning about the significance of something that didn't happen. “We've already passed the stage at which they would have been most effective,” said Keir Giles, a Russia specialist with the Conflict Studies Research Centre in the United Kingdom. “They're the dog that never barked.” The perils of deepfakes in political interference have been discussed too often and many people have become too familiar with them, Giles said during the online discussion, hosted by NATO's Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. Following all the reports and revelations about election interference in the West since 2016, citizens know too much to be hoodwinked in the way a fake video might once have fooled large numbers of people, he argued: “They no longer have the power to shock.” Tim Hwang, director of the Harvard-MIT Ethics and Governance of AI Initiative, agreed that deepfakes haven't proven as dangerous as once feared, although for different reasons. Hwang argued that users of “active measures” (efforts to sow misinformation and influence public opinion) can be much more effective with cheaper, simpler and just as devious types of fakes — mis-captioning a photo or turning it into a meme, for example. Influence specialists working for Russia and other governments also imitate Americans on Facebook, for another example, worming their way into real Americans' political activities to amplify disagreements or, in some cases, try to persuade people not to vote. Other researchers have suggested this work continues on social networks and has become more difficult to detect. Defense is stronger than attack Hwang also observed that the more deepfakes are made, the better machine learning becomes at detecting them. A very sophisticated, real-looking fake video might still be effective in a political context, he acknowledged — and at a cost to create of around $10,000, it would be easily within the means of a government's active measures specialists. But the risks of attempting a major disruption with such a video may outweigh an adversary's desire to use one. People may be too media literate, as Giles argued, and the technology to detect a fake may mean it can be deflated too swiftly to have an effect, as Hwang said. “I tend to be skeptical these will have a large-scale impact over time,” he said. One technology boss told NPR in an interview last year that years' worth of work on corporate fraud protection systems has given an edge to detecting fake media.” This is not a static field. Obviously, on our end we've performed all sorts of great advances over this year in advancing our technology, but these synthetic voices are advancing at a rapid pace,” said Brett Beranek, head of security business for the technology firm Nuance. “So we need to keep up.” Beranek described how systems developed to detect telephone fraudsters could be applied to verify the speech in a fake clip of video or audio. Corporate clients that rely on telephone voice systems must be wary about people attempting to pose as others with artificial or disguised voices. Beranek's company sells a product that helps to detect them, and that countermeasure also works well in detecting fake audio or video. Machines using neural networks can detect known types of synthetic voices. Nuance also says it can analyze a recording of a real, known voice — say, that of a politician — and then contrast its characteristics against a suspicious recording. Although the world of cybersecurity is often described as one in which attackers generally have an edge over defenders, Beranek said he thought the inverse was true in terms of this kind of fraud detection.” For the technology today, the defense side is significantly ahead of the attack side,” he said. Shaping the battlefield Hwang and Giles acknowledged in the NATO video conference that deepfakes likely will proliferate and become lower in cost to create, perhaps becoming simple enough to make with a smartphone app. One prospective response is the creation of more of what Hwang called “radioactive data” — material earmarked in advance so that it might make a fake easier to detect. If images of a political figure were so tagged beforehand, they could be spotted quickly if they were incorporated by computers into a deceptive video. Also, the sheer popularity of new fakes, if that is what happens, might make them less valuable as a disinformation weapon. More people could become more familiar with them, as well as being detectable by automated systems — plus they may also have no popular medium on which to spread. Big social media platforms already have declared affirmatively that they'll take down deceptive fakes, Hwang observed. “That might make it more difficult for a scenario in which a politically charged fake video goes viral just before Election Day. “Although it might get easier and easier to create deepfakes, a lot of the places where they might spread most effectively, your Facebooks and Twitters of the world, are getting a lot more aggressive about taking them down,” Hwang said. That won't stop them, but it might mean they'll be relegated to sites with too few users to have a major effect, he said. “They'll percolate in these more shady areas.

#### 3---No nuclear terrorism.

Ward 18, analyst on the Defence, Security, and Infrastructure team at RAND Europe. Citing Dr Beyza Unal, a research fellow in nuclear policy at think tank Chatham House. (Antonia, 7/27/18, "Is Nuclear Terrorism Distracting Attention from More Realistic Threats?", *RAND*, https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/07/is-the-threat-of-nuclear-terrorism-distracting-attention.html)

Despite Obama's remarks in 2016 and these two incidents, experts and officials contest the viability of the nuclear terrorism threat. Dr Beyza Unal, a research fellow in nuclear policy at think tank Chatham House, argued there is currently no evidence that terrorist groups could build a nuclear weapon. Similarly, a report by the Council on Foreign Relations in 2006 emphasized how building a nuclear bomb is a difficult task for states, let alone terrorists. This is because of the issues involved in accessing uranium and creating and maintaining it at the correct grade (enriched uranium).

While nuclear terrorism is a concern, the majority of terrorist attacks are conducted with conventional explosives. The 2017 Europol Terrorism Situation and Trend Report states that 40 percent of terrorist attacks used explosives. These explosives originate from a wide variety of countries across the world. According to a study by Conflict Armament Research, large quantities of explosive precursor chemicals used to make bombs as seen in the 7/7 attack in London in 2005 and the 2017 Manchester Arena attack, have been linked to supply chains in the United States, Europe, and Asia via Turkey. The threat from the spread of chemical precursors prompted the EU to begin looking at ways to tighten the regulations of these chemicals (PDF).

A nuclear terrorist attack would have grave consequences, but it is currently not a realistic or viable threat given that it would require a level of sophistication from terrorists that has not yet been witnessed. The recent focus of terrorist groups has been on simplistic strikes, such as knife and vehicular attacks. If countries are concerned about nuclear terrorism, the best way to mitigate this risk could be to tighten security at civilian and government nuclear sites. But governments would be better off focusing their efforts on combatting the spread and use of conventional weapons.

#### 4---No emerging tech impact.

Sechser et al. 19, \*Todd S., Pamela Feinour Edmonds and Franklin S. Edmonds, Jr. Discovery Professor of Politics and Public Policy at the University of Virginia and Senior Fellow at the Miller Center of Public Affairs, \*\*Neil Narang, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, \*\*\*Caitlin Talmadge, Associate Professor of Security Studies in the School of Foreign at Georgetown University. ( “Emerging technologies and strategic stability in peacetime, crisis, and war”, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 42:6, pg. 728-729)

Yet the history of technological revolutions counsels against alarmism. Extrapolating from current technological trends is problematic, both because technologies often do not live up to their promise, and because technologies often have countervailing or conditional effects that can temper their negative consequences. Thus, the fear that emerging technologies will necessarily cause sudden and spectacular changes to international politics should be treated with caution. There are at least two reasons to be circumspect.

First, very few technologies fundamentally reshape the dynamics of international conflict. Historically, most technological innovations have amounted to incremental advancements, and some have disappeared into irrelevance despite widespread hype about their promise. For example, the introduction of chemical weapons was widely expected to immediately change the nature of warfare and deterrence after the British army first used poison gas on the battlefield during World War I. Yet chemical weapons quickly turned out to be less practical, easier to counter, and less effective than conventional high-explosives in inflicting damage and disrupting enemy operations.6 Other technologies have become important only after advancements in other areas allowed them to reach their full potential: until armies developed tactics for effectively employing firearms, for instance, these weapons had little effect on the balance of power. And even when technologies do have significant strategic consequences, they often take decades to emerge, as the invention of airplanes and tanks illustrates. In short, it is easy to exaggerate the strategic effects of nascent technologies.7

Second, even if today’s emerging technologies are poised to drive important changes in the international system, they are likely to have variegated and even contradictory effects. Technologies may be destabilising under some conditions, but stabilising in others. Furthermore, other factors are likely to mediate the effects of new technologies on the international system, including geography, the distribution of material power, military strategy, domestic and organisational politics, and social and cultural variables, to name only a few.8 Consequently, the strategic effects of new technologies often defy simple classification. Indeed, more than 70 years after nuclear weapons emerged as a new technology, their consequences for stability continue to be debated.9

# 2NC

## CP

#### Political backlash is key IL.

Marianela 1AC Lopez-Galdos 7/28/21. Global Competition Counsel at the Computer& Communications Industry Association, previously served as Director of Competition & Regulatory Policy, and is a professor at George Washington University Competition Law Center and at the University of Melbourne Law School. “Policy Decisions of Antitrust Institutions Series: The Future of the FTC and Its Perils”. Disruptive Competition Project. https://www.project-disco.org/competition/072821-policy-decisions-of-antitrust-institutions-series-the-future-of-the-ftc-and-its-perils/

But the current FTC leadership seems to have overlooked the agency’s history. As such, it has already promised to produce different policy outcomes and noted that the Section 5 Policy Guidelines were shortsighted. As a result, the current FTC has decided, with the support of the other two Democratic Commissioners, to rescind the Policy Guidelines.

It is unknown whether the current FTC will try to adopt different guidelines or whether it will start opening more cases under Section 5 of the FTC Act. Furthermore, it is less clear whether the new FTC leadership currently counts with the sufficient and aligned Neo-Brandeisian human talent to bring solid cases that are not based on the consumer welfare standard or to litigate before judges that support the Neo-Brandeisian vision of antitrust.

What seems clear is that the new agency’s leader might find it hard to bring all Commissioners to an agreement with respect to what the agency can do with Section 5 of the FTC Act, and this situation, in and of itself, puts the agency in peril.

The FTC’s Rulemaking Authority

Another important policy change that may be detrimental to the FTC is its expressed willingness to expand the agency’s rulemaking authority under, e.g., Section 18 of the FTC Act. It is well known that in addition to its authority to investigate law violations by individuals and businesses, the FTC also has federal rulemaking authority to issue industry-wide regulations.

However, the agency’s rulemaking authority has been self-limited since the 80s in an effort to ensure the institution doesn’t overuse its capacity to adopt industry-wide regulations and raise concerns with those policy makers that are against the legislature deferring its core mandate to an independent agency that doesn’t represent the people.

Traditionally the legislature has the constitutional mandate to create laws affecting different sectors of the economy. Whereas it is legally accepted to design independent agencies with constrained mandates to adopt regulations, such powers are not necessarily understood to construe independent agencies as substitutes for the legislature’s powers. It is a basic tenet of administrative law, that agencies are constrained by the enabling statute that gives them authority to promulgate regulations in the first place.

Against this background, it seems risky for the new leadership to engage in broad rulemaking endeavors that might raise concerns from an institution legitimacy perspective. In the long term, it is predictable that many policymakers might not be supportive of an agency that implements its rulemaking authority in its broadest sense. As a result, some degree of political backlash against the agency might not help the agency’s lifecycle, especially if the agency is not granted with specific legislative guidance in the form of new legislation.

The Future of the FTC

One of the most challenging matters to tackle when it comes to leadership of antitrust authorities, or administrative agency for that matter, is legacy and the impact for the future of the agency. To put it simply, while antitrust leaders leave agencies, the side effects of leadership’s successes and failures condition the future of the agencies. Their leadership has consequences and sets precedent which will bind the agency well into the future.

Under the current political context, it would not be surprising if the current Neo-Brandeisian FTC enjoyed political support and success with its decision to bring big cases, especially against leading tech companies. In the short term, if the FTC makes headlines for opening cases against “Big Tech”, policymakers pushing for antitrust reforms will surely applaud the new changes as they would reflect a commitment to enhanced enforcement outcomes notwithstanding the strength of the cases.

However, in the mid-and long-term, if the FTC loses the big cases, the commitment to policy outcomes won’t be met. And then, it is unlikely that the question would be whether the antitrust norms are fit for today’s economy, but rather if the agency is capable of executing its mandate effectively. The recent decision in the FTC v. Facebook case is a good example of this paradigm, where the Judge expressed that the FTC had not carried out a sufficiently robust analysis supported by evidence, and therefore dismissed the case.

Eventually, the agency’s short-term reputational gains could quickly turn into a debacle for the institution itself with the caveat that by then, most probably, Neo-Brandeisian leadership will be long gone. Unfortunately then, the U.S. antitrust system — which is the only one to keep two federal antitrust agencies, bringing about positive outcomes for consumers — might be at risk. Political support to merge these two institutions could gain even more support, as has happened in the past, to the detriment of consumers.

#### Closes Gitmo — that’s an alt cause only the CP solves, turns every impact.

Adelman et al 7 [Ken—UN Ambassador and Arms Control Director for President Ronald Reagan Author, Acclaimed Story-Teller, and Adventurer, Kenneth Adelman, Graham Allison, Ronald Asmus, Samuel Berger, Stephen Bosworth, Daniel Byman, Warren Christopher, Wesley Clark, Richard Clarke, Ivo Daalder, James Dobbins, Douglas Feith, Leslie Gelb, Marc Grossman, John Hamre, Gary Hart, Bruce Hoffman, Laura Holgate, John Hulsman, Robert Hunter, Tony Judt, Robert Kagan, David Kay, Andrew Krepinevich, Charles Kupchan, John Lehman, James Lindsay, Edward Luttwak, John McLaughlin, Richard Myers, William Nash, Joseph Nye, Carlos Pascual, Paul Pillar, Kenneth Pollack, Joseph Ralston, Susan Rice, Wendy Sherman, Anne-Marie Slaighter, James Steinberg, Anthony Zinni, “Guantanamo's Shadow,” *The Atlantic,* October 2007, <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/10/guantanamos-shadow/306212/>] KS

Has the prison system at Guantanamo Bay helped or hurt the United States in its fight against al-Qaeda? 87% Hurt “Nothing has hurt America’s image and standing in the world—and nothing has undermined the global effort to combat nihilistic terrorism—than the brutal torture and dehumanizing actions of Americans in Abu Ghraib and in other prisons (secret or otherwise). America can win the fight against terrorism only if it acts in ways consistent with the values for which it stands; if its behavior descends to the level employed by the terrorists, then we have all become them instead of us.” “Gitmo has hurt the US in two different ways. At the strategic level, it has undercut the U.S. case around the world that we represent a world view and a set of values that all can admire, even those who do not wish to replicate our system and society in their own countries. Gitmo has become a symbol for cruelty and inhumanity that is repugnant to a wide sector of the world community and a powerful tool that al Qaeda can use to damage US interest and recruit others to its cause. At the tactical level, Gitmo deludes many in the US, an never more than the senior leaders of the Bush Administration, into believing that harsh interrogation techniques can produce good intelligence and is a necessary tool in fighting terrorist. This 'truth' spread from Gitmo to Iraq and we have paid a horrible price for it.” “It has hurt America disastrously. The so-called global war on terrorism depends fundamentally on America's moral authority, so that other nations will want to cooperate with us. Guantanamo has become a vibrant symbol of American exceptionalism, but this exceptionalism is unwanted around the world.” “this one is so basic. i speak as a republican so this is not a partisan comment. the founders would be rightly ashamed of us. we have forgotten, as truman and eisenhower never did, that america's power is as much about what it stands for as for its hard power characteristics. this has all been put in the worst kind of peril by Gitmo.” “The controversies that have surrounded the system have outweighed any benefit. The main reason for locating the facility at Guantanamo—to attempt to keep it out of the reach of anyone's legal system—was never justifiable.” “The Guantanamo system has hurt the U.S. and our fight against Al Qaeda. We have abandoned the moral high ground and, through our actions, have become one of the principle recruiting agents for Islamic extremism.” “Our strongest asset internationally was our reputation and credibility on human rights. We have squandered that.” “Hurt, on balance, because it has severely damaged our moral case in the world, which we have to have in order to rally support for combating Al Qaeda.” “Both in the obvious public relations way, worldwide, and quite directly, in showing Al Qaeda that we can very easily and quickly be seduced into wild overreactions. That is just what Osama Bin Laden hoped. Since it worked so well, he has an incentive to repeat." “It has done enormous damage to our reputation and soft power.”

#### Only the CP solves the LIO — economic power is irrelevant; the question is if we use it. The CP’s boost of soft power is key.

Joseph Nye 20. Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor, Emeritus. "COVID-19’s Painful Lesson About Strategy and Power". War on the Rocks. 3-26-2020. https://warontherocks.com/2020/03/covid-19s-painful-lesson-about-strategy-and-power/

In 2017, President Donald Trump announced a new National Security Strategy that focused on great-power competition with China and Russia. While the plans also note the role of alliances and cooperation, the implementation has not. Today, COVID-19 shows that the strategy is inadequate. Competition and an “America First” approach is not enough to protect the United States. Close cooperation with both allies and adversaries is also essential for American security.

Under the influence of the information revolution and globalization, world politics is changing dramatically. Even if the United States prevails in the traditional great-power competition, it cannot protect its security acting alone. COVID-19 is not the only example. Global financial stability is vital to U.S. prosperity, but Americans need the cooperation of others to ensure it. And while trade wars have set back economic globalization, there is no stopping the environmental globalization represented by pandemics and climate change. In a world where borders are becoming more porous to everything from drugs to infectious diseases to cyber terrorism, the United States must use its soft power of attraction to develop networks and institutions that address these new threats. For example, this administration proposed halving the U.S. contribution to the World Health Organization’s budget — now we need it more than ever.

A successful national security strategy should start with the fact that “America First” means America has to lead efforts at cooperation. A classic problem with public goods (like clean air, which all can share and from which none can be excluded) is that if the largest consumer does not take the lead, others will free-ride and the public goods will not be produced. As the technology expert Richard Danzig summarizes the problem:

Twenty-first century technologies are global not just in their distribution, but also in their consequences. Pathogens, AI systems, computer viruses, and radiation that others may accidentally release could become as much our problem as theirs. Agreed reporting systems, shared controls, common contingency plans, norms and treaties must be pursued as a means of moderating our numerous mutual risks.

Tariffs and border walls cannot solve these problems. While American leadership is essential because of the country’s global influence, success will require the cooperation of others.

On transnational issues like COVID-19 and climate change, power becomes a positive-sum game. It is not enough to think of American power over others. We must also think in terms of power to accomplish joint goals, which involves power with others. On many transnational issues, empowering others helps us to accomplish our own goals. The United States benefits if China improves its energy efficiency and emits less carbon dioxide, or improves its public health systems. In this world, institutional networks and connectedness are an important source of information and of national power, and the most connected states are the most powerful. Washington has some sixty treaty allies while China has few. Unfortunately, as Mira Rapp-Hooper recently argued, the United States is squandering that power resource.

In the past, the openness of the United States enhanced its capacity to build networks, maintain institutions, and sustain alliances. But will that openness and willingness to engage with the rest of the world prove sustainable in the current populist mood of American domestic politics? Even if the United States possesses more hard military and economic power than any other country, it may fail to convert those resources into effective influence on the global scene. Between the two world wars, America did not and the result was disastrous.

#### Global concert solves international cooperation---that solves LIO impact.

Albaret et al. 14, Mélanie, \*PhD, lecturer in political science at the Université Clermont-Auvergne. Bertrand Badie, Kanti Bajpai, Oleg Demidov, Nicola Horsburgh, Adam Humphreys. *et al*. (“A Twenty-First Century Concert of Powers – Promoting Great Power Multilateralism for the Post-Transatlantic Era”, *The 21st Century Concert Study Group*, pg. 10, https://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk\_downloads/PolicyPaper\_ATwentyFirstCenturyConcertofPowers.pdf)

In order to achieve its purpose, a 21st Century Concert will have to rest on a solid foundation of norms that guide the behavior of its members. These norms would include acknowledging the urgency of cooperation, accepting equality between and diversity among great powers, showing empathy and respect for the vital interests of the partners as well as for the interests of non-members, pursuing good neighborhood policies, renouncing the unilateral use of military force and the aim of military superiority in general, and abiding by international law. These norms will likely remain a “work in progress” as it would be unrealistic to expect all of them to be fulfilled at the outset. However, it will be important to “move towards” these norms, lest the Concert should disintegrate.

The Concert and its embedding in the existing world order

The 21st Century Concert would carefully need to integrate itself into the existing world order. Its purpose would not be to substitute but complement existing organizations and institutions. The UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council, for example, should not be marginalized by the Concert; rather, intra-great power deliberations in the Concert should be used to overcome gridlock within these institutions. Relations between the Concert and other international institutions like the G20 and regional security organizations – which are of increasing importance in today’s world – should be characterized by a spirit of cooperation, as opposed to competition. At the same time, the Concert should engage with civil society and care about the legitimacy it enjoys among non-governmental organizations.

The Concert would therefore be embedded within a broader framework of multilateralism. It would help prevent the ultimate common bad, a great power war, and also facilitate cooperation in other areas. Any demands it requires would therefore not mean unacceptable sacrifices, either for member or non-member states; on the contrary, creating a new forum for great power cooperation would serve their own long-term interests. A 21st Century Concert would very likely be able to improve the efficiency of global (security) governance and deepen the culture and practices of cooperation.

## DA

#### AND, causes miscalculated war.

Kavanagh 18, political scientist at the RAND Corporation and associate director of the Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program in the RAND Arroyo Center; and Michael D. Rich, president and chief executive officer of the RAND Corporation (Jennifer, “Truth Decay: An Initial Exploration of the Diminishing Role of Facts and Analysis in American Public Life,” p. 200-207)---language edited

Truth Decay can lead to political paralysis through a number of channels. First, uncertainty and disagreement about basic facts and the blurring of the line between opinion and fact both create divides between elected officials—often, but not always, along partisan lines that make it difficult for these representatives to agree to the terms of debate on key issues and, worse, that prevent compromise or agreement on key pieces of legislation. Low trust in government, another trend of Truth Decay, also contributes to political paralysis by weakening the authority of government institutions and strengthening the position of veto players, such as interest groups, that can interfere in government decision-making and have the power to sway public opinion.17 Some of the factors driving Truth Decay might also play a role. For instance, the polarization that seems to drive Truth Decay creates significant obstacles and barriers between partisan camps, preventing communication, compromise, and agreement. Even Truth Decay’s other consequences might play a role. The erosion of civil discourse, combined with the high volume of disinformation that raises uncertainty about what is fact, what is opinion, and what is simply false, also seems to worsen today’s political stalemate because it is harder for policymakers to be sure that the opinions of their colleagues are grounded in fact and to begin a meaningful dialogue. Although Truth Decay is clearly not the only factor driving political stalemate, increased uncertainty, low trust, and increasing disagreement over facts (all associated with Truth Decay) might be worsening this political [gridlock] paralysis in key ways. For example, low trust and increased disagreement over facts might interfere with Congress’s responsibility to exercise key oversight functions or come to an agreement (sometimes even within a single party) on key legislative issues. These delays and periods of inaction have real financial and other consequences. RAND researchers who assessed the costs of paralysis caused by political polarization have found that drafting and passing laws, confirming presidential executive and judicial appointments (or at least bringing them to a vote), creating budgets and allocating funds, and ensuring proper oversight are needed if the government is to function effectively and provide needed services efficiently, if the United States is to interact constructively with its partners and allies, and if the president and his advisers are to pursue policies that advance the well-being of U.S. citizens. 18 Thus, to the extent that Truth Decay interferes with any or all of these functions, it can pose a threat to the functioning of democracy. Assessing Political Paralysis and Its Costs A number of metrics underscore the sharp increase in political paralysis in recent years. Again, this increase cannot be attributed entirely to Truth Decay but, as already explained, Truth Decay is likely a contributing factor. Filibusters, a partisan tool used to delay a vote on a piece of legislation, could be one metric of friction within Congress and of its inability to pass laws and take other action. Figure 5.1 shows a gradual upward trend in the number of filibusters per year between 1947 and 2017 in the Senate and highlights the sharp increase around 2008, the end of George W. Bush’s presidency and the start of Barack Obama’s tenure. Data on congressional workload reveal similar signs of paralysis and stalemate. Figure 5.2 shows the percentage of total legislation proposed that was enacted by each Congress since 1973 (when the data were first collected). The rate of successful enactment has fallen markedly since its peak in the mid-1980s and declined fairly consistently since roughly 2003,19 which suggests that a smaller fraction of proposed legislation makes it through to enactment. This trend exists despite the fact that the total number of pieces of legislation proposed has been roughly constant since the early 1980s, with the exception of a brief period between 1993 and 1996, when total proposed legislation per two-year period was somewhat lower.20 It is reasonable to hypothesize that polarization and stalemate might be one cause of this decrease in the number of enacted laws in recent terms. However, it is also the case that this metric does not take into account the size or complexity of a given piece of legislation or whether bills passed by Congress in more-recent years are more likely than in prior decades to include many smaller pieces of legislation combined into one. Further analysis of the relative complexity and composition of proposed and passed legislation over the past four decades would be needed to fully explore possible reasons for the decline in the rate of law enactment in the past two decades. Political paralysis has significant political and economic costs. Economically, the power and severity of these consequences were most clearly underscored during the government shutdown in 2013. Estimates varied, but most suggested that the shutdown led to a drop of 0.25 to 0.5 percentage points in real GDP growth, amounting to a loss of about $20 billion to the U.S. economy. Also affected were federal employees and government contractors who could not work during the shutdown.21 A Congressional Research Service review that assessed cost estimates from the shutdown noted, “A review of third-party estimates of the effects of the shutdown on the economy finds a predicted reduction in GDP growth of at least 0.1 percentage points for each week of the shutdown.”22 The review also noted, however, that most forecasters did not attempt to include multiplier or indirect effects, so “the estimates reviewed can be thought of as a lower bound on the overall effects on economic activity.”23 In addition to shutdowns, political paralysis has also contributed to a slower rate of judicial confirmation rates to lower courts, which leads to delays that have economic costs for the government and for people involved in legal proceedings.24 Young et al. developed a framework for estimating some of the economic costs of political paralysis, including delays in executive and judicial confirmations and missed deadlines on must-pass legislative actions, such as spending bills. The results vary based on the specific type of delay considered, but here is an example: Using as a metric the opportunity cost of money held in risk-free accounts by litigants awaiting the adjudication of civil cases, Young et al. estimated that delays in judicial appointments could result in an annual reduction of $3.3 billion in GDP using the baseline conditions. 25 The authors also used the experience of the 2013 shutdown and the estimates discussed earlier to assess the cost of a future shutdown, this time including the indirect costs that other estimates omitted. According to Young et al., a future two-week government shutdown could reduce GDP by $9 billion.26 The authors also note that, although it is more difficult to measure economically, the costs associated with a loss of global credibility or with an inability to avoid an international crisis due to clumsy decisionmaking could be just as large. The quality and efficiency of government services are another victim of political stalemate. Legislative inaction interferes with government ability to modify programs to meet unexpected constituent needs and makes legislative and other government institutions rigid and inflexible.27 Political paralysis can lead to delays in key policy decisions or to the adoption of minimally satisfactory policies that can be passed with support from only one party (or from one party and a few token members of the opposing party) and do not require true compromise. Although the passage of any policy may be preferable to paralysis in some cases, half-measures and policies that are written and passed without debate can create additional negative consequences for individual voters. Efforts to address such major issues as economic inequality and poverty, rising health care costs, and the effects of both trade and automation on certain jobs or workers are consistently hamstrung over disagreements across party lines regarding basic facts and analytical interpretations of those facts. These disagreements can lead to policy choices (or in the case of stalemate, the failure to craft policies) that have significant negative implications for people. For example, inefficiencies in the ACA that have caused higher premiums among some groups of Americans arose partly from political constraints, created by interparty competition, that affected the bill’s final form.28 Continuing uncertainty about the future of health care resulting from political paralysis has had further distorting effects on the market and led to further increases in premiums.29 Delays in policy—or not implementing any policy—have not only economic costs but also possible direct fiscal and other effects on people’s lives. Finally, the government’s inability to reach quick decisions on key issues can create significant foreign policy risk. When external threats arise, the United States must be able to make immediate decisions to protect national security. When it cannot do this because of political paralysis, the safety of individuals and infrastructure are placed in serious jeopardy. Decisions about how and when to deploy U.S. ground forces must be based on clear data and information as well as a definitive understanding of relevant alliances and commitments. In cases when responses must be immediate, hesitation and indecision can have significant consequences. Furthermore, unintentional escalation and other consequences could also result from political paralysis caused by Truth Decay in such a situation. Thus, the costs of political stalemate are substantial, whether measured in terms of economic losses, degradation of the quality of government, increased foreign policy risk, or simply the loss of credibility an ineffectual government suffers in the eyes of its electorate. Increasing disagreement about facts and analytical interpretations of facts and data and the blurring of the line between opinion and fact contribute to this political stalemate by preventing effective civil discourse and meaningful debate and by making compromise increasingly difficult. Because of the magnitude and seriousness of these costs, additional analysis would be valuable both for advancing researchers’ understanding of areas where these costs are greatest and for designing responses to address them. Perhaps most important, although Young et al. make great strides in estimating the costs of government shutdowns, delays in judicial confirmation, and an inability to implement legislation, it is considerably more difficult to estimate the costs associated with foreign policy risk, erosion of diplomatic relationships, reduced government credibility, or a decrease in the overall quality of government legislation and services due to political stalemate. Efforts to estimate these costs would help policymakers and even voters understand the myriad ways in which a stalemate directly affects their livelihoods and national security. For example, efforts to assess the costs of inefficiencies in the ACA could underscore for individual voters how government stalemate directly affects their livelihoods and, in turn, could create electoral pressure for compromise.30 Research on ways that polarization can be reduced (discussed in the previous chapter) will also be essential: The key to overcoming political paralysis is to reduce division and refusal to compromise across party lines. Potential solutions might include institutional or process changes at the state or national levels that incentivize compromise or at least ease its process. Still, it is important to remember that checks and balances in U.S. political institutions are intended to grind processes to a halt when the country is deeply divided and when agreement on key policies is limited. In this sense, government paralysis may be beneficial, serving as a check on the power of any one person or party. Research focused on identifying the benefits and opportunities of stalemate, if they exist, could be beneficial. The research agenda in Chapter Six proposes additional avenues for research into political paralysis.

#### GOP will explicitly tie their support for antitrust reform to fighting “bias” on social media

Brown 7-2021, MA @ Ohio U, senior editor at Reason, where she writes regularly on the intersections of sex, speech, tech, crime, politics, panic, and civil liberties (Elizabeth, “The Bipartisan Antitrust Crusade Against Big Tech,” *Reason*, <https://reason.com/2021/06/05/the-bipartisan-antitrust-crusade-against-big-tech/>)

Hawley's lament is indicative of the larger movement: Republican lawmakers have proposed using antitrust action as an all-purpose cure for all manner of alleged tech industry sins. But under Trump, their complaints coalesced most around these companies' supposed suppression of conservative speech. The Trump administration broke from Obama administration policy to embrace a vision of expanded antitrust enforcement. "Every week you see [European regulators] going after Facebook and Apple and all of these companies," Trump said in 2019. "Well, we should be doing this. They're our companies." In October 2020, the Department of Justice (DOJ) brought a lawsuit accusing Google of anti-competitive behavior; 10 states with Republican attorneys general (Arkansas, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, South Carolina, and Texas) joined immediately. The DOJ and state prosecutors say Google is guilty of violating the Sherman Act, which bans unreasonable "restraint of trade" and "monopolization, attempted monopolization, or conspiracy" to monopolize. Companies found guilty can be fined up to $100 million. That same month, Trump signed a continuing resolution that not only reauthorized the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Permanent Extension Act but repealed its sunset provision. "Since the fall of 2019 alone," the DOJ bragged in a press release, "the division obtained four criminal fines and penalties at or above the Sherman Act's $100 million statutory maximum." And in December 2020, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) sued Facebook, seeking (among other things) to require the divestiture of Instagram and WhatsApp. Democrats' Big Tech Wish List The Trump-era GOP paved the way for Biden-era Democrats to take the anti-tech antitrust crusade even further. Republicans and Democrats might not agree on much right now. But they have both been upset by decisions from Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, and Twitter, and they would both like to pry more control over online content from private actors—or at least knock these companies down a peg. In March, Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D–Mass.) responded to an Amazon tweet about her tax plans by saying she would "fight to break up Big Tech so [Amazon is] not powerful enough to heckle senators with snotty tweets." Warren has been looking for an excuse to go after tech companies for years. During her 2020 presidential primary campaign, she pledged to "unwind" existing mergers—including Amazon's with Whole Foods, Facebook's with WhatsApp and Instagram, and Google's with Nest and Waze—despite the fact that the FTC previously had sanctioned these unions. She also wants to ban Amazon (and every other "platform utility") from selling its own goods on its own site: No more Amazon brand batteries, toilet paper, T-shirts, vitamins, or disinfectant wipes. Warren is joined in these desires by both leftist and centrist Democrats. Breaking up tech companies is not "a radical idea" but a "part of competition," said Sen. Amy Klobuchar (D–Minn.) in March. "Facebook is absolutely an out-of-control monopoly," Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D–N.Y.) posted on Facebook rival Twitter last December. "The only thing that will stop Facebook is to…break it up," Sen. Bernie Sanders (I–Vt.) has opined. Given all this, it's hardly surprising that Republicans' antitrust suit against Google was later joined by the Democratic attorneys general of California, Michigan, and Wisconsin, with many national Democrats cheering them on. Or that the FTC suit against Facebook was joined by 46 states, the District of Columbia, and Guam. Members of both parties have grown adept at slotting their desire for censorship and economic control into an antitrust framework, no matter how ill-fitting that framework might be. But while Republicans at least tend to tie their antitrust designs to the consumer-friendly (if not actually antitrust actionable) cause of fighting political "bias," Democrats seldom bother to connect the dots between breaking up popular tech companies and making consumers better off. Instead, they offer standard lefty agitprop: Big is bad. The solution to big? Antitrust action to chop up large companies into smaller ones.

#### The GOP will go for the link of omission versus any antitrust that doesn’t counter censorship---and the aff is unpopular for being a bold proposal.

Feiner 20 (Lauren, “Key GOP lawmaker lays out ‘non-starters’ for Big Tech antitrust reform,” *CNBC*, <https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/06/key-gop-lawmaker-lays-out-non-starters-for-antitrust-reform.html>)

The House panel’s investigation was launched in June 2019 as a bipartisan endeavor. Buck has repeatedly said in interviews it has remained a coordinated effort. But his report shows that even a Republican who has seemed most open to reform is reticent to endorse some of the bolder proposals Democrats are considering. The divergence leaves an opening for the powerful tech companies to oppose legislation that could place greater regulatory burdens on their businesses or even force them to break up. But Buck told CNBC Tuesday that if anything, his response should concern tech companies even more because it shows there is significant agreement on many key recommendations. “I think it’s clear that there will be a bipartisan effort to make reforms in the antitrust area,” Buck said, “And if I was one of the tech companies I would see this week of Democrat and Republican responses as very concerning because there is clearly a bipartisan conclusion that these companies are acting anticompetitively and that [there’s] bipartisan consensus on many of the reforms that are necessary.” In the draft report, Buck wrote that he agrees “in principle” on the findings of the report, but “cannot endorse all of the legislative recommendations offered by the majority.” “We will work with the Chairman in a bipartisan fashion to help enact the legislative solutions where we can agree,” the draft report says. “However, we are concerned that sweeping changes could lead to overregulation and carry unintended consequences for the entire economy. We prefer a targeted approach, the scalpel of antitrust, rather than the chainsaw of regulation.” In the draft report, Buck lays out the following as areas of common ground he’s found with the Democratic report: Additional resources for antitrust enforcers. Creating rules that ensure users can transfer their data between platforms. Shifting the burden of proof in merger cases to make it more possible for antitrust agencies to bring successful merger challenges. Also under the “Common Ground” section, Buck lays out areas where he’d like to see more expert feedback, according to the draft report, before installing potentially onerous regulations. These areas for further exploration include: Leveraging monopoly power from one market to threaten a separate market. Predatory pricing. Revitalizing the “Essential Facilities Doctrine,” whereby a company with monopoly power must allow competitors “reasonable use” of a facility it owns if those competitors rely on it to succeed in the marketplace. How platform monopolies should be allowed to make design changes to their services. Buck also lists several “non-starters” in the discussions: A “Glass-Steagall for the Internet,” or a type of structural separation that would force large data firms to distinguish different lines of business. Buck calls this “a thinly veiled call to break up Big Tech firms,” according to the draft report and writes, “We do not agree with the majority’s approach to pass a Big Tech Glass-Steagall Act,” referring to the 1933 law that separated commercial and investment banking. Eliminating arbitration clauses and removing limits on class action lawsuits. The draft report says the idea is “rife with unintended consequences,” saying arbitration provides important protections for small businesses, though “there is room for Congress to reevaluate some portions of arbitration clause policy.” Creating a “regulatory regime” to create rules governing “equal terms for equal service” to prevent platforms from self-preferencing. The draft report claims this would reduce innovation and harm small businesses. Removing “barriers” to private antitrust enforcement by excluding antitrust arbitration clauses from contracts. The draft report says Congress should focus on removing barriers for antitrust agencies to move forward with enforcement, rather than do so for private enforcement. In addition to the “non-starters,” Buck’s report criticizes the majority report for not tackling the issue of potential censorship and political bias online. Buck told CNBC Tuesday that alleged platform bias was a “symptom of the overall problem” with tech competition. Conservative lawmakers say tech platforms such as Facebook and Google-owned YouTube stifle conservative speech, an allegation the tech companies have repeatedly denied. Buck’s report shows that regardless of the areas of agreement, there will be a long road ahead for lawmakers to reform antitrust laws, even as the companies they have investigated face potentially imminent competition lawsuits.

#### They oppose revision to the CWS.

Opderbeck 7-30-2021 (David, “House Republicans’ Cynical, Empty Threats Against Big Tech,” *The Bulwark*, <https://www.thebulwark.com/house-republicans-cynical-empty-threats-against-big-tech/>)

On July 6, Rep. Jim Jordan, ranking member of the House Judiciary Committee, released an ambitious agenda for “taking on big tech.” Its urgency was clear from its first, bold sentence: “Big tech is out to get conservatives.” This agenda, largely determined by House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy, is supposed to remedy this alleged animosity while also responding to a package of bipartisan antitrust bills recently passed by the Judiciary Committee. On June 24, Jordan stated that Democrats are “pushing radical antitrust legislation that will systematically change the United States economy as we know it.” Jordan’s agenda includes the now-familiar appeal for government to regulate speech on social media platforms, both by rescinding the safe harbor in Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act and by creating new statutory causes of action. Republican proposals and lawsuits along these lines so far have ranged from unwise to unhinged. But now Jordan and co. have linked them to antitrust—indeed, the word “antitrust” appears nine times in the short agenda. The actual antitrust proposals in the Jordan agenda range from limp (expedited trial court procedures) to inane (direct appeal of antitrust cases to the Supreme Court). But all the proposed changes to “antitrust” law are superficial. The truth is that Reps. McCarthy, Jordan, and other Republicans who remain “conservative” about antitrust don’t really want to change the antitrust laws. Instead, they’re making empty gestures about changing antitrust law so they can look like they’re doing something against tech companies perceived to be hostile to conservatives. But many of Reps. Jordan’s and McCarthy’s colleagues really do support major tech antitrust reform, including through the bipartisan bills Jordan called “radical.” The Republican party is riven by an ongoing dispute over how antitrust law should apply to big tech companies—especially social media. It’s unclear whether the Republicans who support aggressive antitrust action subscribe to the broader arguments and policy proposals of serious antitrust reformers, which call for significant governmental control over the Internet. At the heart of the disagreement are conflicting visions of the proper role of antitrust laws in the first place. The core U.S. antitrust statutes, including sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, are famously lean of expression, leaving the courts ample room for interpretation. Since the Reagan era, the reigning interpretative paradigm has been that of the “Chicago School” originally championed by figures such as Robert Bork. This paradigm has been modified in many ways since the original Bork days, but its core principle still stands: antitrust law protects competition, not competitors. This means the final measuring stick, whether for a horizontal agreement claim under Section 1 or for a vertical integration, refusal to deal, tying, or other monopolization claim under Section 2, is whether the alleged conduct hurts consumer welfare through reduced output and higher prices. A new generation of antitrust scholars and activists is challenging the Chicago consumer welfare standard. Dubbed the “New Brandeis” movement, or somewhat derisively, “hipster antitrust,” these scholars and activists argue antitrust should focus on “structural” concerns rather than on what they consider the narrow, technocratic consumer welfare emphasis of the Chicago School. They have issued a manifesto, the “Utah Statement,” that summarizes their goals—and some of their members are prominent in the Biden administration: Lina Khan, whose academic work helped spark the New Brandeis movement, is head of Joe Biden’s FTC, and Tim Wu, famous for coining the term “network neutrality,” was appointed special assistant to the president for technology and competition policy. Nearly every one of those goals is reflected in the package of bipartisan antitrust bills recently passed by the House Judiciary Committee, notwithstanding the opposition of some Republicans such as McCarthy and Jordan. Under the Chicago consumer welfare standard, large or even dominant market share is not itself unlawful, and a competitor usually cannot be forced to deal with its rivals. In Verizon v. Trinko, decided by the Supreme Court in 2004, Justice Scalia’s opinion for the majority noted three reasons why refusals to deal are not inherently unlawful, even when the defendant is a provider of telecommunications serves that could be considered business infrastructure: (1) a firm’s “infrastructure” might be the result of competitive innovation, something antitrust law is meant to promote; (2) “compelled sharing puts federal courts in the role of central planners”; and (3) compelled sharing may result in collusion that harms further innovation and competition. The Trinko decision sharply limited “essential facilities” claims under U.S. antitrust law. The Trinko precedent was among the core reasons Federal District Judge James Boasberg recently dismissed antitrust complaints against Facebook filed by FTC and State enforcers. The FTC and the States claimed that Facebook refused to share interfacing tools (APIs) with app providers it considered potential competitors, or acquired those potential competitors to enhance its own services. Judge Boasberg held that the FTC’s pleadings failed to allege that Facebook held a market share sufficient to confer monopoly power: “It is almost as if the agency expects the Court to simply nod to the conventional wisdom that Facebook is a monopolist.” But even if Facebook had market power, Judge Boasberg held, under Trinko, “Facebook’s general policy of refusing to provide API access to its competitors does not in itself violate Section 2” of the Sherman Act. According to the New Brandeis movement, opinions like Judge Boasberg’s in the Facebook case are precisely the problem. The New Brandeis movement’s emphasis on “structure” means antitrust law would more actively shape markets, regardless of specific proof of harm to consumer welfare. The Utah Statement holds that Trinko should be overruled and that “[t]he essential facilities doctrine should be reinvigorated for dominant firms that deny access to critical infrastructural services.” The Judiciary Committee antitrust bills supported by some Republicans would enact core pieces of the New Brandeis platform. The American Choice and Innovation Online Act, for example, would establish a “Bureau of Digital Competition” within the FTC to publish interoperability standards, including presumably APIs, that the large platforms would be required to adopt. Another of the bills, the Platform Competition and Opportunity Act, would forbid large platform providers from acquiring present or potential competitors, regardless of any analysis of actual competitive effects of the merger. And the Augmenting Compatibility and Competition by Enabling Service Switching (ACCESS) Act would require large platform providers to share user data with present and potential competitors. These requirements would be enforceable directly by the agencies with hefty penalties or by private litigation buttressed by statutory treble damages and attorneys’ fees. There’s something undeniably appealing about these proposals. No rational person thinks Facebook has their best interests at heart, we all know Google and Amazon’s influence over our lives is creepy, and we rightly fret about social media’s corruption of public discourse and amplification of untruths. Sticking it to Big Tech feels right. And in a sense the New Brandeis advocates are right to focus on infrastructure and interoperability. The internet exists because everyone uses common interconnection protocols that are agnostic about the physical devices being connected, who is doing the connecting, or the content being shared. But the regulatory genius of the early internet era, including the Telecommunications Act of 1996, was to recognize that the internet should not be subject to the regulatory burdens placed on radio, television, and cable television providers. The “physical” layer of the Internet—modems, routers, and cables—was mostly privately owned and generally was subject to little or no regulation; the “code” layer—the internet protocol—was left to the community of coders and engineers, not to any government; and the “content” layer, at least in liberal democracies, was mostly protected by free speech principles and governed by free markets. The New Brandeis school agrees with all this. In fact, many of the New Brandeis school’s leaders are internet nerds. Their fear, however, is that closed interoperability standards such as proprietary APIs will lead to a “splinternet” of competing cyberspaces owned by Facebook, Amazon, Google, and so on. This may or may not be a reasonable fear. After all, as Judge Boasberg noted in the Facebook case, “[a]t the time of the last great antitrust battle in our courthouse—between the United States and Microsoft—Mark Zuckerberg was still in high school.” Who knows what social media and ecommerce will look like ten or twenty years from now if left more or less alone? The Microsoft Windows/Internet Explorer bundling antitrust case began in 1998, the same year Yahoo failed to license the search technology that would become Google; Amazon started selling books online in 1994; the first iPhone was released in 2007. What kinds of devices and platforms will exist in 2035, 2045 or 2050? The parts of Facebook, Amazon, and Google some people today consider essential facilities might not be as essential tomorrow. Did CompuServe or AOL forums eat the public Internet? Did the AOL-Time Warner merger, ominously announced at the start of Y2K, portend doom for other providers seeking media convergence? Today’s Internet giants didn’t arise because the final settlement between the Justice Department and Microsoft in 2001 contained some relatively weak API-sharing requirements. They grew because they innovated and competed as the technology rapidly changed. Of course, like everything else in this space, the significance of the Microsoft antitrust case is debated. Wu argues that the Microsoft case paved the way for the open Internet; others say this is bunk because the rise of Google changed everything. At the very least, it’s fair to wonder whether a “Bureau of Digital Competition” within the FTC, bristling with enforcement powers and enabling a new wave of tag-along private class actions, would facilitate a more free and open internet in the near term, much less over decades of rapid change. And, without any doubt, this is an option that contradicts decades of standard conservative thinking about technology, markets, and antitrust. Even if many of the New Brandeisians’ proposals would likely do more harm than good, at least they value a free and open internet. The breed of Republicans who combine paranoia over social media “censorship” with a genuine desire to control the internet under the guise of antitrust law are much more frightening. The antitrust feints by Reps. McCarthy and Jordan are transparently cynical. They don’t want to ditch the Chicago consumer-welfare standard and they don’t want to pass any major antitrust reform. They want to control the Internet—or at least, to threaten its major institutions—for their own ends. Whatever that movement might be called, it should be resisted.

#### Deplatforming is working now at countering misinformation---but permanence is key

Starbird 21, PhD, Professor @ U Washington (Kate, being interviewed by Cornish, “Is Deplatforming Enough To Fight Disinformation And Extremism?,” NPR, <https://www.npr.org/2021/01/25/960466075/is-deplatforming-enough-to-fight-disinformation-and-extremism>)

When Donald Trump was still in office and had a working Twitter account, just one tweet could change an entire news cycle. People who research disinformation, like Kate Starbird, know this all too well. KATE STARBIRD: My advisor, Leysia Palen, at the University of Washington, was watching content about COVID-19 and just following the CDC account, just trying to, like, understand what the CDC account was going to do. And one day, Donald Trump retweeted three or four tweets from the CDC, and it literally broke her data collection. CORNISH: After the U.S. Capitol riot, Twitter permanently suspended Trump for inciting violence. He's also currently off Facebook and YouTube and many other social media services. This is called deplatforming. Experts say deplatforming can be an important first step in cutting off the oxygen to disinformation and violence, which seemed to be confirmed when a company called Zignal Labs announced a 73% drop in misinformation after Trump had been deplatformed. We asked University of Washington professor Kate Starbird about that study. STARBIRD: I think we just need to add some context to that. And I think if you look at the original reporting from The Washington Post, some of that context was there. What Zignal Labs did was they took a measure of misinformation that was essentially just looking at keywords related to claims of election fraud. And they looked at one week compared to the week before. And a couple of things happened that were different from one week to the next. And that - the suspension of Donald Trump's account probably made a difference, but it's hard to attribute all of that difference to just that one suspension because 70,000 other accounts were taken out of the system. CORNISH: People were looking at this, I think, because there's this question about whether deplatforming actually works as a tactic to mitigate disinformation. Do you have a sense that it can have long-term impact? STARBIRD: I have a sense that it'll have short-term impact for sure. What happens in the long term, I think, is something we don't yet know the answer to. My expectation will be that if those suspensions stay in place and if that vacuum isn't filled by others spreading misinformation and if the platforms can do a better job of not letting those networks build themselves back in, that there will be a long-term benefit to the platforms that did the deplatforming.

## FTC ADV

#### Link turns case---political backlash and partisanship undermine anti-trust enforcement via agency appointments, judge selection, and partisan pressures.

Kovacic 14, Global Competition Professor of Law and Policy @ George Washington (William, Politics and Partisanship in U.S. Antitrust Enforcement, *Antitrust Law Journal*, 2014, Vol. 79, No. 2 (2014), pp. 687-711)

What accounts for these and other notable variations in federal enforcement activity? One common explanation is "politics"9 - a shorthand expression for the capacity of elections and elected officials to bend the antitrust enforcement system to serve a set of policy preferences or constituent desires. By this view, the political process affects enforcement through presidential elections, the selection of agency leadership, the intervention of executive branch and congressional officials in routine agency decision making, and the appointment of federal judges who hear antitrust cases. It is unsurprising that a regulatory system rich in power and prosecutorial discretion would have some connection to the political process. The substantial economic significance of the statutes whose enforcement is entrusted to the DOJ and the FTC ensures that elected officials will study what these agencies do and sometimes seek to influence the exercise of their prosecutorial authority. It is also difficult to imagine that a nation would give significant responsibility to law enforcement bodies without some means for elected officials to hold agency officials to account for their policy choices. Expansive grants of authority tend to come with accountability strings attached. For academics, practitioners, and public officials, the question is not whether political forces surround the DOJ and the FTC, or whether decisions by elected officials sometimes influence agency behavior. They assuredly do.11 The relevant queries are how, and how much? This Article addresses these questions by examining one dimension of the relationship between the federal antitrust agencies and the political process. It discusses how electoral politics can increase the influence of partisanship in the operation of the DOJ and the FTC. As used in this Article, partisanship is a determined commitment to party goals and causes. It manifests itself in a tendency to exaggerate the virtues of the party and to disregard or devalue the accomplishments of political rivals. Through the political appointment of the DOJ and FTC leadership, partisanship can spill over into the formulation and presentation of agency policy. As will be shown, partisanship can have destructive effects. Among other consequences, partisan attitudes can lead officials to act in ways that serve party goals at the expense of the agency's programs and reputation. The partisan tends to overlook how continuity of policy and incremental improvements have strengthened the DOJ and FTC antitrust programs regardless of which party controls the White House.12 Partisanship impedes the development of a norm that recognizes the importance of cumulative improvements, respects past contributions to agency effectiveness regardless of party origin, and encourages long-term investments that enhance the agency's capability and reputation.13 The striving for electoral success can beget partisanship, and, by eroding support for a norm that encourages cumulative investments for improvement over the long term, partisan attitudes can diminish agency effectiveness. In this sense, politics can influence federal antitrust enforcement, and influence it negatively.

#### Alt cause to their link: Big Tech.

Marianela 1AC Lopez-Galdos 7/28/21. Global Competition Counsel at the Computer& Communications Industry Association, previously served as Director of Competition & Regulatory Policy, and is a professor at George Washington University Competition Law Center and at the University of Melbourne Law School. “Policy Decisions of Antitrust Institutions Series: The Future of the FTC and Its Perils”. Disruptive Competition Project. https://www.project-disco.org/competition/072821-policy-decisions-of-antitrust-institutions-series-the-future-of-the-ftc-and-its-perils/

Under the current political context, it would not be surprising if the current Neo-Brandeisian FTC enjoyed political support and success with its decision to bring big cases, especially against leading tech companies. In the short term, if the FTC makes headlines for opening cases against “Big Tech”, policymakers pushing for antitrust reforms will surely applaud the new changes as they would reflect a commitment to enhanced enforcement outcomes notwithstanding the strength of the cases.

However, in the mid-and long-term, if the FTC loses the big cases, the commitment to policy outcomes won’t be met. And then, it is unlikely that the question would be whether the antitrust norms are fit for today’s economy, but rather if the agency is capable of executing its mandate effectively. The recent decision in the FTC v. Facebook case is a good example of this paradigm, where the Judge expressed that the FTC had not carried out a sufficiently robust analysis supported by evidence, and therefore dismissed the case.

Eventually, the agency’s short-term reputational gains could quickly turn into a debacle for the institution itself with the caveat that by then, most probably, Neo-Brandeisian leadership will be long gone. Unfortunately then, the U.S. antitrust system — which is the only one to keep two federal antitrust agencies, bringing about positive outcomes for consumers — might be at risk. Political support to merge these two institutions could gain even more support, as has happened in the past, to the detriment of consumers.

## Inequality ADV

#### Goldilocks growth now---long-term predictive.

Young 21, citing Jamie Dimon, JPMorgan Chase CEO and economic authority (Vicki, 5-5, “Jamie Dimon Says We Could Be in for a ‘Goldilocks’ Economy,” *Sourcing Journal*, <https://sourcingjournal.com/topics/retail/jamie-dimon-goldilocks-economy-remote-work-bitcoin-jobs-travel-zoom-277818/>)

Jamie Dimon believes the U.S. economy could be in for a near-Goldilocks trend. “To start, we are going to have a hugely strong economy, and it’s probably going to go well into 2022, and maybe 2023, because of $7 trillion dollars of spending—a lot of which, some has been spent but a lot has not been spent,” the JPMorgan Chase CEO and economic authority said Tuesday during a WSJ CEO Council interview. In a wide-ranging discussion, Dimon addressed topics from the economy to small business after the pandemic to what a return to work could look like. “The consumer’s in great shape. Consumers are going back to work, their balance sheet is in great shape, home prices are up, their debt levels are low, completely different than in the Great Recession,” he said. During that crash, consumers, Wall Street and financial institutions all sold off assets to minimize and manage their debt, Dimon said. By contrast, today’s companies are good shape, with $2 trillion dollars in excess cash offsetting their debt, he noted. Meanwhile, vaccinations are moving the nation closer to normalcy. “People are dying to get out and go back to work. You see it every day. You are going to have a boom and my reference to Goldilocks is more about that, that if we’re lucky, it’ll be a boom and inflation will go up not too much and rates go up not too much and everything will be fine,” Dimon said. For now, “everyone should enjoy” a boom in jobs and economic growth, Dimon said, cautioning that if inflation goes up too high and too fast, that’s when the Federal Reserve will need to be reactive.

#### Goldilocks economy now, but rate hikes could puncture growth.

Horowitz 21, analyst @ CNN (Julia, 4-8, “Can anything derail the 'Goldilocks' economy?,” *CNN*, <https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/08/investing/premarket-stocks-trading/index.html>)

America's economy could be heading for a golden era of growth. But higher prices and the coronavirus pandemic still present risks. What's happening: "It is possible that we will have a Goldilocks moment — fast and sustained growth, inflation that moves up gently (but not too much) and interest rates that rise (but not too much)," JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Damon said in his widely-read annual letter to shareholders this week. Dimon's optimism comes after the International Monetary Fund said that President Joe Biden's $1.9 trillion stimulus package will boost the US economy to 6.4% growth this year. That would be the fastest annual growth rate in the United States since 1984 under President Ronald Reagan. Economic data continues to support rosy predictions. This week, the Institute for Supply Management published its monthly report on the US services sector, which accounts for 88% of America's gross domestic product. The group's services index for March jumped to 63.7, the highest level ever recorded. "There is clearly a big surge in activity underway," said Paul Ashworth, chief US economist at Capital Economics. This data has helped keep US stocks near record highs. But an undercurrent of anxiety remains. CNN Business' Fear & Greed Index shows that market sentiment is in "greedy" territory, up from a neutral reading one week ago. But investors aren't throwing caution to the wind. In a recent note to clients, Tobias Levkovich, Citigroup's chief U.S. equity strategist, warned that the fear of missing out appears to be dominating. "There's a 1999 perspective being noted with pressure for fund managers to participate in rising share prices even if there's also a recognition that it could end badly," Levkovich wrote, referring to the dot-com bubble that popped at the turn of the millennium. He worries that investors are overlooking the risk that the Federal Reserve could change course and take some stimulus measures off the table, as well as the impact of "plausible tax increases being proposed by the Biden administration."

#### The international order doesn’t solve war or coop.

Mearsheimer ’18 (John; is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science and the co-director of the Program on International Security Policy at the University of Chicago, where he has taught since 1982. PhD from Cornell, research fellow at the Brookings Institution, post-doctoral fellow at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs, and the Whitney H. Shepardson Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York; *The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities*; Yale University Press © 2018; MSCOTT)

Liberal Institutionalism

Liberal institutionalism is probably the weakest of the three major liberal theories.65 Its chief proponents make modest claims about what international institutions can actually do to bring peace, and the historical record shows clearly that for any great power on the road to war, they are little more than a speed bump. That includes liberal democracies like Britain and the United States.

Institutions are the set of rules that describe how states should cooperate and compete with each other. They prescribe acceptable forms of behavior and proscribe unacceptable behavior. The rules are negotiated by states; they are not imposed. The great powers dominate the writing of these rules and pledge to obey them, even where they think it is not in their interest to do so. In effect, countries voluntarily tie their hands when they join an international institution. The rules are typically formalized in international agreements and administered by organizations with their own personnel and budgets. It is important to emphasize, however, that those organizations per se do not compel states to obey the rules. International institutions are not powerful bodies, which are independent of the states that comprise the system, and they are not capable of forcing states to follow the rules. They are not a form of world government. States themselves must choose to obey the rules they created. Institutions, in short, call for the “decentralized cooperation of individual sovereign states, without any effective mechanism of command.”66

This emphasis on voluntary obedience also captures how international law works, which tells us there is no meaningful difference between institutions and law at the international level. International institutions are sometimes called “regimes,” and many scholars use those terms interchangeably. Thus the analysis here is as applicable to international law and regimes as it is to international institutions.67

The Ultimate Goal: Cooperation among States

Liberal institutionalists rarely argue that international institutions are a powerful force for peace. Instead, they make the less ambitious claim that institutions help settle disputes peacefully by promoting interstate cooperation. This emphasis on cooperation is clearly evident in Robert Keohane’s After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, probably the most influential work on international institutions.68 But as his title indicates, Keohane concentrates on explaining how to enhance economic cooperation among states. He says little about war and peace. Some liberal institutionalists do deal directly with security issues, but they too mainly talk about how those security institutions enhance cooperation.69 This focus on cooperation is found throughout the institutionalist literature, where many of the key pieces have “cooperation” in the title, and where hardly anyone elaborates on how cooperation causes peace.70

It is important to specify the particular circumstances in which institutions foster cooperation. They work only when states have mutual interests but cannot realize them because the structure of the situation gives them incentives to take advantage of each other. An example of this problem is the classic prisoner’s dilemma, where two individuals have a vested interest in cooperating but cannot because each fears the other might take advantage of him. Instead, they try to exploit each other, which leaves them both worse off than if they had made the deal. Collective action logic is another instance where individuals have common interests but do not realize them because there are powerful incentives for them to take advantage of each other. Institutions, the argument goes, can help individuals in these situations realize their common interests.

The theory has little relevance when states have conflicting interests and neither side thinks it has much to gain from cooperation. In these circumstances, states will almost certainly aim to take advantage of each other, and that will sometimes involve violence. In other words, if the differences are profound and involve important issues, countries will think in terms of winning and losing, which will invariably lead to intense security competition and sometimes war. International institutions have little influence on state behavior in such conditions, mainly because the theory does not address how institutions can resolve or even ameliorate deep conflicts between great powers.71 It is thus not surprising that liberal institutionalists have little to say about the causes of war and peace.

There is another way to show the limits of institutions. Some liberal institutionalists argue that international politics can be divided into two realms—political economy and security—and that their theory applies mainly to the former. Charles Lipson, for instance, writes that “significantly different institutional arrangements are associated with international economic and security issues.”72 Moreover, the likelihood of cooperation in these realms is markedly different. When economic relations are at stake, “cooperation can be sustained among several self-interested states,” whereas the prospects for cooperation are “more impoverished . . . in security affairs.”73

The same thinking is reflected in Keohane’s After Hegemony, where he emphasizes that he is concentrating “on relations among the advanced market-economy countries . . . the area where common interests are greatest and where the benefits of international cooperation may be easiest to realize.”74 One example of this important distinction is the contrast between the United Nations’ ineffectiveness at resolving political disputes between the great powers and the effectiveness of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank at facilitating economic cooperation among the major powers. What this means in practice is that liberal institutionalists focus mainly on fostering cooperation in the economic and environmental realms, because those are the domains where states are most likely to need the help of institutions to realize their common interests. Liberal institutionalists devote much less attention to security regimes.

One might argue that military alliances are security institutions, and they certainly have an important effect on international politics. There is no question that alliances are useful for coordinating the actions of the member states in both peace and war, which makes their collective efforts more efficient and effective. NATO is a case in point. It was hugely important during the Cold War in helping the West deter Soviet ambitions in Europe. But the alliance was among states with powerful incentives to cooperate in the face of a common threat, not states that had fundamental disagreements. Thus the general point stands: liberal institutionalists pay little attention to questions about war and peace.

Some might say that John Ikenberry, probably the most prominent liberal institutionalist besides Keohane, is an exception. He has developed a theory that is truly international in scope and can explain how to achieve cooperation in both the economic and security realms. In his seminal book After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars, he explains the circumstances under which states can build international orders, which seems to imply an order that covers the entire globe.75 Ikenberry is particularly interested in the international order that came into being after World War II, for which the United States was principally responsible. That order, of course, was heavily institutionalized.

On close inspection, however, we see that Ikenberry’s story is all about the Cold War order within the West, where the major countries had few profound disputes. He pays little attention to the security competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Nor does he say much about the United Nations—a truly international institution, but almost useless for managing superpower relations. In the end, Ikenberry is not dealing with international order; he is dealing with economic and military relations among the advanced industrial countries of the West. His focus is similar to Keohane’s in After Hegemony, and although they offer somewhat different theories, neither explains what causes security competition and war or how institutions prevent rival great powers from fighting each other.

The Anarchy Problem

It might seem surprising, but the major liberal institutionalist thinkers do not claim, at least most of the time, to be offering a clear alternative to realism. They seem to want to retain significant elements of realpolitik in their arguments while yet going beyond it. Ikenberry, for example, writes that his theory “draws upon both realist and liberal theoretical traditions,” while Keohane writes that “we need to go beyond Realism, not discard it.”76 Helga Haftendorn, Keohane, and Celeste Wallander, the editors of a book dealing directly with security institutions, write: “As we see it, security studies, still dominated by realist thinking, will greatly benefit by incorporating institutionalist approaches.”77 It is hard to understand how any theory that is based in good part on realist logic can possibly leave balance-of-power politics behind. But let us put that matter aside and instead concentrate on explaining why international institutions hold out little hope of significantly enhancing the prospects for peace, even if they enhance the prospects for cooperation.

Liberal institutionalism is predicated on the belief that the main inhibitor of international cooperation is the threat of cheating, which is largely a consequence of intractable uncertainty. A state can never know what other states will think and do in the future. Institutions, so the argument goes, can ameliorate that problem in four ways.

First, they can increase the number of transactions among countries over time. This iteration raises the cost of cheating by creating the prospect of future gains through cooperation. The “shadow of the future” deters cheating today, since a state caught cheating jeopardizes its prospects of benefiting from future cooperation. Iteration gives the victim the opportunity to retaliate against the cheater: it facilitates a tit-for-tat strategy, which works to prevent cheaters from getting away with their transgression. In addition to punishing states that gain a reputation for cheating, it also rewards those that develop a reputation for adherence to agreements.

Second, rules can tie together interactions between states in different issue areas. The aim of issue linkage is to create greater interdependence between states, which will make them more reluctant to cheat in one issue area for fear that the victim, and perhaps other states, will retaliate in another area. Like iteration, linkage raises the costs of double-dealing and provides ways for victims to retaliate against the cheater.

Third, a system of rules can increase the amount of information available to the participants in cooperative agreements, which permits close monitoring. Raising the level of information discourages cheating by increasing the likelihood cheaters will be caught. It also provides victims with early warning of possible cheating, enabling them to take protective measures before they are badly hurt.

Finally, rules can reduce the transaction costs of individual agreements. When institutions perform the tasks described above, states are able to devote less effort to negotiating and monitoring agreements, and to hedging against possible defections. By increasing the efficiency of international cooperation, institutions make it more profitable and thus more attractive.

There is no question that the fear of a rival state breaking the rules, either covertly or openly, is a central element in the realist story, and one of the driving forces behind security competition and war.78 States are deeply concerned about the balance of power because they can never be certain they will not fall victim to another state cheating. If they do, there is no night watchman they can turn to for help. The key question for our purposes is whether international institutions solve the cheating problem in any way that challenges basic realist logic. Almost certainly, they do not.

The central problem, of course, is the absence of a higher authority that can credibly threaten to punish states if they disobey the rules. International institutions are not autonomous actors that can force a state to obey the rules when it thinks that doing so is not in its national interest. There is no evidence of any institution coercing a great power into acting against realist dictates. Instead, institutions depend on their member states to stick to the rules, because they think it serves their long-term interests. In the institutionalist story, member states have to police themselves.79

But we know from the historical record that states will cheat or disobey when they think that adhering to the rules is not in their interest. Consider, for example, that the United States—the quintessential liberal democratic state—violated international law to initiate wars against Serbia in 1999 and Iraq in 2003.80 In both cases, Washington failed to secure the required United Nations Security Council resolution sanctioning those wars. Still, the United States opted to ignore international law in both cases because it felt there were strong moral and strategic imperatives for doing so. Naturally, it was never punished. One could also point to instances when France and Germany violated well-established EU rules because they believed doing so was in their interest.81 They were not punished either. It is hard to find a case where an international institution punished a great power in any serious way for breaking the rules.

Given that states sometimes have fundamental differences and international institutions cannot meaningfully constrain them, those states recognize that they are operating in a self-help world where it makes eminently good sense to control as large a share of global power as possible, regardless of whether they gain that control by following the rules. After all, if a state obeys the law but sacrifices its security, who will come to its rescue if it is attacked by a rival state? Probably nobody. This logic explains why liberal institutionalism has so little to say about matters of war and peace, and why it does not offer a serious challenge to realism.

I would add a final word about cheating. Fear of cheating is generally considered a more formidable obstacle to cooperation when security issues are at stake:82 betrayal in such circumstances could bring a devastating military defeat. This threat of “swift, decisive defection,” as Charles Lipson writes, is simply not present in international economics. Given that “the costs of betrayal” are potentially much graver in the military sphere, it is hardly surprising that liberal institutionalism has little to say about security affairs but much to say about economic and environmental cooperation. As we saw, the other reason liberal institutionalism is relevant in the economic realm is that states often have common interests that institutions can help realize. In the security realm, where rival states often have fundamental differences, institutions are largely irrelevant, save for alliances.

In sum, international institutions are useful tools of statecraft when states have common interests and need help realizing them. They can facilitate cooperation among states, although that cooperation is not always for peaceful ends. The more important point, however, is that there is no reason to think institutions can push states away from war.

# 1NR

## 1NR---Inflation DA

### 1NR---Overview

#### Outweighs on magnitude.

McDonald 19, writer and geography PhD student at University of Oxford studying the intersection of grassroots movements and energy transition. (Samuel Miller, 1-4-2019, “Deathly Salvation”, *The Trouble*, https://www.the-trouble.com/content/2019/1/4/deathly-salvation)

A devastating fact of climate collapse is that there may be a silver lining to the mushroom cloud. First, it should be noted that a nuclear exchange does not inevitably result in apocalyptic loss of life. Nuclear winter—the idea that firestorms would make the earth uninhabitable—is based on shaky science. There’s no reliable model that can determine how many megatons would decimate agriculture or make humans extinct. Nations have already detonated 2,476 nuclear devices. An exchange that shuts down the global economy but stops short of human extinction may be the only blade realistically likely to cut the carbon knot we’re trapped within. It would decimate existing infrastructures, providing an opportunity to build new energy infrastructure and intervene in the current investments and subsidies keeping fossil fuels alive. In the near term, emissions would almost certainly rise as militaries are some of the world’s largest emitters. Given what we know of human history, though, conflict may be the only way to build the mass social cohesion necessary for undertaking the kind of huge, collective action needed for global sequestration and energy transition. Like the 20th century’s world wars, a nuclear exchange could serve as an economic leveler. It could provide justification for nationalizing energy industries with the interest of shuttering fossil fuel plants and transitioning to renewables and, uh, nuclear energy. It could shock us into reimagining a less ~~suicidal~~ civilization, one that dethrones the death-cult zealots who are currently in power. And it may toss particulates into the atmosphere sufficient to block out some of the solar heat helping to drive global warming. Or it may have the opposite effects. Who knows? What we do know is that humans can survive and recover from war, probably even a nuclear one. Humans cannot recover from runaway climate change. Nuclear war is not an inevitable extinction event; six degrees of warming is.

#### a---speed---the turn is faster than solvency and obviates wage growth---that’s Lacurci and…

Bivens 21, director of research at the Economic Policy Institute (Josh, 7-17-2021, "Should You Worry About Inflation? Experts Weigh In.", *NY Times*, <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/17/business/dealbook/inflation-questions-experts.html>)

Inflation hawks might argue that this is because the Fed successfully stayed ahead of the inflation curve. But too often the Fed has cut recoveries short before wages for most U.S. workers saw decent growth. In a recent study, we estimated that too-austere macroeconomic policy is the most important reason for anemic wage growth seen by the vast majority of U.S. workers after 1979.

So, recent inflation is a little worrisome, but an inappropriate response to it is very worrisome.

#### b---steep rates lock in long-term decline

Guida 11-2-2021, Economics Reporter @ Politico. (Victoria, "The Fed is ready to rein in its aid. Market tremors are already emerging.", *POLITICO*, <https://www.politico.com/news/2021/11/02/fed-interest-rate-hike-518405>)

For the Federal Reserve, this could be a year of living dangerously. The central bank is expected to announce this week plans to begin withdrawing its massive support for the economy, the first step in winding down the historic cash infusions it launched to save markets during the pandemic. What could come next — interest rate hikes — is causing angst among the Wall Street investors who finance the nation's debt and creating potential peril for Democrats on the 2022 campaign trail. Weaker-than-projected economic growth in the last quarter, a jobs slowdown and supply chain snags that are likely to continue deep into next year are all sending warning signs for President Joe Biden’s economy, despite an overall positive outlook that has sent the stock market soaring. At the same time, top Fed officials are increasingly voicing concern that inflation will stay higher for longer than they expected. As a result, some on Wall Street are worried that the Fed might raise borrowing costs as early as the middle of next year to fight price surges, a move that could jeopardize the recovery. Political progressives have similar concerns, but their focus is on ordinary Americans. “What problems would an interest rate hike solve and what problems would an interest rate hike create?” said Lindsay Owens, executive director of the Groundwork Collaborative, one of many progressive groups that have pressed the Fed to keep rates low until full employment is reached. “How did the American economy end up in a place where our supply chain is so shoddy that we can’t stock frozen pizza? When you think about that, the answer is not related to monetary policy.” The prospect of the central bank raising interest rates during an election year could cause tremors in the political world, with Democrats seeking to maintain their hair-thin majorities in Congress. Biden’s stewardship of the economy is a make-or-break issue for voters, and GOP lawmakers have hammered away at his big-spending policies as the driver of price surges. The White House and many economists point to production and shipping delays as the main culprit. The clearest sign of concern in the markets over the economy? Rates on long-term U.S. debt recently dipped below those on some shorter-term debt, a rare event known as a yield curve inversion that shows expectations of slower growth and has been the harbinger of recessions in the past. A slowing economy is not just an American concern: Yield curves in the Euro-zone flattened last week after the European Central Bank confirmed expectations for rate increases beginning next year. Markets aren’t predicting a downturn yet, said Roberto Perli, founding partner of research firm Cornerstone Macro and a former Fed economist. But they are saying: “By tightening [credit] prematurely, the Fed will compromise the long-term prospects for the U.S. economy.” In an interview Sunday with Bloomberg News, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen said she wasn’t worried about the movement in Treasury yields: “No, not me. I think what we’re going to see is a good, solid recovery. The unemployment rate has gone down considerably, and this is nothing like the recovery from the 2008 financial crisis.” Fed policymakers begin two days of meetings today, after which they’re expected to announce plans to start pulling back the $120 billion in monthly bond purchases the central bank has carried out since the pandemic began, a move that was designed to depress interest rates. Fed officials have said that once that is completed, likely by mid-2022, they may begin a new cycle of raising rates That means the next year will be a delicate dance for the central bank, which hasn’t sent a definite signal yet whether rate hikes are likely, and the immediate challenge facing either Fed Chair Jerome Powell, if he is reappointed, or his successor. If the Fed moves too quickly to rein in consumer and business spending to cool inflation, it would be damaging to longer-term growth and job creation. If the central bank waits too long, it would have to act more aggressively to raise borrowing costs down the road, which could also trigger a recession. “It’s a no-win situation the Fed has been put in,” said Douglas Holtz-Eakin, president of the American Action Forum and the former head of the Congressional Budget Office.

#### Inflation is the largest danger to the economy.

Summers 21, a professor at and past president of Harvard University. He was treasury secretary from 1999 to 2001 and an economic adviser to President Barack Obama from 2009 through 2010. (Lawrence, 5-24-2021, "Opinion: The inflation risk is real", *Washington Post*, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/05/24/inflation-risk-is-real/>)

But new conditions require new approaches. Now, the primary risk to the U.S. economy is overheating — and inflation.

Even six months ago, it was reasonable to regard slow growth, high unemployment and deflationary pressures as the predominant risk to the economy. Today, while continuing relief efforts are essential, the focus of our macroeconomic policy needs to change.

#### Low rates induce competition

Barkai 19, PhD, Assistant professor of finance at the London Business School and junior fellow at the Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State (Simcha, “The Anticompetitive Effects of Low Interest Rates,” *Pro Market*, <https://promarket.org/2019/02/21/anticompetitive-effects-low-interest-rates/>)

This mechanism of low interest rates leading to an increase in the persistence of monopolization can be tested with micro data. As clearly demonstrated in the paper, this prediction is not easy to test. As the economy transitions to a steady state with lower interest rates, some previously monopolized industries will see an increase in competition due to the new and greater desire of trailing firms to gain market share. With this caveat in mind, do we see that dominant firms today are more likely to maintain their market position?

### 1NR---AT: Inflation Now

#### No hikes soon, BUT steady, moderate growth is key.

Smart 11-1, citing Wells Fargo Managing Director and Senior Economist Sam Bullard (Tim, "The Fed Is in Focus as it Begins to Dial Back Support for the Economy", *US News*, <https://www.usnews.com/news/economy/articles/2021-11-01/the-fed-is-in-focus-as-it-begins-to-dial-back-support-for-the-economy>)

The Fed is expected to reduce its $120-billion-a-month purchases of Treasuries and mortgage-backed securities by $15 billion a month on the way to ending the program by the middle of next year. Beyond that, it is unclear when the Fed may begin raising interest rates, with projections ranging from late next year to 2023. Fed Chairman Jerome Powell has said officials will look to broad improvement in the labor market and a stabilization of inflation trends. "We think the Fed is unlikely to hike rates by September 2022, given that numerous (Fed) policymakers have made clear that the bar for a rate hike is much higher than the bar for tapering asset purchases," Wells Fargo Managing Director and Senior Economist Sam Bullard wrote in a Sunday preview of the week's economic news. "At August's rate of job growth, it would take a little more than two years to recoup 100% of the jobs lost during the pandemic, and even then, the economy would be still several million jobs short of its pre-pandemic trend," Bullard added. "Even with our faster projected pace of job growth, we still expect the labor market to face a meaningful employment gap for the entirety of 2022. As such, we currently have the first rate hike not occurring until 2023." A reading on the job market will come Friday when the Labor Department reports the number of new jobs created in October. Economists are looking for a number close to 400,000 following September's disappointing 194,000 increase. The central bank was instrumental in providing stimulus to the economy when it suffered the sharpest drop in gross domestic product since the Great Depression, along with additional trillions of dollars in relief payments to individuals and businesses from Congress. Overall, the economy rebounded sharply from the downturn, although in the third quarter growth slowed markedly to a 2% annual rate as much of the federal stimulus ended and the delta variant of the virus curtailed consumer spending and supply chain disruptions hampered businesses. The question now is how well the U.S. economy and its global counterparts will fare absent the massive shots of adrenaline. One reason for hope: Americans are sitting on roughly $2 trillion in excess savings generated during the pandemic, which could be spent down during the holiday season and coming months. The fly in the ointment continues to be inflation, which according to the most recent data released Friday is running at a 30-year high driven by rising food and energy costs. How much of that increase is the result of economic conditions brought on by the pandemic will be something to watch going forward. The Fed meeting will occur against the backdrop of activity in Washington, where Congress is close to a vote on twin infrastructure bills. If passed, those would provide an additional $2 trillion or more in fiscal fuel to the economy, though the spending plans stretch out over 10 years. And there are critical elections Tuesday, including in the Virginia governor's race, that could give an idea how Democrats will fare in the 2022 midterm elections given their razor-thin majorities in both chambers. Still, the main event continues to be the coronavirus and there is good news on that front, with the recent approval of booster shots of the main vaccines as well as the imminent approval of shots for children as young as 5 years old. "The Delta variant and supply chain issues will subside, and these issues will 'spread out or shift' spending to Q4 and 2022," says Chris Gaffney, president of world markets at TIAA Bank. "The expected growth is not gone but will instead be shifted to future quarters as we see these challenges to growth fade." "The slower growth will actually ease concerns on an 'overheating' economy and give support to Chairman Powell's view that interest rates need to remain at current levels through the later half of 2022." Meanwhile, the stock market continues to rally, with all the major indices posting a strong October. Dow Jones Industrial Average futures were up more than 100 points in pre-market trading following a week of strong third-quarter earnings and merger and acquisition news.

#### October’s report demonstrates the brink. There’s no inflation spiral yet.

Stewart 11-10-2021, vox analyst, interviewing a senior fellow at the Jain Family Institute and former Federal Reserve economist (Emily, “Why it’s not quite time to panic about inflation,” *Vox*, <https://www.vox.com/the-goods/2021/11/10/22775092/inflation-cpi-october-economy-biden-fed>)

I reached out to Claudia Sahm, a senior fellow at the Jain Family Institute and former Federal Reserve economist, to ask how to parse the latest inflation numbers. Sahm isn’t an inflation hawk and has for some time pushed back against fearmongering on the issue, but she acknowledged that the October situation isn’t good. Wages aren’t broadly keeping up with inflation across all jobs, though they are in some sectors, such as hospitality. However, Sahm notes, the economic situation — and pandemic situation — is much better for many people this year than it was last. She’s not hitting the panic button on prices, but she worries about the implications for the reconciliation bill in Congress, and emphasizes that the Fed is paying attention to what’s going on. Our conversation, edited for length and clarity, follows. So the October inflation numbers were not good. Legitimately, October wasn’t a good month. Prices really across the board — with some exceptions — rose in October. The increase that we saw in total aggregate prices was as large as the big increases that we saw early in the summer. What had happened between, say, June and October was that the level of prices had stayed high. We haven’t seen outright declines in prices, but inflation had been stepping down, which has been the forecast, the expectation, of Fed officials, the White House, myself personally, a lot of other professional forecasters. It hasn’t stepped down as fast — the peak earlier this year was much higher than I certainly expected. But this is a step backward. Inflation moved back up, so that means off of the high level of prices, we have moved up, again, pretty notably. CPI is over 6 percent year-over-year. This is not good news. Is there a broader context you think people should pay attention to here? There’s a good, bad, and ugly of inflation. There are good reasons that inflation comes down, like we start working out supply chains and labor shortages. And there are bad reasons, and my bad case is Covid-19 comes back and we get scared and pull back. Prices are supply and demand. We look at lower inflation and say, “Yay, this is a good thing.” But lower jobs is bad. Covid has been the root of all evil through this entire pandemic. It comes, slows some, then it comes back with a surge, then it slows, then it comes back with a surge. Just like you can’t draw a straight line through the Covid cases and the Covid deaths, you cannot draw a straight line through the economic recovery. We are pointed in the right direction, particularly after the vaccines came out, but not every month. How does this tie into what else is happening in the economy? People are exhausted. Workers, businesses are exhausted. We are moving in the right direction, but it is painful. One of the pain points is higher prices. Another big pain point is not having a job. Inflation is felt more broadly because the unemployment rate is back down. It’s still above where it was before, but we’re really moving on that. Far fewer people are in these dire straits than were happening earlier in the pandemic, but everybody is facing some price increases. But the vast majority of Americans fill up their cars with gas, and they notice it’s a lot higher. It’s a much more diffuse pain, it’s not as severe, but people hate inflation. Inflation has both a reality and a life of its own. It’s just like taxes — taxes are something you pay, but they’re something we all just broadly hate. Both because jobs have been coming back and also because the federal government put out a lot of economic relief, people — especially those who are at the very top of the heap — have, on average, enough money to pay those extra prices in the majority of cases. When you look at the price at the pump, you think, “Ahhh,” and you’re staring at it. But if you’re staring at it, that means you put gas in your car. And if you look at the consumption numbers adjusted for inflation, these things have gone up, and that is because people have more money. Prices are rising, but their bank accounts rose faster. There’s a hardship, but when you look back to the Great Recession, where there was much less relief, real consumer spending did not rise like we are seeing this year, and inflation, frankly, it was rising faster. That was worse. Inflation wasn’t as high as it is now, but at the end of the day, it’s, “Can you eat?” not just, “How much did you pay for the food?” How does all the government support during the pandemic play into this? Low-income people spend a bigger part of their budget on necessities, food, on housing, on medical care. It puts a squeeze on them if you hold income constant. If you have more money in their pocket, it really does help. The stimulus, for a family of four, it was almost 20 percent of median family income in all three rounds. Low-income people have more in liquid assets, more in wealth, than they have had in a very, very long time. It’s amazing, because we are coming out of the worst recession in living memory, a massive global pandemic. Inflation, it’s not good, I’m not sugarcoating it, but there was a lot of good done. The American Rescue Plan [the stimulus bill signed into law by President Joe Biden earlier this year] was the absolute best policy, particularly in an environment with high inflation. You look across the world in developed countries, they all have inflation. And you know what the difference is in the United States? We put thousands and thousands of dollars in people’s pockets at the beginning of the year. It really made a big difference to people’s lives. The fact that higher inflation is eating away at the wealthy, the lenders, the bond market people, I have no sympathy. I loved the packing plant that was complaining in the news because they couldn’t hire enough workers. Maybe if you hadn’t killed so many of your workers, right? Inflation is too high, it’s causing problems, but it’s not our biggest problem right now. Covid is. There’s a trope about inflation that the Fed’s behind the curve; inflation hawks say the same thing over and over again. We are not living the same moment as the ’70s, the ’50s. There was no global pandemic. If that’s how you’re going to approach this, something is missing in the model, and frankly, it just wastes so much time. There are real problems, there are real solutions, and they are going to tank that legislation in Congress. The inflation debate has already clearly cut down the size of the kids, care, and climate legislation, as I like to call the [Build Back Better reconciliation bill]. The midterms are coming. We will not have a united government; they will not pass anything like this again for years. And inflation will come back down. Even if it stays above 2 percent, you’re going to say climate change, children, education, and housing are less important? It’s not about inflation, it’s about the size of government. It’s not about the taxes, it’s not about the debt, it’s about how much government should be active in people’s lives. I feel like economists are the accessories to the murder of good long-term policy, and it’s frustrating. It’s a tough line to walk, because I don’t want to pretend like prices haven’t risen a lot. I believe in fact. So I hear you that there are a lot of other things going on in the economy, but people really do feel inflation. People see the numbers — my mom’s been complaining her Christmas baking is more expensive this year. How worried should normal people be? Because a lot of them are starting to feel a little panicked. You learn a lot as a policy expert if you engage with people, and I listen because I cannot tell someone how to feel. I cannot tell someone what should you expect in the future. I can’t help but bring in, “Hey, but what about those checks? And it’s the pandemic, and the supply chain, and prices fell for a long time, we’ll get back there. Gas prices will go down.” You can bring facts into it, but I can’t tell them how to feel. And, frankly, what we are seeing, I’m not surprised. If you told me inflation would be 6 percent year-over-year right now and asked me what the University of Michigan consumer sentiment survey would look like, I could tell you. People really dislike inflation. There are a lot of people, particularly older people, who have lived through periods of high inflation where it got out of control and policymakers were asleep at the wheel. They haven’t seen what Jay Powell’s Fed is going to do. Most people don’t trust government at all, and a lot of people don’t trust facts either; we have lots of problems here. If a politician you look up to or a talking head on the news tells you that you should be freaking out about inflation, it’s going to get worse. I do worry about an inflation spiral, but in the Michigan survey, they ask about the buying conditions for large household durable goods, big household purchases. It is at its lowest level, at least going back decades and decades. That made me so relieved, because when I’m thinking about this inflation spiral, in countries that experience high and rising inflation, what fuels that spiral is that people look at the high and rising prices, and you ask them if they should buy now, and they say yes, because prices will be higher. If I ask you if it’s a good time to buy and you say no, that means you’re not going to start hoarding things and creating more price pressure. People hear inflation haws, and that’s where the fear goes — in the economy, the trust in government, the questions about where we are headed. But for me, there’s this disconnect, because yes, prices are bad, but we helped a lot of families. It’s a tough time right now. Precarious is too strong of a word, because I don’t see the makings of an inflation spiral — vaccines are coming out, Covid is coming down. But some days it’s a good day, and some days it’s a bad day. And sometimes it’s really good — half a million jobs really good. Other times, it’s inflation rising almost a percent month-over-month — really bad.

#### Current inflation is insufficient to trigger wage-price spiral

Horsley 8-11-2021 (Scott, “Wages Are Going Up — And So Is Inflation. Consumer Prices Have Hit A 13-Year High,” *National Public Radio*, <https://www.npr.org/2021/08/11/1026493316/workers-are-getting-pay-raises-and-it-could-end-up-contributing-to-high-inflatio>)

A lot of workers are getting wage hikes this year as employers compete for scarce labor. But it's not all good news for workers, or for the economy: Some businesses are raising prices to offset the wage hikes, contributing to surging inflation and eroding some of the benefits from that higher pay. The Labor Department reported Wednesday that consumer prices were 5.4% higher in July than a year ago. That matches the June inflation rate, which was the highest in nearly 13 years. The increase was driven by rising costs for shelter, food, energy and new cars. Most of the recent jump in inflation has been caused by pandemic bottlenecks, like the shortage of chips that limited new car production and caused a big spike in the price of used cars. Used car prices continued to climb in July, but at a much slower rate, and those prices are expected to decline in the months to come. Rising worker pay could become a bigger factor in higher prices going forward even if it's not raising alarm bells yet. Burrito chain Chipotle, for example, boosted its average pay to $15 an hour this summer. But to cover the cost of that pay increase, Chipotle raised prices 3.5% to 4%. For the moment, restaurants are able to pass on higher costs to customers without a hit to their bottom lines because demand for eating out remains so strong. "People are tired of cooking their own meals," says Lyle Margolis, a senior director at Fitch Ratings. "They're tired of cleaning up after themselves. They want to be waited on and they want to be social. And restaurants are a great place to do that." Chipotle, for one, has seen little drop in demand for carnitas or guacamole. "We saw very little resistance to the price increase," CEO Brian Niccol said on the company's quarterly earnings call. But it's not necessarily all good news. The price of restaurant meals jumped 0.8% between June and July — the biggest increase in more than four decades. Other prices are also rising, partly as a result of rising wages. Tyson says it plans to raise prices for chicken and pork, in part to offset higher wages in its meat processing plants. "It is encouraging that wages are rising," says Wells Fargo economist Shannon Seery. "Some of these lower-paying sectors are seeing higher wages, which in turn, hopefully, will bring more workers back to the labor force." "But it does suggest that this inflationary environment is broadening out beyond the supply constraints that we were initially seeing from the re-opening," Seery adds. The rising cost of living erodes some of the benefits of higher pay for workers who will have to pay more for a range of goods across the board. For employers, their rising labor cost is also something that bears closely watching. Amazon – the nation's second largest private employer – has been paying more to attract workers to its giant warehouses. "We have raised our wages and have increased the use of incentives to hire people," Amazon's chief financial officer Brian Olsavsky told reporters on a conference call. "We're watching it carefully. But it's probably one of the bigger elements of inflation in our business right now." Still, for now, Federal Reserve chairman Jerome Powell sees little danger of the kind of wage-price spiral that led to runaway inflation in the 1970s. Wage gains are likely to level off as more people return to the workforce. What's more, many employers have found more efficient ways to operate, so pay increases don't automatically have to be passed on to consumers. "The problem is if it happens in a way that pushes firms broadly into raising prices," Powell told reporters last month. "We don't see that now."

#### Squo inflation is limited and sector-specific---only labor-driven increases causes the Fed to stomp on the brakes.

Bivens 7-17-2021, director of research at the Economic Policy Institute (Josh, "Should You Worry About Inflation? Experts Weigh In.", *NY Times*, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/17/business/dealbook/inflation-questions-experts.html)

Josh Bivens: The Fed’s reaction to inflation could be worse than inflation itself.

Mr. Bivens is the director of research at the Economic Policy Institute.

Rising prices can certainly squeeze families’ budgets, all else equal. But recent inflation has been driven by price spikes in a small number of sectors, such as used cars, hotel rooms and airfares. Inflation driven by idiosyncratic sectoral shocks should not spur policymakers to stomp on the brakes.

The only inflation that should spur more contractionary macroeconomic policy is inflation that comes from the labor market, when jobs become so plentiful that workers can successfully demand wage growth that runs far ahead of the economy’s capacity to deliver it. This has not happened in the United States for a long time.

#### Inflation is temporary and will subside.

Goolsbee 7-17-2021, professor of economics at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business (Austan, "Should You Worry About Inflation? Experts Weigh In.", *NY Times*, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/17/business/dealbook/inflation-questions-experts.html)

Austan Goolsbee: Temporary supply issues are to blame.

Mr. Goolsbee is a professor of economics at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business.

I lean Team Temporary. Economists call the “potential” of the economy the output it can sustain at full employment. When the economy gets above potential output — as it seems imminently in danger of — it’s time to think about overheating.

The amount we exceeded potential output in the 1960s, which helped ignite more than a decade of inflation, was much higher than what it is now and remained so for almost eight years. Our situation looks more like the situations in the late 1990s, the mid-2000s, and 2017 to 2019, none of which ignited sustained inflation despite unemployment rates well below today’s.

Difference in real versus potential G.D.P.

**[GRAPH OMITTED]**

Source: Commerce Department, Congressional Budget Office By The New York Times

This suggests temporary supply chain issues unless something about the pandemic fundamentally changed the sustainable rate of employment in the economy.

#### Inflation constrained so far

Ip 7-21-2021 (Greg, “How Inflation Threatens the Recovery,” *Wall Street Journal*, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-inflation-threatens-the-recovery-11626876000)

One reason markets are struggling is fear the Fed will do something similar. The Fed will resist tightening monetary policy unless it sees a one-off price surge fueling a continuing cycle of wage and price inflation. That would be a prelude to stagflation: a sustained period of both higher inflation and slower growth. The good news is that it doesn’t appear to be happening yet. Long-run expectations for inflation as reflected in inflation-indexed bond yields have slipped in the past month. Meanwhile, the best hope for the Fed and consumers is that higher prices do what they have reliably done in the past, which is to bring forth more supply.

#### Even if it’s increasing, it’s not yet at dangerous levels

White 7-13-2021 (Ben, “New concern for Biden: Could Larry Summers be right about inflation?,” *Politico*, <https://www.politico.com/news/2021/07/13/larry-summers-biden-inflation-499502>)

Tuesday’s CPI report is not likely to ease that anxiety. Even after stripping out volatile food and energy prices, costs rose 4.5 percent, the highest rate since 1991 and well above estimates of 3.8 percent. Rising housing costs contributed to the inflation bump, jumping 0.5 percent over last month, the biggest gain since 2005. A Wall Street Journal survey of economists published over the weekend showed expectations for inflation rising to 3.2 percent in the fourth quarter of this year from the same time last year and averaging 2.58 percent from 2021 through 2023, a level not seen since 1993. Still, even that is not historically high and many economists say it's too soon to suggest that inflation is rising in a dangerous way. “We are still in a wait-and-see mode on whether it’s transitory,” said Diane Swonk, chief economist at Grant Thornton LLP. “Powell will be in the hot seat on Capitol Hill because inflation is a highly political issue, even if this is just transitory. Nobody likes inflation.”

#### 2---the fed thinks it’s transitory---they’re patient now, but it’s a tightrope. New economic conditions cause a rash rate hike.

Edelman 11-3-2021 (Larry, “A patient Fed walks a tightrope between job creation and inflation fight,” Boston Globe, https://www.bostonglobe.com/2021/11/03/business/fed-takes-first-step-keep-economy-overheating/)

The Federal Reserve helped blunt the worst of COVID’s damage to the economy by slashing interest rates, steadying the inner workings of the financial system, and vowing to do [whatever was needed](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/29/upshot/fed-powell-economy-pandemic.html) to prevent the crisis from spiraling out of control. Now comes another tough assignment: Tame inflation without jeopardizing the recovery. On Wednesday, central bank officials made clear they wouldn’t respond rashly to [prices that are rising at the fastest rate](https://www.bea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-10/pi0921.pdf) since 1991. Inflation is being fueled by temporary forces that will likely retreat next year, [they said in a statement](https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/monetary20211103a1.pdf), giving them leeway to keep interest rates pinned near zero in the hopes that [unemployment will fall further.](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UNRATE) “There is still ground to cover to get to maximum employment,” Fed chairman Jerome Powell said during a news conference after policy makers wrapped up their two-day meeting. “We don‘t want to stop now.” The US jobless rate was 4.8 percent in September, compared with 3.5 percent in February 2020, just before COVID hit, and there are still 3.3 million fewer jobs than there were then. The Fed, as expected, said it would begin to reduce the $120 billion a month it has been pumping into the financial system — using purchases of Treasury bonds and mortgage securities — to offset the impact of COVID. It will cut purchases by $15 billion this month and another $15 billion in December. Barring any unexpected change in economic conditions, that gradual stepdown would continue until the program is finished in June. The Fed said the move, known as tapering, was appropriate given “the substantial further progress the economy has made toward the Committee’s goals since last December.”

#### Rates won’t be increased now. The Fed thinks inflation is transitory.

Kuttner 11-10-2021 (Robert, “Kuttner on TAP,” The American Prospect, their email liststerv, <https://prospect.org/blogs/tap/price-of-political-success-inflation-midterms/>)

The Price of Political Success

Will inflation subside in time for the 2022 midterms?

The only good news in today’s inflation report for October is that the Fed is not overreacting to it. Life is not fair, and the spike in consumer prices—for reasons that have nothing to do with Biden’s policies—is a blow to the Democrats. Consumer prices are up 4.6 percent over a year ago, and almost a full point in just a month; but in highly visible sectors such as retail gasoline, they are up a lot more. Gas prices are up almost 50 percent over a year ago, and with winter coming, home heating will be more expensive, too. Most of this is the result of long-term policy failures by Republicans and other conservatives. The supply chain bottlenecks that are creating spot shortages and raising prices across a range of products reflect a brew of too much globalization, too much deregulation, and too little public management of logistics as a coherent national system. All of this, however, is hard to explain in a sound bite. Even The New York Times ran a front-page feature story correctly flagging a national shortage of truck drivers as a key choke point in the supply chain crisis, noting the long hours and lousy pay, but without mentioning the words trucking deregulation or Teamsters once. Back in the day, long-haul trucking was a good job and there were no shortages of drivers. By the same token, if we had gotten more serious about domestic renewable energy much earlier, we would not be at the mercy of swings in the global price of energy, magnified by the speculations of futures markets. The trouble is that people don’t want subtle explanations of past policy failures. They want prices to subside. Biden has some leverage to make the ports work more smoothly in the near term, but most of these fixes will take years, not months. And fully funding Build Back Better will help pay to bring home supply chains sooner rather than later. In the meantime, we can be grateful for small favors, the most important of which is the Fed’s refusal to join the clamor for higher interest rates, which would only make the situation worse by dousing a still-fragile recovery.

### 1NR---AT: High Wages =/= Inflation

#### Inflation is limited now, but higher wages trigger it.

Guilford 10-31-2021 (Gwynn, “Wages and Prices Are Up, but It Isn’t a Spiral—Yet,” Wall Street Journal, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/wages-and-prices-are-up-but-it-isnt-a-spiralyet-11635688981>)

It’s no longer just prices. Now wages, too, are flashing inflation signals. Wages in the third quarter were up 4.2% from a year earlier, the fastest increase since 1990 as labor shortages in a widening range of industries prompted employers to raise pay. Meanwhile, inflation has topped 5% for the past four months, the hottest in decades. At first blush, this looks like the start of a process where wages push up prices, which then prompt employees to ask for, and receive, higher wages. That sort of wage-price spiral has historically been a key ingredient in persistently high inflation. But economists aren’t predicting that yet. They note in only a few industries so far do higher prices seem directly due to higher wages. Wages and prices are often thought to have “an iron lockstep relationship and that’s just not the case here,” said Peter Matthews, economics professor at Middlebury College. While firms will attempt to pass on higher labor costs to customers, differences in how various sectors tend to respond will determine the impact on inflation, he said. Last quarter, wages in leisure and hospitality rose 7.6% from a year ago—much higher than the 4.2% overall pace, according to the Labor Department’s employment cost index, released Friday. RECESSION 2007 '10 '15 '20 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 % Fast-food average hourly​wage Fast-food prices In that sector, though, labor makes up a relatively large share of overall costs, and it is one of the few in which higher wages seem to be driving prices. Restaurant prices have climbed at a 6.8% annual rate in the past six months, the fastest pace since 1981, according to Labor Department data. Wages are up an average of 15% this year at company-owned McDonald’s Corp. restaurants in the U.S., the company said. The Chicago-based burger chain is still struggling to hire the workers needed to keep stores open at full hours, executives said. “Wage increases were initially concentrated among lowest-wage restaurant workers,” said Veronica Clark, a Citi economist. The pass-through to prices seems to be showing up in several other low-wage sectors, she said. Domestic services climbed an annualized 6.9% since March, without seasonal adjustment, while recreation service prices jumped 5.2%, near the highest since records began in 2010. Prices have surged even more for factory goods, but those increases seem linked to key materials, energy and shipping rather than wages. Factory pay growth accelerated to 3.7% in the last quarter, the fastest increase since 2001, but still within historical norms. RECESSION 2008 '10 '15 '20 -5.0 -2.5 0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 12.5 15.0 % Durable goods, average​hourly wages Durable goods prices Decades ago widespread unionization and cost-of-living adjustments meant wages responded relatively quickly to higher inflation. Since then declining unionization, slower-to-adjust minimum wages and lower productivity growth have restrained wage growth except when unemployment is low. Even in the third quarter wage growth lagged behind inflation. Lawrence Katz, a labor economist at Harvard University, sees the current dynamic as more of a one-off adjustment as low-wage workers exploit their strongest bargaining power in decades. “The relative price of fast food and deliveries may go up because of a tight labor market, but I don’t see that as a persistent wage-price spiral,” he said. “It’s like when you raise the minimum wage substantially you will jack up the prices of fast food this year, but not for 10 straight years.” Whether wages keep accelerating depends largely on how long labor shortages last. Sarah House, senior economist at Wells Fargo, expects workforce participation to rebound next spring, as health concerns and child care conflicts recede and savings are exhausted. “That could take the edge off some of the wage pressures.” But the longer the pandemic goes on, the bigger the risk that workforce exits will be permanent, said Paul Ashworth, chief North America economist at Capital Economics. He notes that shortages aren’t limited to low-wage industries, with the job-opening rate in most industries up 50% from pre-pandemic levels. Even in the most labor-intensive industries, businesses often face a delicate balance between passing on wage costs and preserving market share. Andreea Pfeifer, owner of girlFriday, a high-end cleaning service in Chicago, started raising wages in May to retain and recruit employees as demand boomed. Squeezed margins prompted her to increase her prices in June and July. “I have never gone back to any [long-term] client and changed their pricing. But I had to do it this year,” said Ms. Pfeifer. The overall price increase of 7% to 10% was the highest possible without sacrificing customers, she said, though not enough to offset the rise in labor costs. And despite offering wages of over $20 an hour and a $500 signing bonus, “it’s been crickets,” said Ms. Pfeifer. How Retail Cheese Prices Weather Market Volatility YOU MAY ALSO LIKE UP NEXT How Retail Cheese Prices Weather Market Volatility How Retail Cheese Prices Weather Market Volatility With food markets on a wild ride lately, cheese has seen more volatility than most. Yet in supermarkets, prices have remained relatively stable. Here’s why sharp changes in wholesale cheese prices are slow to make it to consumers. Illustration: Jacob Reynolds Higher wages in low-wage sectors have already had a sizable impact on inflation. Goldman Sachs economists estimate that wages for low-paid workers rose 6% in the third quarter, a three-decade high, which they said added 0.15 percentage points to inflation, as measured by the price index of personal consumption excluding its volatile food and energy components. If that wage pressure stays elevated, it could contribute up to 0.5 percentage points to annual inflation in 2022, Goldman said. However, neither wage nor price data currently signals a spread beyond low-wage services that might threaten the Fed’s 2% inflation target, said David Mericle, Goldman’s chief U.S. economist. “If overall wage growth is running not at 4% but at 6% or something like that, then I think it’s harder to reconcile that with actually achieving the Fed’s inflation target,” he said. “The key question is really what will happen with wage growth now that the enhanced unemployment benefits have expired, and [the third-quarter] numbers are too dated to tell us the answer,” Mr. Mericle added.

#### Wages are steadily rising now, keeping inflation in check---BUT fast hikes in wages would create a spiral.

Cox 9-7-21, Finance editor for CNBC.com where he manages coverage of the financial markets and Wall Street (Jeff, September 7th, “A sharp rise in wages is contributing to worries over inflation,” *CNBC*, <https://www.cnbc.com/2021/09/07/a-sharp-rise-in-wages-is-contributing-to-worries-over-inflation.html>, Accessed 11-06-2021)

“Today we see little evidence of wage increases that might threaten excessive,” Powell said during the Aug. 27 speech. Measures Powell said he follows – he did not mention the Labor Department’s monthly average hourly earnings figure – point to “wages moving up at a pace that appears consistent with our longer-term inflation objective.” One specific measure Powell mentioned was the Atlanta Fed’s Wage Growth Tracker. That measure looks at wages on monthly and 12-month basis and then uses a three-month moving average to iron out distortions. On a smoothed level, the tracker is showing wages rising at a 3.7% pace, fairly consistent with the past few years. Without smoothing, the 12-month rate runs to 4.2%, which is the highest since 2007 and representative of how bumpy the data has gotten lately. The Atlanta Fed will next update the tracker Friday, giving the Fed another look at potential pressures that could trigger a wage-price spiral, which economists consider “bad” inflation. Fed officials thus far have attributed higher inflation numbers to supply issues. A continued rise in wages could signal that demand is becoming a factor. “When it is difficult to disentangle demand from supply effects, price signals become more important to assess the extent of excess demand,” wrote Nomura chief economist Rob Subbaraman. Concerns about policy To be sure, there also is evidence that some of the issues that might spur inflation could abate ahead, particularly some of the supply chain issues Powell has cited. The chairman also noted that unit labor costs remain low, meaning that companies still aren’t spending substantially more for productivity, which also could tamp down inflation. “They’re taking a lot of solace in all these other factors,” Moody’s Analytics chief economist Mark Zandi said. “Inflation is on their radar screen, but it’s not blinking red, not even yellow.” The rising wage numbers under most circumstances would be considered a positive. However, the gains trailed the headline consumer price index growth of 5.4% in July and only matched the 3.6% increase when stripping out food and energy prices in July, the most recent month for which data is available. Some central bank officials and economists worry that easy Fed policy is feeding inflation and starting to cause more harm than help. Rising home prices and high inflation expectations from consumers are fueling some of those fears. “It is not surprising that a combination of doubling central bank assets over the past 18 months, massive fiscal stimulus, and a skill mismatch in the labor market has resulted in inflation rising to levels not seen in decades,” wrote Komal Sri-Kumar, president of Sri-Kumar Global Strategies. “Drilling a square peg into a round ole does not solve problems. It worsens it.” Still, Zandi thinks Powell and the Fed will be content with allowing wages to rise for now. “It’s not like they’re dismissing this as an issue. It’s a factor in their thinking about broader inflationary pressures,” he said. “But so far, they’d say the wage growth they’re observing is more a feature than a bug.”

#### Unions link---enhanced labor bargaining pegs wages to cost-of-living increases---triggers runaway inflation.

Schrager 10-8-2021, senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute and author of "An Economist Walks Into a Brothel: And Other Unexpected Places to Understand Risk. (Allison, “Inflation Expectations Matter for Federal Reserve’s Clout,” *Bloomberg*, <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-10-08/inflation-expectations-matter-for-federal-reserve-s-clout>)

Federal Reserve officials are trying to reassure the public that this is temporary, the natural result of taking an economy offline and restarting it, or that inflation is limited to a few quirky sectors like used cars. But at what stage does transitory inflation become permanent, and when do we need to worry? The answers are “not yet” and, more important, “now.” All inflation pretty much starts as temporary. It could be due to a spike in oil prices, supply shortages that cause the prices of food and other goods to rise, or the injection of a lot of money into the economy by the Fed. But whether inflation peters out when conditions change depends on people’s expectations. If stores raise their prices because they expect shortages to last for a several months or a year and people demand higher wages to pay for the increase, inflation takes hold and is hard to extinguish. The role of expectations has received some pushback lately from senior Fed economist Jeremy Rudd. Expectations may not be a great predictor of sudden inflation, like the type we are seeing now. Economists also do not fully understand what drives expectations, and they are very difficult to observe. But there is good evidence that over the long term, expectations matter. Expectations don’t just depend on how long shortages last; they are also influenced by policy. That is what went wrong in the 1970s. Prices of food and oil went up, and that was met with accommodative monetary policy. People expected inflation, and it became self-fulfilling. That’s in large part because the Fed also lacked credibility. The central bank was in a new, untested regime after the U.S. left the Bretton Woods system in 1971, and Fed Chair Arthur Burns was skeptical he could do much about prices. Inflation spiked from 1972 to 1974 and then rose again in 1976, rising to more than 13% by 1980. Finally, the Paul Volcker-led Fed increased rates enough to break inflation once and for all, but that led to a recession. There are parallels today. The Fed in the 1970s also tried to reassure people that inflation would pass, as the central bank is doing now. And, despite a resurgence in inflation, the modern Fed is pursuing extremely accommodative policies, keeping interest rates near zero through 2022 and buying $120 billion worth of assets each month. The Fed is also promising to tolerate more inflation, even if it goes above target, though how much it will tolerate and for how long is unclear. The Fed may not have the credibility it once did. If Americans follow monetary history, they would expect higher inflation to take hold. But some things are different, which may temper inflation expectations and help avoid a repeat of the 1970s. It is a more global economy; the U.S. now imports about 15% of its goods and services (nearly double the percentage in the early 70s) from other countries, many with cheaper labor, which means if global supply-chain issues are resolved, prices may fall, too. We also buy more goods online, which means prices are observable across many different sellers. This has become a deflationary force because pricing is more competitive and merchants (and buyers) know what others are charging and prices become more dynamic. Rudd argues labor is also less centralized. Unions traditionally negotiated cost-of-living increases in salaries. Only 6% of U.S. workers are unionized today, and wages are rarely pegged to inflation.

### 1NR---AT: LT---Aff Enhances Productivity

#### Supply chain constraints are certain and long-term

O’Neal 10-28-2021, citing the head of Prologis (Lydia, “Prologis CEO Sees Supply-Chain Strains Extending to 2023,” *Wall Street Journal*, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/prologis-ceo-sees-supply-chain-strains-extending-to-2023-11635437626?mod=article_inline>)

The head of industrial real-estate giant Prologis Inc. expects disruptions and congestion that have tied up supply chains are likely to last into 2023, a break from many forecasts that suggest the global stresses should ease next year. “I think it’s going to take a while,” Prologis Chief Executive Hamid Moghadam said at a supply-chain forum hosted by the company on Wednesday. “If I were going to bet on a date, I would say middle of 2023, end of 2023.” Many economists and logistics industry executives have said they expect widespread shipping bottlenecks and shortages of manufacturing parts and finished goods to continue through the end of the year, with relief likely to come only after the first quarter of 2022 as supply-side output catches up to demand. Mr. Moghadam said he expects strong retail demand and shifts in consumer behavior, including the accelerated growth of e-commerce during the Covid-19 pandemic, will continue, however, and that strains in supply chains will last longer as a result. “Everyone’s currently talking about the supply chain disruption as it relates to the holiday shopping season,” he said in an emailed statement. “But the inventory shortage will continue for longer than people are expecting.” “The systemic issues that are driving today’s supply chain headaches will not be fixed quickly,” Mr. Moghadam said. “It’s going to take several years for supply chains to catch up with the changes in shopping patterns brought about by the pandemic.”

#### Biden can’t solve it

Yergin 10-22-2021, author of “The New Map: Energy, Climate, and the Clash of Nations,” is vice chairman of IHS Markit, where Peter Tirschwell is vice president of Maritime and Trade. (Daniel, “Why the supply chain crunch will continue into 2022,” Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/10/22/why-supply-chain-crunch-will-continue-into-2022/>)

On Oct. 13, President Biden assumed the unofficial title of supply-chain manager in chief. He proposed a “90-day sprint” to try to untangle the gigantic snags in global trade that, as of Thursday, had forced 79 container ships to anchor off the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, an all time record. With no berths available, they were unable to unload cargo with a combined value of almost $8 billion, according to industry sources and our organization’s proprietary data. Biden’s fixes are limited. The Great Supply Chain Disruption has been more than a year in the making (last October the first three container ships idled off the Los Angeles-Long Beach port complex), and the supply chain mess will almost certainly continue deep into 2022. The president’s alarm is justified. Supply chain woes are snarling the U.S. economy and stoking inflation. Factories are temporarily shutting down, manufacturers delaying deliveries, agricultural exporters losing overseas markets, retailers struggling with empty shelves and consumers worrying whether orders will arrive by Christmas. The Biden administration brokered a deal to have the Los Angeles-Long Beach port complex — the nation’s largest — operate around the clock, rather than its usual 16-hour days, and obtained agreements from some major importers to pick up containers in the middle of the night. That’s a move in the right direction, but it’s a small step: The initial agreement with shippers covers less than 5 percent of the containers moving through the complex. The causes of this maelstrom are deeper-seated than any 90-day cure can address. During the pandemic, locked-down consumers, unable to go to stores, switched to e-commerce. Four to six years of anticipated e-commerce growth has been compressed into one year. All those personal computers, toys, power tools and Pelotons are typically shipped via container, mainly from Asia. Shipments into the United States surged.

### 1NR---AT: IL Indicts---No Renewables/Other Countries

#### Investors are pouring trillions into renewables now---solves emissions sufficiently BUT requires containing rates

Patterson 21, reporters @ the WSJ; citing James Chapman, chief financial officer at Dominion Energy Inc. (5-22-2021, Scott and Amrith Ramkumar, "Green Finance Goes Mainstream, Lining Up Trillions Behind Global Energy Transition", *WSJ*, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/green-finance-goes-mainstream-lining-up-trillions-behind-global-energy-transition-11621656039>)

Some of the world’s biggest companies and deepest-pocketed investors are lining up trillions of dollars to finance a shift away from fossil fuels. Assets in investment funds focused partly on the environment reached almost $2 trillion globally in the first quarter, more than tripling in three years. Investors are putting $3 billion a day into these funds. More than $5 billion worth of bonds and loans designed to fund green initiatives are now issued every day. The two biggest U.S. banks pledged $4 trillion in climate-oriented financing over the next decade. “We’ve reached the tipping point and beyond,” said James Chapman, chief financial officer at Dominion Energy Inc., D -0.05% one of the country’s biggest utilities. Dominion, which has begun issuing green bonds, is planning to spend $26 billion or more on clean energy such as wind and solar in the next five years. After years of intermittent excitement followed by fizzled expectations, green finance is now looking less like the niche interest of socially conscious investors and more like a sustainable gold rush. Driven by surging valuations for electric-vehicle companies such as Tesla Inc. TSLA 1.32% and startup battery producers, banks and investors are betting the transition from fossil fuels is here to stay, and that they can make money by getting behind it, further entrenching the shift. Behind the geyser of capital is a confluence of forces. Big money managers see opportunities for substantial profits, and they also worry about financial risks associated with climate change. Many of their clients—giant pension funds and fast-trading young investors alike—want to put their wallets behind projects that aim to curb environmental damage. And many governments around the world are boosting spending on environmental issues and instituting new regulations on the carbon emissions that contribute to climate change. The Biden administration has proposed spending billions of dollars to address climate change. Such moves provide momentum to the investment wagers of the private sector, accelerating the shift. Even if investors and governments suffer losses, the inflow of cash could produce innovations in areas like batteries that are needed to significantly reduce carbon emissions. “Wall Street will throw money at this problem,” said David Brown, principal analyst in the energy-transition practice at consulting and research firm Wood Mackenzie. “Some will lose and some will gain, and the net benefit is you will have new industries that will emerge.” As recently as 2014, the world’s energy companies spent $735 billion on oil-and-gas extraction. The figure was less than half that last year, while spending on wind and solar projects rose to nearly $220 billion, up from about $135 billion six years earlier, according to Rystad Energy, a consulting firm. Some analysts predict spending on renewable energy will exceed oil and gas in the next several years. Spending Spree Energy companies are spending more on renewable projects and less on oil and gas, but analysts say much more is needed to hit global climate goals. **[CHART OMITTED]** To be sure, few banks or businesses have been willing to give up profitable business lines in the name of climate change. Investors and banks still finance industries that produce lots of carbon, though they often charge more to do it. And some of the climate-friendly initiatives launched by businesses and investment firms appear designed to do little more than burnish their reputations—a phenomenon called “greenwashing.” Some energy companies, for example, tout efforts to reduce carbon even while producing large amounts of oil and gas and seeking new fossil-fuel sources. Some green-energy advocates, for their part, say the pace of investments still needs to accelerate substantially and target potential supply-chain bottlenecks such as raw materials used in rechargeable batteries. The International Energy Agency said recently that global investment in energy projects needs to more than double from its current level to $5 trillion a year by 2030 to meet net-zero emission goals by midcentury. A large portion of the spending needs to be for renewables and other green projects, it said. Wood Mackenzie has estimated that at least $50 trillion in investment will be needed to reduce fossil-fuel and other greenhouse-gas emissions by 2050 to meet the goals of the Paris climate accord. The figure is based on the agreement’s targets of the world getting to net-zero emissions in the next 30 years, and limiting the rise in average global temperatures to 1.5 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels. Wood Mackenzie’s models estimated the amount of wind, solar, battery storage and other projects necessary to meet the temperature goal. Roughly half of that money, the firm said, needs to go to areas such as wind and solar power and battery storage. Another $18 trillion is needed to modernize the electric grid, in part to transition to cleaner energies such as solar and wind. The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimates that without these investments, costs from weather-related catastrophes and sea-level increases associated with climate change will reach tens of trillions of dollars in the decades ahead. Total investment in renewable-energy projects, electric vehicles and other green efforts exceeded $520 billion last year, a record, according to Bloomberg New Energy Finance, which tracks green investments. Spending was up 12% from a year earlier and nearly 60% from 2015, Bloomberg data show. “This is what’s really going to drive the momentum for the green shift to happen,” said Ajay Kochhar, the chief executive of Li-Cycle, which recycles battery materials and has agreements to work with several battery and auto makers. “It enables scale, which brings down costs, which then enables more proliferation. It’s a positive feedback effect that results.” Reaching a deal to secure about $600 million in new financing earlier this year has allowed the Toronto-based company to pursue plans to expand operations in Rochester, N.Y., and around the world. Financing costs for solar and onshore wind projects during the 2015-20 time period were 20% and 15% lower, respectively, than in the 2010-14 period, according to an Oxford University study. Fossil-fuel projects, by contrast, have become riskier for investors. Credit-rating firms Moody’s Investors Service and Standard & Poor’s in recent months warned that industries that produce significant amounts of carbon could be hurt financially as governments, banks and money managers try to lower the carbon intensity of their investments. Some of the $26 billion that Dominion Energy plans to spend on alternative energy is going toward one of the nation’s few major offshore wind facilities, a project off the coast of Virginia Beach, Va. When the project is completed in 2026, it is expected to be the largest offshore wind farm in the U.S., with about 180 turbines, enough to power 660,000 homes. Dominion Energy employees must travel 27 miles offshore to visit the two wind turbines it operates off the coast of Virginia Beach. Virginia passed a clean energy act in 2020, mandating that Dominion be carbon free by 2045. The company, with its steady stream of income from electricity customers, says it was able to finance the project relatively cheaply. Even in coal-rich West Virginia, a $200 million wind farm is under development. When construction began earlier this year, the governor, coal magnate Jim Justice, said, “This innovation, this diversification for West Virginia, is amazing.” Investment firms are responding to demand from their clients. Since the start of 2019, a net $473 billion has flowed into stock mutual and exchange-traded funds with environmental goals as part of their mandates, while a net $103 billion has gone into all other stock funds, according to data from fund tracker Morningstar Inc. compiled by Goldman Sachs Group Inc. Investment firms started 579 new funds with environmental goals last year, the data show. More than 70% of funds that invest based on environmental, social and corporate-governance practices across all asset classes beat the returns of funds that don’t have those objectives in the first four months of the year, according to Morningstar. Electric-car companies and renewable-energy producers have been some of the market’s best performing investments in recent years, although they have fallen off in recent weeks. Some investors say green-energy companies could struggle if interest rates rise and make early-stage investments less attractive.

#### Low rates power a renewable transition and push out fossil fuels

Hall 20, journalist @ PV Magazine. Citing Tim Buckley, Director of Energy Finance Studies, Australasia at Institute for Energy Economics & Financial Analysis (6-9-2020, "Historic-low interest rates will power ahead astonishing solar cost reductions", *PV Magazine International*, <https://www.pv-magazine.com/2020/06/09/historic-low-interest-rates-will-power-ahead-astonishing-solar-cost-reductions/>) \*PV = Photovoltaics, the conversion of light into electricity

U.S.-based energy transition thinktank the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (Ieefa) has taken a swipe at intergovernmental peer the International Energy Agency (IEA) over the latter’s prediction the Covid-19 crisis will slow the dramatic cost reductions achieved by the solar industry. Positing the argument that the final cost of solar energy depends on solar resource, the capital cost of generation facilities and the rate of return on finance, Ieefa’s Tim Buckley pointed out PV projects have continued to be deployed at scale during the global health crisis as finance interest rates have plunged to historic lows because central banks are attempting to propel all types of economic investment during the current shock. Buckley, Ieefa’s director of energy finance research for Australasia, pointed to the U.S. Treasury’s ten-year bond interest rate as an example, with bonds with a 2.7% interest rate at the start of last year now offering a 0.7% cost which can be fixed in for the longer term. The Covid-19 crisis is far from slowing the cost reductions driven by continual advances in solar technology, stated Buckley, in his Renewables continue to break records despite Covid-19 impacts report. The Ieefa author cited the award in April of the 1.5 GW Al Dhafra solar project in Abu Dhabi by the Emirates Water and Electricity Company to French power company EDF and Chinese developer JinkoPower. That project will sell solar electricity for AED0.0497/kWh ($0.0135330). Buckley’s report sets Ieefa in opposition to the IEA, which has been routinely criticized for under-estimating the rate of solar deployment in its forecasts. Ieefa, Buckley wrote in the report which was published yesterday, “expects the International Energy Agency (IEA) to continue to be surprised every year over the coming decade at the speed of ongoing technology-driven [cost] deflation and hence the rate of uptake of renewable energy, electric vehicles and battery storage, as it has been for the past decade, every year without fail.” Rather, the thinktank predicted the cost of generating electricity from solar would be near zero in high-resource locations such as Arizona, Spain, Rajasthan and North Queensland by 2030-40, Buckley added. Such a development will in turn accelerate the rush to even out intermittent supply by improving storage solutions including pumped hydro; lithium-ion batteries; Power-to-X with hydrogen, aluminum or ammonia; and other solutions including demand-response, grid interconnectors and gas-fired, grid-back-up peaking plants. Buckley also addressed the continual busting of the myth that electricity grids would reach breaking point past certain levels of renewables penetration. The author pointed out the black-outs predicted by some political parties in Australia as the nation moved to a 26.1% clean energy grid in April failed to materialize. “Despite the policy chaos created by the federal government of Australia, investment pressure for [the] energy transition is building,” wrote Buckley. The author added, 56.5% of the electricity consumed in Germany to the end of last month came from intermittent renewables, with a figure of 58% for the state of South Australia.

### 1NR---AT: Hausfather

#### Concedes that climate action is urgent---just dislikes the rhetoric of “5 degrees as business as usual” (KU YELLOW)

Zeke Hausfather & Glen P. Peters 20. \*Director of climate and energy at the Breakthrough Institute in Oakland, California. \*\*Research director at the CICERO Center for International Climate Research in Oslo, Norway. "Emissions – the ‘business as usual’ story is misleading". Nature. 1-29-2020. https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-00177-3

In the lead-up to the 2014 IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), researchers developed four scenarios for what might happen to greenhouse-gas emissions and climate warming by 2100. They gave these scenarios a catchy title: Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs)1. One describes a world in which global warming is kept well below 2 °C relative to pre-industrial temperatures (as nations later pledged to do under the Paris climate agreement in 2015); it is called RCP2.6. Another paints a dystopian future that is fossil-fuel intensive and excludes any climate mitigation policies, leading to nearly 5 °C of warming by the end of the century2,3. That one is named RCP8.5.

RCP8.5 was intended to explore an unlikely high-risk future2. But it has been widely used by some experts, policymakers and the media as something else entirely: as a likely ‘business as usual’ outcome. A sizeable portion of the literature on climate impacts refers to RCP8.5 as business as usual, implying that it is probable in the absence of stringent climate mitigation. The media then often amplifies this message, sometimes without communicating the nuances. This results in further confusion regarding probable emissions outcomes, because many climate researchers are not familiar with the details of these scenarios in the energy-modelling literature.

This is particularly problematic when the worst-case scenario is contrasted with the most optimistic one, especially in high-profile scholarly work. This includes studies by the IPCC, such as AR5 and last year’s special report on the impact of climate change on the ocean and cryosphere4. The focus becomes the extremes, rather than the multitude of more likely pathways in between.

Happily — and that’s a word we climatologists rarely get to use — the world imagined in RCP8.5 is one that, in our view, becomes increasingly implausible with every passing year5. Emission pathways to get to RCP8.5 generally require an unprecedented fivefold increase in coal use by the end of the century, an amount larger than some estimates of recoverable coal reserves6. It is thought that global coal use peaked in 2013, and although increases are still possible, many energy forecasts expect it to flatline over the next few decades7. Furthermore, the falling cost of clean energy sources is a trend that is unlikely to reverse, even in the absence of new climate policies7.

Assessment of current policies suggests that the world is on course for around 3 °C of warming above pre-industrial levels by the end of the century — still a catastrophic outcome, but a long way from 5 °C7,8. We cannot settle for 3 °C; nor should we dismiss progress.

Plan for progress

Some researchers argue that RCP8.5 could be more likely than was originally proposed. This is because some important feedback effects — such as the release of greenhouse gases from thawing permafrost9,10 — might be much larger than has been estimated by current climate models. These researchers point out that current emissions are in line with such a worst-case scenario11. Yet, in our view, reports of emissions over the past decade suggest that they are actually closer to those in the median scenarios7. We contend that these critics are looking at the extremes and assuming that all the dice are loaded with the worst outcomes.

Asking ‘what’s the worst that could happen?’ is a helpful exercise. It flags potential risks that emerge only at the extremes. RCP8.5 was a useful way to benchmark climate models over an extended period of time, by keeping future scenarios consistent. Perhaps it is for these reasons that the climate-modelling community suggested RCP8.5 “should be considered the highest priority”12.

We must all — from physical scientists and climate-impact modellers to communicators and policymakers — stop presenting the worst-case scenario as the most likely one. Overstating the likelihood of extreme climate impacts can make mitigation seem harder than it actually is. This could lead to defeatism, because the problem is perceived as being out of control and unsolvable. Pressingly, it might result in poor planning, whereas a more realistic range of baseline scenarios will strengthen the assessment of climate risk.

[Their card ends]

This admission does not make climate action less urgent. The need to limit warming to 1.5 °C, as made clear in the IPCC’s 2018 special report13, does not depend on having a 5 °C counterpoint.

**It’s a threat multiplier, and their authors have incentive to downplay the risk**

**Spratt 19**, \*David, Research Director for Breakthrough National Centre for Climate Restoration, Melbourne; \*\*Ian T. Dunlop, member of the Club of Rome. Formerly an international oil, gas and coal industry executive, chairman of the Australian Coal Association, chief executive of the Australian Institute of Company Directors, and chair of the Australian Greenhouse Office Experts Group on Emissions Trading 1998-2000 (May 2019, “Existential climate-related security risk: A scenario approach”, *Breakthrough – National Centre for Climate Restoration*, pg. 4-6)

Climate change intersects with pre-existing **national security risks** to function as a **threat multiplier** and **accelerant to instability**, contributing to **escalating cycles** of humanitarian and **socio-political crises**, **conflict** and **forced migration.** Climate-change impacts on **food and water** **systems**, **declining** crop **yields** and rising food prices driven by **drought, wildfire** and **harvest failures** have **already become catalysts** for **social breakdown** and **conflict** across the **Middle East**, the **Maghreb** and the **Sahel**, contributing to the **European migration crisis**. Understanding and foreseeing such events depends crucially on an appreciation of the real strengths and limitations of climate-science projections, and the application of risk-management frameworks which differ fundamentally from conventional practice. SCIENTIFIC RETICENCE Climate scientists may err on the side of “**least drama**”, whose causes may include adherence to the scientific norms of restraint, objectivity and skepticism, and may **underpredict** or **down-play future climate changes**. In 2007, security analysts warned that, in the two previous decades, scientific predictions in the climate-change arena had **consistently under-estimated** the severity of what **actually transpired**. 3 This problem **persists**, notably in the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (**IPCC**), whose Assessment Reports exhibit a one-sided reliance on general climate models, which incorporate important climate processes, but **do not include** all of the processes that can contribute to **system feedbacks, compound extreme events**, and **abrupt** and/or **irreversible changes**. 4 Other forms of knowledge are downplayed, including paleoclimatology, expert advice, and semi-empirical models. IPCC reports present detailed, quantified, complex modelling results, but then briefly note more severe, non- linear, system-change possibilities in a descriptive, non-quantified form. Because policymakers and the media are often drawn to headline numbers, this approach results in less attention being given to the most devastating, difficult-to-quantify outcomes. In one example, the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report in 2014 projected a sea-level rise of 0.55-0.82 metre by 2100, but said “levels above the likely range cannot be reliably evaluated”. By way of comparison, the higher of two US Department of Defence scenarios is a two-metre rise by 2100, and the “extreme” scenario developed by a number of US government agencies is 2.5 metres by 2100. 5 Another example is the recent IPCC 1.5°C report, which projected that warming would continue at the current rate of 0.2°C per decade and reach the 1.5°C mark **around 2040**. However the 1.5°C boundary is likely to be passed in **half that time**, around **2030**, and the 2°C boundary around 2045, due to **accelerating anthropogenic emissions**, **decreased** **aerosol loading** and changing **ocean circulation conditions**.6 EXISTENTIAL RISK An existential risk to civilisation is one posing permanent large negative consequences to humanity which may never be undone, either annihilating intelligent life or permanently and drastically curtailing its potential. With the commitments by nations to the 2015 Paris Agreement, the current path of warming is 3°C or more by 2100. But this figure does not include “**long-term**” **carbon-cycle feedbacks**, which are materially relevant now and in the near future due to the unprecedented rate at which human activity is perturbing the climate system. Taking these into account, the **Paris path** would lead to around **5°C of warming** by 2100. 7 Scientists warn that warming of 4°C is **incompatible with an organised global community**, is **devastating** to the **majority of ecosystems**, and has a high probability of not being stable. The World Bank says it may be “**beyond adaptation**”. But an **existential threat** may also exist for many peoples and regions at a significantly **lower level of warming**. In 2017, 3°C of warming was categorised as “catastrophic” with a warning that, on a path of unchecked emissions, low-probability, high-impact warming could be catastrophic by 2050. 9 The Emeritus Director of the Potsdam Institute, Prof. Hans Joachim Schellnhuber, warns that “climate change is now **reaching the end-game**, where very soon humanity must choose between taking unprecedented action, or accepting that it has been left too late and bear the consequences.” He says that if we continue down the present path “there is a **very big risk** that we will just **end our civilisation**. The human species will survive somehow but we will destroy almost everything we have built up over the last two thousand years.” 11 Unfortunately, **conventional risk** and probability **analysis** becomes **useless in these circumstances** because it excludes the full implications of outlier events and possibilities lurking at the fringes.12 Prudent risk-management means a tough, objective look at the real risks to which we are exposed, especially at those “fat-tail” events, which may have consequences that are damaging beyond quantification, and threaten the survival of human civilisation. Global warming projections display a “fat-tailed” distribution with a greater likelihood of warming that is well in excess of the average amount of warming predicted by climate models, and are of a higher probability than would be expected under typical statistical assumptions. More importantly, the risk lies disproportionately in the “fat-tail” outcomes, as illustrated in Figure 1. This is a particular concern with potential **climate tipping-points**—passing critical thresholds which result in step changes in the climate system that will be irreversible on human timescales—such as the **polar ice sheets** (and hence **sea levels**), **permafrost** and other **carbon stores**, where the impacts of global warming are **non-linear** and **difficult to model** with current scientific knowledge. Recently, attention has been given to a “**hothouse Earth**” **scenario**, in which system feedbacks and their mutual interaction could drive the Earth System climate to a point of **no return,** whereby further warming would become **self-sustaining**. This “**hothouse Earth**” planetary threshold could exist at a temperature rise as low as **2°C**, possibly **even lower**.13

### 1NR---AT: Case Turns DA

#### Growth strong now. Predictive.

Winck 10-26-2021 (Ben, “3 signs the US economy roared in October and started to leave the Delta wave behind,” *Business Insider*, <https://www.businessinsider.com/economy-boomed-october-supply-chain-recovery-hiring-spending-ubs-forecast-2021-10>)

Several signs suggest the US recovery is accelerating again as the Delta wave fades, UBS economists said.

Americans' spending is rebounding, factories are solving backlogs, and businesses are hiring faster. The recovery through October is "far outpacing" the progress seen in September, UBS said. Temperatures are dropping across the US, but in one crucial way, it's feeling a lot more like summer. The US economy is booming once more after the Delta wave slowed the recovery through August and September. The comeback through October is "far outpacing" the progress seen the month before, UBS economists said in a Monday note. The degree of the rebound is also extraordinary. Such month-over-month improvements have only happened about 20% of the time historically, the team led by Ajit Agrawal said. The pickup comes from gains across the board. The Delta wave continued to fade, and daily case counts are now the lowest they've been since late July. The plunge in virus cases led to Americans spending more, with UBS forecasting that sales "picked up substantially" in October. Filings for unemployment benefits have steadily declined through the month. And while the country remains mired in a supply-chain mess, companies are working around the clock to solve massive backlogs. The signs all point to a stronger recovery heading into the end of the year. Here are the three trends revealing just how much the recovery picked up in October, according to UBS.

1. Spending is rebounding everywhere

Among the most encouraging signs is a healthy bounce in spending. Personal consumption expenditures — a popular measure of Americans' spending — likely improved "substantially" in October, UBS said. With consumer spending accounting for 70% of US economic activity, a pickup would broadly aid the recovery. Credit-card data suggests strong growth in sales of goods, particularly in the electronics, merchandise, and home renovation sectors. The bank expects retail sales to climb 0.2% in October. That would place sales just above record highs and mark a third straight monthly gain. The stronger spending isn't just on goods. Service spending, which is more affected by the virus, likely grew in September and probably grew even faster through October, the team said. Spending rebounded most at arts and entertainment, healthcare, and air travel businesses. While spending at restaurants and hotels was mixed, the bank still expects sales to shift further toward services as virus cases decline further.

2. Factories are sorting out their backlogs

Stronger spending is a good sign for the recovery. Yet Americans' massive spending has ran into global supply shortages in recent months. That mismatch helped keep inflation at decade-highs. October likely marked a turnaround for the problem, UBS said. Industrial production broadly bounced back in October after slowing the month prior, the team said. The largest improvements showed up in auto production, goods manufacturing, utilities, and gasoline production. Exports are also trending higher and could break from a months-long trend of flat output, the team added. The rosier outlook suggests the worst of the global supply-chain crisis could be behind the US. Port logjams, materials bottlenecks, and factory blackouts in China all slammed supply in the US through early fall. UBS's latest projections suggest the shortages will ease into the holiday season. The team isn't alone. Economists at Jefferies made a similar forecast earlier in October, saying in a note that "we may already be witnessing the worst" of the supply-chain mess.

3. The labor market is rebounding again

Job fair US hiring employers Employers manned booths with banners promoting their companies benefits, free logo branded swag and salary pay scales and in some cases recruitment bonuses in order to entice job applicants to approach their booths during the Lee County Area Job Fair in Tupelo, Miss., Tuesday, Oct. 12, 2021. Rogelio V. Solis/AP Photo The labor market remains far from healed, but October should mark a turning point for US hiring, UBS said. The pickups in consumer spending and industrial production should power much stronger job creation, according to the team. The bank estimates 631,000 payrolls were added in October, well above the consensus forecast of 390,000 added jobs. Such a reading would also mark a major improvement from the disappointing job creation seen over the last two months. The Delta wave limited August growth to 366,000 payrolls, more than halving the gain seen in July. September showed the recovery slipping further with an addition of just 194,000 jobs. The UBS forecast suggests the Delta wave's negative impact ended in October, and that the labor market's recovery will strengthen into 2022.